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This dissertation has made an attempt to interrogate the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces imbedded in African unity, which spans six decades and more. This study used 
the ideology of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance alongside the theories of 
regional integration to examine how the debates on the quest for African unity have 
evolved over a period of sixty years. The author divided the evolution of the quest for 
African unity into three phases: the first phase involves the early 1900s, which was 
marked by the formation of the Pan-African Congresses, however, this was to set a 
background history of Africa’s quest for unity. It further maintained that the 
transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the African diaspora to Africa represented the 
first phase, which came to an end when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was 
established in 1963 ushering in the second phase in the quest for African unity. The 
transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2002 marked the third phase 
in the quest for African unity.  
While the above classifications are not unique to the author’s views, however, these 
phases enabled the author to thoroughly examine the evolution of the debates and 
also to point out the convergent and divergent views found in the African unity debates. 
In the first phase, this study pointed out the reason that led to the fragmentation of 
newly independent African states into three rival camps while also examining the 
factors that exacerbated the tensions and  the factors that pulled them together for a 
common purpose. The author argued that it was unequivocal that the desire for African 
unity was found in all three rival camps, however, the missing link was how and when 
this unity should be attained. The differences culminated in a compromise between 
the Casablanca and Monrovia groups leading to the formation of the OAU, which 
transformed the debates from theoretical arguments to practical policy steps. The 
author reviews some of the problems and challenges that have been encountered by 
the OAU. In particular, focusing on its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of member states, coupled with the role of the Cold War in hindering Africans’ quest 
xii 
 
for unity. The author also examines the revival of these debates by the Libyan leader 










Introduction, aim and scope of study 
1. Introduction  
“We must unite now or perish,” warned Kwame Nkrumah at the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 (Nkrumah, 1963:16). Similar 
sentiments were echoed by Thabo Mbeki in commemoration of the 50th Anniversary 
of the OAU in the article entitled: “Africa must unite! An imperative of our time” (Mbeki, 
2013:18). Over and above these two views, Agenda 2063, encapsulates Africa’s 
aspirations for the future and calls for “a united Africa” predicated on “Pan-Africanism 
and African Renaissance” (Agenda 2063, 2015:1). The quest for African unity and the 
debate thereof is certainly not new; it has been there for over five decades (Adi and 
Sherwood, 2003: vii; Ackah, 1999:2). African unity, also known as Pan-African unity 
has been expressed and pursued differently over the years (Murithi, 2008:3). 
Furthermore, it has been studied, debated and propagated through the lenses of Pan-
Africanism and African Renaissance (Legum, 1962:55; Mbeki, 2013:18).  
Pan-Africanism as an ideology and a movement has evolved over the years and in its 
evolution, it has acquired new definitions, aims, objectives and discourses (Sherwood, 
2012:147). African unity is one of the discourses evolving with Pan-Africanism 
geographically, in theory or even in policymaking and implementation (Adogamhe, 
2008:12). This evolution of Pan-Africanism is deeply rooted in the fight against slavery, 
colonialism, imperialism, segregation and apartheid. Moreover, it is dedicated to the 
unity of Africans in the motherland and in the diaspora (Drake, 1959:7; Dung and 
Erhunmwunsee, 2016:81). It is unequivocal that old Pan-Africanism represented a 
struggle for self-determination and freedom as encapsulated in the words of freed 
slaves, “Free at last, Free at last, Thank God almighty we are free at last” (Bergad, 
2007:260).  With the dawn of decolonisation in Africa similar sentiments were heard in 
Ghana, Accra; however, Nkrumah reminded his compatriots that Ghana’s 
independence was incomplete without the total liberation of Africa (Young, 2010:148). 
On the other hand, new Pan-Africanism has been marked by African Renaissance in 
search of what Landsberg (2018:2) termed “revival of an Africa of hope and 
prosperity”. A common dominator between the old and the new Pan-Africanism has 




interrogate over six decades (1950s to 2020) of converging and diverging dynamics 
towards continental unification. 
 In line with the above argument, there is substantial literature on the debates on 
African unity. However, the bulk of literature on these debates tends to be segmented 
and scant attention has been paid to the explication of the concept of African unity. 
Hence, this dissertation builds on the existing literature to add to the debate on African 
unity. The unique angle to be taken by this dissertation is to engage convergent and 
divergent forces, or the centripetal and centrifugal factors, embedded in the debates 
on African unity over the years. Furthermore, the study will analyse the evolution of 
these debates within the purview of Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.    
1.1 Background to the research question 
25 May 2013 marked a golden jubilee since the formation of the OAU, which was later 
transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002. The commemoration of this milestone 
brought together Heads of State and Government from all AU member states and 
many other stakeholders to a commemoratory summit hosted at the AU headquarters 
in Addis Ababa. The summit was held under the theme “Pan Africanism and the 
African Renaissance” (African Union, 2015:11). In her opening remarks as 
Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma said, “many of the 
themes we are concerned with today also occupied the OAU founders in 1963” 
(Dlamini-Zuma, 2013). Dlamini-Zuma divided these concerns into five categories and 
in explaining the fifth category she echoed Nkrumah’s captivating words expressed at 
the formation of the OAU: 
“Never before has unity of action been more desirable and urgent; never before 
have nations faced such a challenging and splendid opportunity for concerted 
action” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2013).  
At the formation of the OAU, unity was a buzzword and this continued well into 2013 
with the proposal of Africa’s “blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the 
global powerhouse of the future, Agenda 2063”, which spells out Africa’s aspirations 
for the next 50 years (African Union, 2015:11). It came as no surprise that the quest 
for African unity featured greatly in “Africa’s strategic framework for socio-economic 
transformation of the continent over the next 50 years”. Furthermore, Dlamini-Zuma 




fought against slavery, colonialism and segregation. For Dlamini-Zuma, the formation 
of the OAU was an attestation to the declaration of independence of the first black 
Republic of Haiti. By drawing parallels between the formation of the OAU and the 
struggle against slavery and colonialism, Dlamini-Zuma was essentially saying that 
the commemoration of this golden jubilee must be understood within a broader history 
of African struggles against slavery, colonialism, apartheid and under-development. 
According to Dlamini-Zuma, Pan-Africanism “united and inspired peoples of Africa 
across the continent and globe”, never to accept oppression. Having said that, the 
conceptualisation and understanding of African unity has varied from generation to 
generation. With the dawn of independence in Africa in the late 1950s, these ideas of 
African unity became “a cardinal pillar” of Pan-Africanism (Legum, 1962:40). However, 
for over 50 years there has been a discourse on what this unity should look like and 
what constitutes that unity. 
September 2015 was a momentous period in African history, as this marked the 
adoption of Agenda 2063 by the AU member states in which they echoed the Pan-
African call that Africa must unite in order to realise its renaissance (African Union, 
2015:11). Moreover, showing re-dedication to the enduring Pan African vision of “an 
integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing 
a dynamic force in the international arena” (African Union, 2015:11). The AU Agenda 
2063 underscores the importance of unity in Africa for meaningful integration, free 
movement of Africans and increased trade. The word unity, or unite/united appears 
more than 17 times in Agenda 2063 making it one of the most used phrases/terms in 
the document. Unity or Pan-African unity has been a buzzword dating back to the early 
days of a decolonial project in Africa.  
As aforementioned, African unity has resurfaced on Africa’s Agenda 2063 as one of 
the central pillars that would usher Africa into the next 50 years as it aspires to 
becoming a powerhouse of the future (Ndizera and Muzee, 2018:143). With that being 
said, African unity has for many years been part of Africa’s programme of action. Its 
history is as old as the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism, apartheid and 
segregation. With this background set, the following section will focus on the research 





1.2 Research questions  
The primary question that this study will grapple with is:  
I. Given the overarching question to achieve the aims and objectives of this 
research, does the lack of agreement on what African unity is, what constitutes 
African unity, how and when Africa should unite; hinder African unity? 
The second, sub-question is: 
II. Given convergences and divergences in the African unity debate can we reach 
a point of agreement on African unity? If yes, where is that point? If no, why? 
1.3 Problem statement  
Despite being pursued, debated and studied for over three centuries (more organised 
from the 1990s) there has been no agreement on the definition of African unity, what 
constitutes African unity, and how and when Africa should unite. Hence, unity remains 
an ultimate goal after over three centuries since its pursuit began.  But there has 
always been tension and differences between various groupings and forces, such as 
the Monrovia and Casablanca groups in the 1950s, and the Gaddafi vs Mbeki debate 
in 2007. With that said, not much attention has been paid to understanding the 
contestation of ideas between the federated option, vs the unionisation – or the 
incremental idea. Where it has been done, the focus has not been much on the key 
convergences and divergences in the African unity debates. As such, this has often 
been dismissed as a mere contestation of ideas between the protagonists and 
antagonists on the pursuit of African unity.  
1.4 Research aims/ goals  
 
Given the vast amount of attention that the concept of African unity has attracted over 
the years, the debates generated and being increasingly regarded as a solution to 
Africa’s pre- and post-independent challenges; this  dissertation will examine the 
concept of African unity by looking at the opposing views that emerged during key 
moments. It will do so by tracing the evolution of the African unity debate in search of 
the convergences and divergences in the debates towards African unity. In this regard, 




I. To contribute to the already existing body of knowledge on the debates around 
African unity by looking at the proponents of “grand” vs “incremental” or “step-
by-step” approaches; and 
II. To consider the continuities and convergences and divergences in the evolution 
of the African unity debate since the late 1950s. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
In line with the above aims, the research objectives of this dissertation are to: 
I. Explicate the concept of African unity.   
II. Interrogate the convergences and divergences embedded in the debates on 
African unity as expressed by various African leaders (past and current), 
scholars, civil society groups, private sector, the peoples of Africa and its 
diaspora. 
1.6 Rationale/ significance of the research 
There is a void to be filled, and this study sets out to contribute to the ongoing debates 
and the efforts of attaining African unity by considering the tensions between the 
debates around African unification – the federated option, vs the unionisation – or 
incremental, approaches to African unity. The study seeks to penetrate the debate 
about African unity being a non-linear process and has pitted the two approaches 
against each other. 
These debates on African unity have been part of Africa’s struggle for political and 
economic emancipation dating back to the anti-slavery and anti-colonial movements. 
Julius Nyerere argued that “without unity, there is no future for Africa”. Undoubtedly, 
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere were stalwarts  of Pan-Africanism. Both Nkrumah 
and Nyerere ushered their nations into the new era of independence and coupled with 
that they both shared a common goal of a united Africa. However, they held different 
views on how Africa should go about seeking unity. Their conflicting views on African 
unity culminated in the 1960s grand debate, which was thawed by a compromise in 
the formation of the OAU in May 1963.   
Nyerere, reflecting on his encounter with Nkrumah on their different perspectives on 




W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey. The colonialists were against this and frightened 
of it”. Nyerere continued: 
Kwame and I met in 1963 and discussed African Unity. We differed on how to 
achieve a United States of Africa. But we both agreed on a United States of 
Africa as necessary. Kwame went to Lincoln University, a black college in the 
US. He perceived things from the perspective of US history, where 13 colonies 
that revolted against the British formed a union. That is what he thought the 
OAU should do. I tried to get East Africa to unite before independence. When 
we failed in this, I was wary about Kwame’s continental approach. We 
corresponded profusely on this. Kwame said my idea of ‘regionalisation’ was 
only balkanisation on a larger scale. Later African historians will have to study 
our correspondence on this issue of uniting Africa (Shijvi, 2009). 
In line with Nyerere’s call for future historians to study these debates, as a student of 
politics one is reminded by Shijvi that when it comes to the question of African unity 
the student of politics does not regard it as a historical question because of its fluid 
nature. With that said, this study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates and efforts 
of attaining African unity; this is what ignited the researcher’s interest in pursuing such 
a research.  
1. 7 Literature review  
A literature review is an important component of academic writing, more especially for 
a topic that has stimulated significant debates in African affairs from pre- to post- 
independence. “A literature review is the selection of available documents on the topic, 
which contain information, data, ideas, and evidence written from a particular 
standpoint to fulfill a certain aim or express certain views on the nature of the topic to 
be investigated, and the effective evaluation of these documents in relation to research 
being conducted” (Adler and Clark, 2011:49).  
“At the founding of the OAU 50 years ago, the leaders who attended the 25 May 1963 
meeting in Addis Ababa set themselves two major objectives: the liberation of Africa 
from colonial rule and apartheid, and the unification of independent Africa. 
Independent leaders dedicated to the liberation of the continent recognised that 
without strong political and economic union, Africa would have no chance of achieving 




Nkrumah encouraged his peers on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa to: 
Unite we must. Without necessarily sacrificing our sovereignties, big or small, 
we can here and now forge a political union based on defence, foreign affairs 
and diplomacy, and a common citizenship, an African currency, an African 
monetary zone and an African central bank (Nkrumah, 1963).  
Motivating why African must unite Nkrumah said: 
We must unite in order to achieve the full liberation of our continent. We need 
a common defence system with African high command to ensure the stability 
and security of Africa… We will be mocking the hopes of our people if we show 
the slightest hesitation or delay in tackling realistically this question of African 
unity (Nkrumah, 1963). 
 Kwame Nkrumah’s commitment to a united Africa made his name synonymous with 
African unity; however, Nkrumah is not the only protagonist of African unity (Kumah-
Abiwu and Ochwa-Echel, 2013:123). As aforementioned, the concept of African unity 
and debates thereof have attracted a vast amount of attention from scholars, 
politicians, civil society, and policymakers from national, regional, continental bodies 
and even beyond the African shores (Wapmuk, 2009:646). Consequently, a significant 
body of knowledge has been generated on the question of African unity.  
“While the total liberation of Africa was achieved with the inauguration of democratic 
South Africa in 1994, ‘this question of African unity’ has proved to be much more 
challenging (Wapmuk, 2009:655; Maluwa, 2004:196). As the AU marked the 50th 
anniversary of the OAU under the theme ‘Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance’, 
the need to tackle realistically this question of African unity remains much more urgent 
today than at the time it was raised half a century ago (Mbeki, 2013:13). What progress 
has Africa made towards its unity? What does African unity mean today? What are the 
most plausible approaches for achieving unity in the light of the multifaceted historical, 
developmental, governance and environmental challenges facing Africa today? What 
steps should be taken to achieve both political unity and economic integration?” 
As aforementioned, there is substantial literature on the debates on African unity. 
However, the aim of this section is to bring forth that literature and explain the 




literature. So, to begin with, the concept of African unity and its association with Pan-
Africanism will be discussed using existing literature. This will be followed by a critical 
evaluation of the evolution of Pan-Africanism and the debate on African unity. 
Furthermore, African Renaissance under the banner of new Pan-Africanism will be 
examined as a driving philosophy/theory of African unity in the 21st century.    
The concept of African unity and its association with Pan-Africanism  
On  27 May 2008, the then “head of Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme in 
the South African Institute of International Affairs”,  Tim Hughes briefed the Committee 
on the challenges to African unity. Hughes identified 10 challenges to African unity 
and the first and the most important of those 10 challenges is that the concept of 
African unity is understudied which then hinders African unity (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2008: internet). However, there is a substantial body of literature 
relating to the components and variables that constitute this concept. Pan-Africanism 
and African Renaissance are the bedrock of this concept (Adogamhe, 2008:2).  
For Mbeki (2013:17), African unity means synergising as Africans. According to 
Blyden, African unity means “the grand return of the peoples of Africa in the diaspora 
to Africa” (Billingsley, 1970:5). For Nkrumah and the African nationalist leaders, 
African unity meant the “immediate political and economic integration in the form of a 
United States of Africa consisting of an African Common Market, African Monetary 
Union, an African Military High-Command, and  continent-wide” (Martin, 2013:170). 
On the other hand, Adogamhe (2008:7), defines African unity as an interim plan 
propagated by Pan-Africanists in order to achieve the collective empowerment of the 
peoples of Africa.  
From the above argument, it is unequivocal that the concept of African unity has been 
widely linked with Pan-Africanism; hence, there is a need to engage the literature to 
determine the relationship between the two concepts: Pan-Africanism and African 
unity. The concept of Pan-Africanism has been the subject of many scholarly debates 
and interpretations over the years. However, central to these debates has been the 
ambiguity on the origin and definition of Pan-Africanism (Abegunrin, 2016:1; Dung, 
2016:82). The contestation on the origin and meaning of Pan-Africanism has led 
scholars such as Esedebe (1994) to argue that “when Pan-Africanism began and who 




of the shortfalls of Pan-Africanism is that it “means anything to anyone”. Ackah goes 
as far as to say that the obscurity embedded in Pan-Africanism makes it almost 
impossible to define Pan-Africanism. Abegunrin (2016:1) concurs with Ackah that 
there are many conflicting definitions and interpretations of Pan-Africanism. While on 
the other hand, the German historian Imanuel Geiss thinks that Pan-Africanism “is an 
irrational concept, a matter of vague emotions” (Cited in Abegunrin, 2016:2). 
In spite the fact that Pan-Africanism has been the subject of many scholarly debates 
and interpretations as far as its meaning and origin is concerned, there has been 
considerable agreements that Pan-Africanism developed as a movement or ideology 
that promotes African unity. For Williams (2005:173), Pan-Africanism is “a global 
movement to unite Africa and its people against racial oppression and exploitation 
associated with European hegemony”. From a continental (African) perspective, 
M’bayo (2004) and Okhonmina (2009) argue that Pan-Africanism involves efforts to 
mobilise continental Africans against colonialism and racism as well as recognising 
the concept as the philosophical grounding for the unity of Africa through the AU. In 
fact, the theme (Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance) for the 50th anniversary 
celebration (25 May 2013) of the AU provides a good description of Pan Africanism 
and African unity.” 
What then can be deduced from the above arguments is that African unity has been 
one of the central pillars of Pan-Africanism rather than being an independent concept. 
Meaning, one cannot speak of Pan-Africanism without mentioning the aspiration of 
African unity, and vice versa. This is evident. However, there is a need to unpack the 
meaning of African unity  
The 2007 Accra Grand Debate on a Union Government for Africa produced a replica 
of the 1960s grand debate on African unity with three rival groups: the maximalism, 
gradualism and scepticism groups, seeking to define and influence African unity 
(Lecoutre, 2008:45). And this is how these three rival groups defined African unity: For 
maximalism the immediate formation of super-ministries in 12 key areas with an 
African government would inform African unity. The gradualists opted for a step-by-
step approach by harmonising policies and regional integration; while on the other 
hand, the skepticism rival defined African unity as a mixture of the two elements that 




African unity meant a United States of Africa but through a gradual approach 
(Lecoutre, 2008:51).  
The evolution of Pan-Africanism and the unity debate  
Murithi (2008:12) divided the evolution of Pan-Africanism into three phases. This 
evolution in Pan-Africanism brought out different discourses both in theory and 
practice. The first phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism was the formation of the 
Pan-African Congresses hosted from 1900 to 1945 with six Congresses hosted in the 
African diaspora. Contrary to Murithi’s assertion that the 1900 one was the first Pan-
African Congress, Adegunrin (2008:17), argues that the first Pan-African Congress to 
be hosted was in 1893 under the banner of the Chicago Congress on Africa. In 
attendance was one of the advocates of the return to Africa movement, Bishop Henry 
Turner. At this conference Bishop Henry Turner presented a paper titled: “What do 
American Negros owe to their kind beyond the sea”. In this paper, Bishop Henry Turner 
called for the return to Africa in order to foster African unity. On the other hand, 
Billingsley (1970:4), reinforces the point that  uniting the peoples of Africa in the 
diaspora with Africa through Pan-Africanism was one of the core visions of Pan-
Africanism in the diaspora from its early years under the campaign “back to Africa” 
spearheaded by Edward Blyden who took the baton from Daniel Coker in the spirit of 
uniting Africans. According to Legum (1962:26), Marcus Garvey became the leading 
proponent of “back to Africa” after World War I with the sole purpose of fostering 
African unity and Du Bois became his opponent on what Africa unity was and other 
ways of fostering African unity. According to Adegunrin (2008:19), the discussion at 
the Chicago Congress on Africa in 1893 was to encourage the feeling of unity and this 
theme of African unity would dominate the subsequent Pan-African Congresses even 
beyond 1945. What is significant about 1945 as far as Pan-Africanism is concerned is 
that Pan-Africanism was then transplanted to Africa as a rallying ideology calling for 
the decolonisation of Africa (Ackah, 1999:12). Important to note is that there was also 
a debate on whether going back to Africa was the most effective strategy of uniting the 
Africans and on who should return to Africa (Billingsley, 1970:5). For some, African 
unity meant uniting ideas; not physically.  
Cervenka (1977:1) argued that with the dawn of independence in the 1960s the call 




was unity and integration of Africans through the removal of colonial imposed borders. 
What is essential about Cervenka’s argument is that it shows the paradigm shift in the 
concept of African unity, from the call to unite the African diaspora with Africa to 
Africans uniting in the ‘motherland’. However, this call sparked a debate and division 
among newly independent countries on how and when Africa should unite (Legum, 
1962:56).  
The second phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism saw the geographical shift of 
Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa (Murithi, 2008:12).  This transplantation of 
Pan-Africanism from the diaspora sparked a debate on African unity which divided the 
newly independent African countries into three rival camps: the Casablanca, Monrovia 
and Brazzaville camps (Legum, 1962:50). These rival camps engaged in what became 
known as the Grand Debate on African unity with the Casablanca group led by 
Nkrumah who argued for “an immediate continental integration”. On the other hand, 
the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups opted for “a gradual approach which would start 
with economic regional blocs as building units towards continental integration” 
(Cervenka, 1977:1). This debate culminated in a compromised OAU, which not only 
failed to unite Africa but failed to bring economic freedom. However, it played a crucial 
role in the liberation of the continent and it also provided a platform wherein African 
leaders could express their views and exchange ideas on a whole range of issues 
affecting Africa and the globe (Cervenka, 1977:X).     
African Renaissance in the concept of African unity 
The third phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism deals with what Mathews (2018:17) 
noted as New Pan-Africanism which denotes the transition from the OAU to the AU in 
2002 led by what Gilbert Khadiagala dubbed as the “renaissance coalition”. For 
Landsberg (2016:1), African Renaissance represented “Pan-African agency led by 
Thabo Mbeki and his African Renaissance counterparts”. The transition was in search 
of African solutions to African problems, therefore among many other options which 
were regarded as African solutions to African problems was African unity.  
In 2007, African leaders converged in Accra, Ghana from 1 to 3 July  for the 9th 
Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG), to 
debate the possibility of forming the Union Government of Africa, a position that was 




endorsed the earlier views of the gradualists and conservatives of the early 1960s 
(Murithi, 2008:3). Landsberg (2007:6) argues that “the debate on the Union 
Government of Africa was a replica of the 1960 Grand Debate with different 
protagonists”. At the centre of this debate was Muammar Gaddafi and Thabo Mbeki 
with Gaddafi calling for immediate African unity under the banner of the United States 
of Africa and Mbeki calling for the step-by-step approach towards African unity 
(Lecoutre, 2008:48). 
The contribution that this dissertation will seek to make to the literature, is to deepen 
the knowledge on the concept of African unity. From the literature presented above 
there is a clear indication that there has been a desire for African unity and that desire 
has often been communicated and pursued differently. So, this dissertation seeks to 
fill the gap in this literature by: (a) explicating  the concept of African unity, (b) 
integrating the evolution of African unity into an already existing discourse on the 
evolution of Pan-Africanism, and (c) critically evaluating the convergences and 
divergences in the African unity debate. This would help solve three problems (1) 
ambiguity/discrepancies found in the concept of African unity, (2) find common 
denominators in the debates on African unity, and (3) detachment from one debate to 
another, meaning the African unity debate will then be understood as a series of 
connected debates which is undergoing evolution. 
1.8 Limitations and delimitations 
The Democratic Republic of Ghana might not have been Africa’s first country to gain 
independence, however, its independence in 1957 set Africa on a new trajectory. This 
is encapsulated in Nkrumah’s allegiance to the total liberation of Africa when he stated 
in his independence speech that “We (referring to Ghanaians) have won the battle and 
again rededicate ourselves … our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up 
with the total liberation of Africa” (Nkrumah, 1957). The total liberation of Africa 
required Nkrumah’s Ghana and other free independent African states to synergise, 
and it is within this period that the need for a united Africa became the talk of the 
continent. Having said that, the period under study covers approximately six decades 
between the early 1950s to date (2020), so the pertinent question at this juncture would 
be, what is so significant about this period? Before delving into the question at hand it 




as building blocks towards the debates on African unity. Moreover, from a theoretical 
and ideological point of view, Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance have played a 
vital role as frameworks for these debates and cannot be delinked from their historical 
bases that informed their inception. Therefore, the use of these ideologies/ frameworks 
in the study would require one to revisit their historical origins within the context of 
forging African unity, which would ultimately stretch beyond the stipulated scope of 
this study in time and geographical locus.  
To answer the questions raised above, it is noteworthy to state that the significance of 
the early 1950s in the debates on African unity has been chosen because of the 
beginning of the wave of independence in Africa. This wave of independence as 
aforementioned brought about the coining of phrases such as the United States of 
Africa. Moreover, the transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa 
happened during the early 1950s. 
A plethora of research on the question of African unity or the debates thereof has 
turned to focus solely on the role of states, heads of states or politicians, and 
continental organisations.  This has perpetuated misconceptions that the quest for 
African unity has been driven by states and politicians. This study will clarify this 
misconception by adding other voices in the debates ranging from academics, civil 
society and the private sector to mention but a few. Why  it is so important to debunk 
the myth that these debates were taking place in political circles, is because this gives 
a narrow view of these debates.  
The Pan-African ideology and movement has contributed tremendously to the debates 
on African unity, and this is evident in that these debates are often regarded as Pan-
African unity debates (Abegunrin, 2016b:43). With that being said, it is important to 
note that Pan-Africanism emerged in the diaspora in pursuit of strengthening bonds of 
solidarity between all indigenous and diasporan ethnic groups of African descent, a 
shift in geographical location of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to the motherland 
became what Sherwood (2017:63) dubbed as “the gift of the new world to the old 
world”. This Pan-African gift was prepared and packaged in the new old, and 
bequeathed to Africans in the motherland to pursue the project of decolonisation, unity 
and solidarity.  Therefore, in order to have a clear picture of the nature of this gift to 




and debates on what the diaspora deemed as African unity before and after the 
transplantation of Pan-Africanism to Africa. This will then ultimately require the scope 
of this study to be broadened to the early days of Pan-Africanism (although there is no 
consensus on the origins of Pan-Africanism), in order to set a clear historical 
background on the debates on African unity.   
1.9 Research methodology 
This research will utilise a qualitative, interpretive research approach, and will provide 
description, understanding and contextual analysis as it seeks to contribute to the 
development of conceptual definitions and analyses empirical primary and secondary 
data concerning African unity. According to Babbie and Mouton (2015:271), “the 
primary goal of using a qualitative approach is to describe and understand human 
behavior”. This study will describe and seek to understand, but will also analyse, 
interpret and critique literature as it seeks to build comprehensive bodies of data and 
knowledge around Pan-African discourse. This will thus be a desktop-based research 
exercise, predicated on primary and secondary research documentation which 
includes: journal articles, books, commentaries and monographs from the OAU and 
AU, its officials and government representatives. 
The primary and secondary documents that will be accessed will be from the OAU, 
the AU, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as statements, 
speeches, declarations and presentations and speeches by African heads of states, 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other ministers and leaders and representatives of 
civil society groups.  
1.10 Organisation of the research  
In line with the aims and objectives of this dissertation, the final submission will be 
organised into six chapters. Chapters three, four and five will use Murithi’s 
classification of the three phases in the evolution of Pan-Africanism. This classification 
will guide this study in terms of the chronology of events.  
Chapter one: Introduction to the study 
This chapter consists of the introduction, aims and objectives, rationale of the research 
and the methodology employed in the research. This chapter lays the foundation of 




Chapter two Conceptual and theoretical framework  
This chapter will provide the conceptual and the theoretical framework underpinning 
this research. To begin with, this chapter will conceptualise the term African unity. In 
doing so, this chapter will also discuss the origins of this concept as well as its 
evolution. This chapter will move on to examine the role of a theoretical framework; 
however, before delving into that, this chapter will explore the concept of theory in 
Politics and International Relations (IR), which will pave a way for understanding the 
role of a theoretical framework. Having established the role of a theoretical framework 
and the concept of a theory, this chapter will proceed to analyse Pan-Africanism, 
African Renaissance and regional integration theories as theoretical underpinnings of 
the debates on African unity. 
Chapter three: Centripetal and centrifugal forces during the first phase of 
African unity 
The quest for African unity and the theory of Pan-Africanism are inextricably 
intertwined; hence, an understanding of the debates on African unity would require an 
analysis through Pan-African lenses. Having said that, this chapter seeks to 
interrogate the question of African unity in the first phase of Pan-Africanism. The first 
phase of Pan-Africanism began during the First Pan-African Congress (1900) and 
continued to the end of World War II (1945). This will be undertaken by examining the 
history of Pan-Africanism focusing on how Pan-Africanism has evolved over time, 
providing key dates, key players, and its significance.  This will be punctuated with 
“back to Africa” debates, the quest for African unity in Pan-African Congresses and 
the transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa in search of 
decoloniality and unity.  
This chapter is aimed at conceptualising the Grand Debate of the 1960s on African 
unity. This chapter will describe the situation of unity and integration on the continent 
(in different regions of Africa) during colonialism and towards the wave of 
independence in Africa.  This will then be followed by an extensive deliberation on the 
Grand Debate on continental integration as expressed by the three rival camps that 
emerged with opposing views about how these goals could best be achieved. 
Furthermore, the attempts and progress of regional integration schemes will be 




Chapter four: Converging and diverging views during the second phase of 
African unity 
In this chapter, the focus will be on the OAU as the first institution/organisation for 
continental unification and its role towards fostering a united Africa. To begin with, this 
chapter will discuss the formation of the OAU and its founding objectives. This will then 
be followed by a scrutiny of the OAU’s guiding principles, in particular the policy of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, as a challenge to continental 
unification. This chapter will also focus on the OAU and the quest for economic 
emancipation and will interrogate the relations between the OAU and economic 
regional communities as stepping stones towards continental unification.   
Chapter five: Pull and push forces during the third phase of African unity 
Chapter five of this study will interrogate new Pan-Africanism which was brought about 
by what Gilbert Khadiagala dubbed “the African Renaissance coalition”. To begin with, 
this chapter will discuss the African Renaissance as Pan-African agency within the 
context of African unity. This will then be followed by a discussion on the origins and 
aims of the AU in relation to African unity.  The New Partnership for African 
Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism will be examined as building 
blocks towards continental integration. This chapter will engage with aspects of the 
‘Grand Debate on the Union Government’ and analyse the prospects for a Union 
Government of Africa as suggested in the Accra Declaration. This chapter will be 
concluded by examining Africa’s Agenda 2063: The Future We Want for Africa, 
adopted at the 50th anniversary of the OAU in 2013, in relation to African unity.  
Chapter six: Conclusion and recommendations  
This concluding chapter will set out the key findings from the research. This summary 
will essentially constitute a concise synthesis of the research findings. This section will 
also outline identified research gaps and consequently provide recommendations for 








Conceptual and theoretical framework  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to achieve two purposes. First, to provide a conceptual framework, 
which will form a structure that can best explain the natural progression of the 
phenomenon to be studied. Second, to provide a theoretical framework from which the 
study is undertaken. In order to achieve these aims, this chapter will explicate the 
concept of African unity and its evolution, in an endeavour to advance a unified 
definition of African unity. Concerning a theoretical framework, this chapter will discuss 
several theories, which will form a theoretical base for this dissertation.  
The concept of African unity is not a new concept, and it is also a concept that has 
been marred by contestations, especially relating to its meaning and significance. 
Babbie and Mouton (2015:111), have defined a concept as simply a construct, so 
African unity can be regarded as a construct formed by conceptions of different people 
who have engaged the term. Insofar as conceptualisation is concerned, it can be 
defined as a process through which one specifies what one means when using a 
particular term(s). As noted by Babbie and Mouton (2015:111), “one cannot 
meaningfully study the question, let alone agree on the answer, “without some working 
agreements about the meaning of the term being studied”.”  
A conceptual framework has numerous benefits to a research. First, it helps the 
researcher to identify and construct their worldview on the phenomenon to be studied. 
Also, it is one of the most effective methods used by researchers to present their 
asserted remedies to the problem they have defined. Furthermore, it highlights the 
“reasons why a research topic is worth studying, states key assumptions of a 
researcher, and the literature they agree or disagree with” (Adom, Hussein and 
Agyem, 2018:7). Moreover, to provide a reference point for interpretation of findings. 
More importantly, is to conceptualise the study (Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2011:122).  
The theoretical framework is one of the most important aspects in the research 
process. According to Grant and Osanloo (2014:13), “without a theoretical framework, 
the structure and vision for a study is unclear”. Grant and Osanloo (2014:12) have 




of construction or working drawings that define all the construction specifications of a 
residential house such as dimensions, materials, layouts, installation methods and 
techniques”. A theoretical framework in a research serves as the guide on which to 
support and build the study. Over and above, it allows the researcher to outline or 
define the epistemological, philosophical, analytical and methodological approach to 
be adopted/used in a study.  
Scholars, policymakers and students have been generating a plethora of research on 
various topics, and much of these researches have witnessed an increase in the use 
of words such as theory, theoretical and theorise in both natural and social sciences 
(Abend, 2008:173). Although the use of these terms or concepts might differ from one 
discipline to another, it is unequivocal, that the concept of theory is one of the most 
essential concepts in the lexicon of modern scholarship. Hence, there is a need to 
understand a theory, its function, purpose, goals and aims in a study. This would not 
only strengthen the study but will also bring about practicality, as noted by James 
Maxwell’s “there is nothing more practical than a good theory” and Kurt Lewin’s “there 
is nothing so useful as a good theory”. Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance have 
not received enough attention from a theoretical perspective. Henceforth, this chapter 
will make an attempt in discussing Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance as 
theories, which will theoretically guide this study; however, these two theories will be 
supplemented by regional integration theory to form a theoretical framework 
underpinning this study.  
2.2 Conceptualising African unity 
Pan-Africanism is formed on different pillars with African unity forming one of the 
central pillars of Pan-Africanism. African unity, also known as Pan-African unity, plays 
an integral part in the Pan-African movement, and without unity the African continent 
will perish, according to Nkrumah who spearheaded the course for political and 
economic unity (Bankie, 2013:2). One of the protagonists of African unity, Julius 
Nyerere argued that “without unity, there is no future for Africa”. Ackah (1999:15) 
asserts that the calls for unity led to the formation of the OAU in 1963, which was later 
replaced by the AU in 2002. In his tribute on the 50th anniversary of the OAU in 2013, 
the former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki (2013:14) captured the words of 




Tanganyika, which merged with the People’s Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba to form 
the modern-day state of Tanzania: 
Politically we have inherited boundaries which are either unclear or such 
ethnologically and geographical nonsense that they are a fruitful source of 
disagreements…. the present boundaries must lose their significance and 
become merely a demarcation of administrative areas within a large unit (Cited 
in Chacha, 2003:3). 
As noted in the previous chapter, one of the foremost challenges associated with 
African unity is that it is a contested concept with varying meanings (Abegunrin, 
2016a:1). However, what makes the debates on African unity even more interesting 
and worth studying is that there is hardly ever a debate between those who are totally 
against African unity and those who are advocates of African unity. Paradoxically, the 
debates on African unity have always been between those who seek to achieve 
African unity. Suffice it to say, there is generally a consensus that Africa should unite, 
but the question of how and when is what “has brought contentions on the concept of 
African unity” (Mathews, 2018:16). This study will explicate the concept of African unity 
by examining different meanings and approaches to African unity. Part of what will be 
discussed in this section will further be elaborated on in the chapters to follow. 
Pan-Africanism as a theory, an ideology and movement has often been linked to 
several slogans and concepts/phrases such as “Africa for Africans”, “African solutions 
to African problems” and “African unity” to mention but a few (Abegunrin, 2016a:8). All 
these slogans and concepts stem from Pan-Africanism, which traces its modern 
history to the African diaspora (Mathews, 2018:10). Insofar as African unity is 
concerned it became popular after the transplantation of Pan-Africanism to Africa in 
the late 1950s. However, the Pan-African movements such as the back to Africa 
movement, which gained currency in the early 1900s propagated by Marcus Garvey, 
was another form of the quest for African unity.  Garvey was also inspired by the earlier 
Pan-African predecessors of the back to Africa movement such as Edward Blyden. It 
will be demonstrated in the following discussions that the quest for African unity traces 
its roots to the back to Africa movement, which rose to prominence towards the end 




The concept of African unity can be divided into three phases, and each phase 
represents a different conception of African unity. The first phase of African unity under 
the banner of Pan-Africanism was the back to Africa movement, which has often been 
associated with Garvey (Del’a, 2000:14). However, this movement began way before 
Garvey, and the conception of African unity within this movement was solely based on 
the desire for African descendants in the diaspora to be reunited with their brethren in 
their motherland (Murithi, 2008: 3). 
The second phase in the evolution of the concept of African unity can be traced to the 
Pan-African Congresses (1900 to 1945), which were like academic forums for the 
peoples of African descent and the peoples of Africa. These congresses were mainly 
for African scholars, leaders of the African communities, either in the diaspora or in 
Africa, African political activists and religious leaders; to discuss matters affecting the 
peoples of Africa across the globe. Within the Pan-African Congresses, unity was 
defined as “social and cultural unity”. Although Garvey had popularised the idea of the 
United States of Africa, his conception did not include a central government (Murithi, 
2008:3). 
The third phase in the evolution and quest for African unity began with the wave of 
decolonisation in Africa from the late 1950s to 1994. The conceptualisation of African 
unity in this phase is contested by scholars, political leaders and non-state actors alike. 
The contestation regarding the conceptualisation of African unity in post-colonial Africa 
began in the late 1950s after Nkrumah of Ghana called for the United States of Africa; 
an idea that was welcomed by all the independent African states. However, his 
approach to African unity was rejected. Suffice it to say, African unity under the third 
phase implies the formation of a central government, but the only debated issue 
remains on the powers and levels of sovereignty that would be given to the member 
states (Murithi, 2008:4).  
As aforementioned, the struggle for anti-slavery and anti-colonialism sparked the call 
for African unity, however, the abolition of slavery and the end of colonial rule in Africa 
did not mean an end of the road in the quest for African unity (Thompson, 1969:xxii). 
A decolonised Africa was faced with numerous challenges, which were attributed 
mainly to the legacies of colonialism. These included among many other things: 




clan and civil wars, and political and social deficiencies (Adebajo, 2010). The calls for 
African unity intensified and with that a plethora of perspectives on how Africa should 
unite, which to some degree contained elements of how African unity was perceived 
by various individuals, policymakers and civil society groups (Mathews, 2018:26). 
African unity is what Africans have been seeking; however, there has never been a 
consensus on what is meant by this unity, what form this unity would take and how 
and when should this unity be attained. 
African unity has been defined and conceptualised differently, hence this section aims 
to provide those divergent and convergent views on the concept of African unity. To 
Nkrumah African unity was the formation of the United States of Africa in a form of 
supranational government predicated on a single currency, and an African standby 
force, among many other things (Wapmuk, 2009:652). Describing Nkrumah’s 
commitment to the idea of African unity the Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui (2004:22) said: 
Nkrumah’s greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of continental unification. 
No one else has made the case for continental integration more forcefully, or 
with greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most African leaders 
regard the whole idea of a United States of Africa as wholly unattainable in the 
foreseeable future, Nkrumah even after death has kept the debate alive through 
his books and through the continuing influence of his ideas. 
Ali Mazrui used the word “continental integration” in his endeavour to capture 
Nkrumah’s devotion to African unity. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked 
at this juncture: is African unity synonymouss with integration? In the Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations, the word integration is defined as “a process and 
an end state. The aim of the end state sought when actors integrate is a political 
community. The process or processes include the means or instruments whereby that 
political community is achieved. There is an important proviso which must be entered 
immediately”. On the other hand, unity is defined as “the state of being in agreement 
and working together; the state of being joined together to form one unit”. The word 
unity in the Oxford dictionary is divided into two components: First, as an agreement, 
which could simply imply that individuals or separate entities are collaborating to 




separate entities or individuals come together as one entity instead of agreeing to work 
as individuals towards a common goal.  
The word integration is often used as a means towards African unity, especially when 
looking at it from the African regional integration perspective, as outlined in the Abuja 
Treaty, Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Agenda 2063, among many others. The 
concept of integration will be dealt with extensively in this chapter under the rubric of 
regional integration theory.  The concept of African unity is also understood on the 
same basis as the word unity, which takes two forms as outlined above. To 
demonstrate this above point, one should examine among many others Nkrumah’s 
conceptualisation of African unity vis-à-vis that of Julius Nyerere. To be clear, these 
are not the only activists, leaders, scholars and Pan-African pantheons to 
conceptualise African unity.  
It is unequivocal that among many other understandings of what is meant by African 
unity, the two dominant schools of thought on African unity are predicated on an 
agreement between independent African states on various issues which include 
political and socio-economic issues. Another view is that these independent states 
operate as a single unit. “Unity implies that an individual thing or person is regarded 
as single and complete, but which can also form an individual component of a larger 
or more complex whole.” 
As aforementioned, the debates have always been between these two schools of 
thought; with the debate on the amount or level of status and power accorded to a unit 
(member-state) in the federation vis-à-vis the federation’s power over the member’s 
state. Nkrumah (1963) told his African counterparts:  
Unite we must. Without necessarily sacrificing our sovereignties, big or small, 
we can here and now forge a political union based on defence, foreign affairs 
and diplomacy, and a common citizenship, an African currency, an African 
monetary zone and an African central bank. We must unite in order to achieve 
the full liberation of our continent. We need a common defence system with an 
African high command to ensure the stability and security of Africa. 
Nkrumah’s conception of African unity calls for a political union, which does not 
threaten or take away the sovereignty of member states. While on the other hand, 




although Julius Nyerere does not dismiss that the end goal of African unity is a political 
union. This is evident in his speech delivered in 1966 titled: “The Dilemma of Pan-
Africanist”, wherein he laments the challenges facing African leaders. For Nyerere 
(1966), the challenge is to develop one’s nation while working towards the total 
development of the continent. Nyerere (1966) argues that: 
Pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty; on 
the other hand, is the fact that each Pan-Africanist must also concern himself 
with the freedom and development of one of the nations of Africa. These things 
can conflict. Let us be honest and admit that they have already conflicted. 
To find a balance between national interest and continental interests, Nyerere 
recommends that it each state must promote its own nationhood. However, this should 
not be reduced to promoting patriotism. For Nyerere (1966), “it also involves 
deliberately organizing one part of Africa economically, socially, and constitutionally, 
to serve the overall interests of the people of that part of Africa, and (in case of conflict) 
not the interests either of another part, or of Africa as a whole”. 
Essentially, Nyerere was arguing that it is invertible to have conflict if the issue of 
African unity is viewed from a political union, which is constituted without harnessing 
and harmonising national or regional interests. Nyerere went as far as to say economic 
cooperation should be viewed as the “stepping stones towards African unity”. 
In this study, African unity is defined as the political and economic integration in the 
form of a United States of Africa consisting of a free-trade area, a common currency 
regulated through the African Central Bank, and a single military. African unity is 
envisioned in this study as a federal system of governance, which will give a degree 
of sovereignty to its member states. This definition is in line with the one espoused by 
Nkrumah and the radical Pan-Africanists.  
2.3 Theory as building blocks of a theoretical framework 
“A theoretical framework is made up of concepts, definitions of those concepts, and 
existing theory/theories that are used in a study. The objective of a theoretical 
framework is to demonstrate an understanding of theories and concepts that are 
relevant to the research at hand, but most importantly, assist in stimulating research 




the research inquiry. It also enhances the empiricism and rigour of a research. Thus, 
it is no exaggeration for Imenda (2014) to say that both the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks give life to a research.” 
A theoretical framework should relate to the broader fields of knowledge under study. 
“The theoretical framework is not something that is found readily available in the 
literature. Therefore, one is required to review course readings and relevant research 
literature for theories and analytic models that are relevant to the research problem 
one is investigating. The selection of a theory should depend on its appropriateness, 
ease of application, and explanatory power.” 
By virtue of its application nature, “good theory in the social sciences is of value 
precisely because it fulfills one primary purpose: to explain the meaning, nature, and 
challenges of a phenomenon, often experienced but unexplained in the world in which 
we live, so that we may use that knowledge and understanding to act in more informed 
and effective ways”” (Auriacombe, 2017: 14). 
Over and above the aforementioned, what else makes a good theory?  
“1. Parsimony: the ability to explain in relatively few terms and statements 
2. Breadth of phenomena explained 
3. Accuracy of predictions of new phenomena 
4. Ability to be disproved” 
According to Imenda (2014),” “theories are formulated to explain, predict, and 
understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing 
knowledge, within the limits of the critical bounding assumptions. The theoretical 
framework is the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study”. The 
theoretical framework “introduces and describes the theory which explains why the 
research problem under study exists” Given the role played by a theory or theories in 
the formation of a theoretical framework, it is therefore vital to unpack the concept of 
theory in politics and IR with a strong focus on the role of a theory, its meaning and 
characteristics which distinguish it from an ideology and approach. These will be 





2.3.1 Towards understanding theory 
Every discipline has a base, a foundation; IR’s foundation is theory, or theories and 
these theories define and view the world they attempt to explain. While IR has many 
theories, which are fiercely contested, it is commonly incorrect to regard them as rivals 
over some universal truth about the world of politics. Having said that, each theory in 
IR is predicated on certain epistemologies and assumptions, bound by specific 
conditions, and pursue their own analytical goals. While many theories may have more 
or less convincing conclusions about IR, not even one is definitively “right” or “wrong”. 
However, each theory has some tools that can be of use in examining and analysing 
rich, multi-causal phenomena. Now that one has established that IR is predicated on 
theories, then the question becomes, what is theory; its role and purpose in a discipline 
or in a research? Before one can delve into examining Pan-Africanism and African 
Renaissance as theories of IR it is necessary to establish a basic understanding of 
theory.  
The word “theory” originates from the Greek word theoria, which means contemplation 
or speculation (Auriacombe, 2017:10). Botha (1990:29-33) defines a theory as a 
scientific attempt to describe, interpret or explain the reality of a phenomenon within 
that reality. On the other hand, Fox and Meyer (1995:128) have defined a theory as 
an explanation of reality with an aim to predict. Furthermore, Odi (1982:313) defined 
theory as "an internally connected and logically consistent proposition about 
relationship (s) between phenomena". Schutt described a theory as a “logically 
interrelated set of propositions about empirical reality”. 
As noted in the above argument, the word theory is frequently used across academic 
disciplines and it often carries different meanings from one discipline to another or 
from one study to another. To demonstrate the above point, in natural sciences, for 
example, the “word theory refers to a comprehensive explanation of an important 
feature of nature that is supported by many facts gathered over time” (Auriacombe, 
2018:6).  On the other hand, in social sciences, a theory is regarded as a general 
proposition, “which establishes a relationship between two or more variables” (Abend, 
2008:176). A common denominator is that theories allow both social and natural 
scientists to make predictions about as yet unobserved phenomena. “In principle, 




wider theory. Theories are constructed in order to explain, predict and understand 
phenomena. A theory makes generalisations about observations and consists of an 
interrelated, coherent set of ideas and models”.  
Leaning on Abend’s work on the meaning of theory, this section provides multiple 
meanings of a theory. The word theory is often used in different contexts, and as such, 
giving it different meanings. It is important to note that this study uses a semantic 
approach, which does not presuppose a concept of theory. Moreover, it does not make   
any normative claims or ontological commitments. However, it gives an account of 
what different social scientists imply when they use terms such as theory, theoretical, 
and theorise. According to Abend (2008:177) “there are seven and even more 
meanings of theory used by sociologists”. Important to note, these are equally 
applicable in political studies and IR.  
“First, the word theory as used by social scientists can be in light of a general 
proposition, or logically connected system of general propositions, which establishes 
a relationship between two or more variables. Second, a theory can be thought of as 
an explanation of a particular social phenomenon”. Third, in sociology, “a theory is a 
way to explain different aspects of social interactions and to create a testable 
proposition, called a hypothesis, about society” (Allan 2006).” 
2.3.2 The difference between a theory, ideology and approach 
The phrases or terms such as theory, ideology and approach feature greatly in social 
science research, and as such, tend to be used differently and given different 
meanings. This study will also deploy such terms in the deliberation; hence, it is 
important to define these terms beforehand and to differentiate between them.  
A theory refers to “a scientific manner in which certain phenomena are explained, 
analysed and predicted in reality” (Auriacombe, 2018:9). In this regard, the focus is on 
the theories which can explain, analyse and predict the true nature of the subject of 
African unity. On the other hand, “an approach refers to a practical way in which the 
objective is implemented”. In this case it is the practical method in which the search 
for unity in Africa is or will be realised. Thus, a theory is applicable to the philosophical 
side of the subject, “while approaches are applicable to the concrete methods and 
techniques that are applied to reach a certain objective. The theory of a subject will, 




Dosenrode (2010:3) argues that, “when looking at the African Union and its aspiration 
of African unity there is no theoretical framework to guide the statesmen embarking 
on it”. This is because not much attention has been given to Pan-Africanism and 
African Renaissance as theoretical frameworks in IR, hence, Dosenrode is oblivious 
of these two key theoretical frameworks that have been guiding Africans in their pursuit 
for African unity. The following section will outline in detail some of the key theories 
which will form a theoretical base for this study.  
2.4 Pan-Africanism as a theory of IR 
The discipline of IR has enjoyed a lot of scholarly attention over the years, and in 
particular the subject of IR theories, which supposedly provides a worldview. However, 
these worldviews are often reflective of Western societies, while those of the global 
South remain unheard. Most of the literature that delves into IR theories tends to 
borrow heavily from the Western manuscripts. This often raises questions such as: is 
there a theory or theories that resonate with the global South, and more in particular, 
Africa? Tieku (2013:12) argues that, “any theory that will help answer key questions 
about Africa’s IR must accommodate at least three key collective traits − that is, group 
preferences formation, consensual decision-making procedures and the solidarity 
principle, which are the central referents of Africa’s IR”. 
Tieku (2013:15) further asserts that, “no theoretical account of Africa’s international 
relations will be complete without taking into serious consideration a regional African 
norm called the pan-African solidarity norm”. Not much academic work has been 
produced on the notion of Pan-Africanism as a theory of IR.  As such, this study sees 
it fit to include Pan-Africanism as a guiding theory towards understanding of the Pan-
African unity debates. However, before doing that, this study has an obligation of 
proving whether Pan-Africanism is a theory of IR.  
On Pan Africanism as a theory of IR, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:22), writes “Pan-
Africanism is, above all, an international phenomenon and, as such, it should deal with 
power and interest and their dynamics in the international arena: international political 
forums and international political economy”. Furthermore, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:22), 
laments the exclusion of Pan-Africanism as a theory in the study edited by “Martin 
Griffiths titled International Relations Theory for the Twenty First Century”, “which 




The ideas of Pan-Africanism are certainly not new and have been contested over the 
years leading to scholars such as Esedebe (1994) arguing that “when Pan-Africanism 
began and who launched it will never be known”. In the same vein, Ackah (1999:12) 
argued that one of the shortfalls of Pan-Africanism is that it “means anything to 
anyone”. Ackah goes as far as to say that the obscurity embedded in Pan-Africanism 
makes it almost impossible to define Pan-Africanism. Abegunrin (2016a:1) concurs 
with Ackah that there are many conflicting definitions and interpretations of Pan-
Africanism. One of the prominent Pan-Africanists of the 20th century, W.E.B Du Bois, 
defined Pan-Africanism as a “movement aimed at an intellectual understanding and 
cooperation among all groups of African descent to bring about the industrial and 
spiritual emancipation of the Negro people” (Legum, 1962:15).  While on the other 
hand, the German historian Imanuel Geiss thinks that Pan-Africanism “is an irrational 
concept, a matter of vague emotions” (cited in Adegunrin, 2016a:1). With this being 
said, is it then possible to extract a common definition or understanding of Pan-
Africanism? If yes, then what is it, and if no, why not? Although this section is an 
endeavour to understand Pan-Africanism as a theory of IR and politics, this 
momentous task cannot be successful without providing clarity on the concept of Pan-
Africanism, especially in reference to the objectives of this study.   
The starting point in defining the concept of Pan-Africanism is to first understand what 
is meant by Africa or African. The term “Africa” is one of the contested terminologies, 
and it is often used to refer to different things. For example, Africa can denote a 
geographical location in the form of the continent, which is known as the continent of 
Africa. Also, African can be used to refer to a person of African origin, hence there are 
those of African origin in America known as African Americans. Nkrumah challenged 
this idea of associating Africanism with ancestry or place of birth when he famously 
said: “I am not African because I was born in Africa but because Africa was born in 
me” (Obeng, 1997:2). In essence, Nkrumah was asserting his African personality.  
Now that we have established the multifaceted usage of the term Africa or African, the 
task at hand would be to understand what is meant by Pan-Africanism. One of the 
overstated claims in this dissertation is the lack of a unified or single definition of Pan-
Africanism”. As noted by Azikiwe (1962), “it would be useless to define Pan-Africanism 
exclusively in racial or linguistic terms, since the obvious solution would be parochial.” 




factor in human society at all known times of human history”. It would also alienate 
many people who have come to associate themselves with the idea of Pan-Africanism 
or Africa.”  
The above argument has noted challenges associated with defining Pan-Africanism; 
hence, it is important to offer the definition of Pan-Africanism adopted by this study. 
An understanding of Pan-Africanism or the definition thereof is often influenced by 
many factors, which among others includes geographical location, period, and the 
conditions that gave rise to it. Dr John Henrik Clarke argues that “there is now a need 
to look at Pan-Africanism holistically. After a general view of Pan-Africanism, it is also 
a necessity to look at the many manifestations of Pan-Africanism under different 
historical pressures and in different places” (Young, 2010:141).  
Pan-Africanism has been an essential tool in uniting Africans in the diaspora and on 
the continent in pursuit of respect, equality and freedom for Africans in Africa and in 
the diaspora. Although this unity has dwindled over the years between Africans in the 
diaspora and those on the continent (Dung and Erhunmwunsee, 2016:81), Pan-
Africanism was a force that helped liberate Africa from colonial rule and minority 
domination (Adeleke, 1997:107).  
The dominance of powerful regions of the world in shaping theories in IR makes it 
even harder for the emergence of theories from the developing regions. This does not, 
however, suggest that applying theories from the powerful regions into case studies 
of developing regions makes the study less valuable or accurate. It does, however, 
suggest that the epistemic injustice and the overdominance of the powerful regions in 
the IR theories will be perpetuated.  
Adepoju (2018:103) notes that “perhaps the imperative to arrest these twin legacies 
spurred the emergence, at the level of both theory and praxis, of the radical Pan-
Africanist approach to African integration.” However, as much research on 
“personhood show, collectivism is the dominant worldview in Africa and any theory 
that neglects collectivist practices cannot account for Africa’s IR.”  
“The relational behavioural pattern associated with collectivism often makes African 
governments seek a compromise position on major issues at regional, continental 
forums, and to a limited extent at the global level. African leaders’ deference to 




dissent has meant that African leaders often make decisions at summit meetings 
without any serious debate or analysis of the issue.” 
What comes as a surprise is that in mainstream studies of IR, “Pan-Africanism is not 
included as one of the important worldviews” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:22). As noted 
by Mathews (2018:16), Pan-Africanism has historically consisted of four key themes: 
• ““a clear expression of the pride and achievement of Africans;  
• the idea of returning to Africa, a notion mainly promoted by Africans in the 
diaspora;  
• the liberation from colonialism and all forms of oppression; and  
• the promotion of African unity as a primary objective in the struggle for 
liberation from European colonialism” 
As a theory that seeks to unite Africa it is predicated on the following assumptions:  
• Africans share a common ancestry, therefore should share a common destiny. 
• The Africa map was reconfigured to reflect the interest of the colonisers in 
Africa; therefore, these barriers should fall because they are not a true reflection 
of Africa. 
• African unity will make Africa a strong force in the international arena, rather 
than when single states pursue different interests.  
2.5 African Renaissance as a theory of IR  
The concept of African Renaissance is closely associated with South Africa’s former 
president Thabo Mbeki (Landsberg, 2018:1). However, Mbeki was not the first to 
articulate this concept (Mekoa, 2018:503). According to Sesanti (2018:503), the 
African Renaissance vision was first articulated by one of the founding fathers of the 
African National Congress (ANC), Pixley Ka Isaka Seme in his famous speech titled 
“The Regeneration of Africa”, delivered at Cambridge University in April 1906. In that 
speech, Ka Isaka Seme makes reference to the uniqueness of Africans, and defines 
the regeneration of Africa as a “new and unique civilization” (Ka Isaka Seme, 1906). 
One of the other great contributors to this notion of African Renaissance is Cheikh 
Anta Dioph in his series of essays, which began in 1946  culminating in a book entitled 




2018:9). Landsberg (2018:3) has also noted other contributors to this notion of African 
Renaissance, which includes Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Steve Biko.  
Another notable contributor to this notion of African Renaissance is the founder of the 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Robert Sobukwe. Acting in his capacity as 
President of the Students’ Representative Council (SRC), Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe 
delivered a speech at the University of Fort Hare on 21 October 1949. In his address, 
Sobukwe had the following to say:  
Let me plead with you, lovers of my Africa, to carry with you into the world, an 
Africa reborn, an Africa rejuvenated, an Africa recreated, young Africa. We are 
the first glimmers of a new dawn (cited in Landsberg, 2018:4). 
According to Nabudere (2001:16), the formulation of this concept in its Mbekian form 
can be traced to his famous speech ’I am an African’. Also, it can be traced to the 
response of the “ANC’s leadership to the demand of the ANC members during its 50th 
National Conference in 1997”, as such, forming a foreign policy and economic policy 
of the ANC.  For Kornegay and Landsberg (1998:5), the “’I am an African’ speech can 
be considered as the intellectual foundation for the articulation of an African 
renaissance”. The credit is rightly given to President Mbeki for popularising the 
concept of African Renaissance, and giving it a policy dimension (Landsberg, 2018:3).  
President Mbeki was a leading proponent of African Renaissance and he was 
supported by what Khadiagala dubbed as the “Africa Renaissance Coalition” 
(Mathews, 2018:28). “This coalition included President Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdul 
Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Joachim Chissano of 
Mozambique and Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali (Mathews, 2018:28).” 
According to Mathews (2018:28) African Renaissance is the “re-emergence of Pan-
Africanism in the 21st century” to provide new guidance and direction for the much-
needed regeneration and rebirth of Africa. For Landsberg (2018: 2), African 
Renaissance is a Pan-African foreign policy doctrine, focusing on economics, politics, 
culture, power and influence, as well as African identity. Furthermore, African 
Renaissance aims at uniting Africans economically and politically in order to achieve 
sustainable economic development, place Africa at the centre of the global economy, 




Moreover, Nabudere (2001) defined African Renaissance as a useful tool for the 
peoples of Africa to redefine the course of Pan-Africanism in the era of globalisation. 
Mekoa (2018:9) argues that “one cannot discuss African Renaissance without making 
mention of Pan-Africanism and Black Consciousness, and this precisely because they 
too form part of the tradition of African renewal or consciousness”. Mekoa has also 
noted that the concept of African Renaissance has never been used to refer to Pan-
Africanism or Black Consciousness, despite all being renaissance philosophies. All 
“African renaissance philosophies emerged as a response to European renaissance 
that emerged as a counter-discourse to supernatural knowledge”. As correctly 
observed by Mekoa (2018:10), this changed when it transformed into an oppressive 
institution of slavery, colonialism and imperialism. Hence, there was an emergence of 
African renaissance philosophies to repel these oppressive institutions.  
Having established that there is a philosophical underpinning of African renaissance 
philosophies, in explaining the difference between classical Pan-Africanism and 
African Renaissance, Landsberg (2018:2) noted that, “the former was dedicated to 
fighting for the emancipation of the enslaved and colonised Africans”. On the other 
hand, the latter focuses on restoring Africa’s agency in global affairs, with the aim of 
achieving socio-economic emancipation. Therefore, one can argue that, Pan-
Africanism embodied Nkrumah’s dream of a political kingdom. On the other hand, 
African Renaissance embodies what Nkrumah promised would be added on to Africa 
after attaining the political kingdom. Moreover, Landsberg argues that, unlike Pan-
Africanism which seeks to champion African unity, African Renaissance does not. 
However, one could argue that African Renaissance is an offshoot of Pan-Africanism, 
therefore, it cannot separate itself from the central mission of Pan-Africanism of African 
unity.  
The argument that this section advances is that, the proponents of African 
Renaissance were not averse to African unity, but, were mainly arguing that Africa 
must create institutions that would promote good governance, constitutionalism, 
peace and security and development before uniting. Speaking at the United Nations 
University on 9 April 1998, in his address entitled: “The African Renaissance, South 
Africa and the World” Thabo Mbeki had the following to say about African 




asks a pertinent question that sets the tone for African Renaissance in the post-
colonial and post-Cold War era: “What is it which makes up that genuine liberation?” 
In discussing this question, Mbeki spoke of true liberation, which entails the end of 
one-party government, end of military coups, promotion of good governance. This 
would bring about a complete decolonisation and political freedom. Mbeki provided 
examples from the then continental organisation, the OAU, and regional organisation, 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), to demonstrate initiatives taken 
by the continental, regional, and national level towards the attainment of the African 
Renaissance.  
Under the OAU, Africa was able to free itself from the yoke of colonialism, however, 
the jubilation of freedom was soon replaced by the sadness of underdevelopment, 
unconstitutional removals of governments, commonly through coup d'etat, which led 
to the prevalence of military regimes. Moreover, poverty worsened, and conflicts 
became the norm in Africa, and a case in point is the Rwandan genocide. It soon 
became clear that the OAU was not able to deal with all these post-colonial challenges. 
As a result, the transition from the OAU to the AU took place in 2002, ushering in a 
period of the operationalisation of Pan-Africanism under the auspices of African 
Renaissance. This notion of African Renaissance was highly inspired by President 
Mbeki who transformed it into a theoretical framework to remedy these post-colonial 
challenges. The first step in tackling the post-colonial challenges “was to translate the 
African Renaissance into sub-regional and continental policies, in order to promote 
good governance, development, peace and security, and cooperation” (Landsberg, 
2018:2).  
The foundation of the institutionalisation of African Renaissance was from 8-9 
September 1999, which culminated in the signing of the Sirte Declaration on the AU. 
The host, leader of the Al Fatah Revolution, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi proposed the 
immediate creation of the United States of Africa. It was at this juncture, that the 
African Renaissance coalition demanded that a step-by-step approach be adopted as 
opposed to a maximalist approach.  
The creation of the AU became a reflective wish of the African Renaissance coalition, 
which had called for the African agency in the era of globalisation. According to 




Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is a modern development plan 
characterised by democracy and development, and also peace and security”.  
Landsberg goes on to argue that Mbeki was the main proponent of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM), which aimed at promoting good governance. Here was 
the beginning of the institutionalisation of the African Renaissance as an operational 
theoretical framework for advancing a healthy step-by-step approach towards African 
unity. The Constitutive Act of the AU reinforced the importance of unity and solidarity 
and emphasised the importance of achieving good governance.  
The rivalry on the African unity debate was revived in the 2007 Accra Grand Debate 
on the Union of Government where two major camps argued from different angles. 
The gradualists who were in the majority involved South Africa and Nigeria (Africa’s 
powerhouses), calling for the step-by-step approach, which entailed the creation of 
institutions that would solidify a regional integration first. On the other hand, “the 
maximalist camp led by Libya and Senegal called for an immediate formation of the 
Union of Governments, and it could be argued that they were acting from a radical 
Pan-Africanist perspective” (Lecoutre, 2008:49).   
African Renaissance can be understood as having the attributes of theory worthy of 
inclusion in the IR theories, because of the following reasons:   
• Seeks to reinvigorate Africa’s cultural, social, political and economic stature 
globally. 
•  “Promotion of peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, 
progressive leadership and good governance” 
2.6 Understanding regional integration in Africa: Theory and practice  
“Regional organisations often take different forms when it comes to the degree of 
autonomy they have as actors or agents in IR, independent of their member states. 
According to Sturman (2007:1), “the extent to which the organisation has a 
supranational identity, and supranational institutions and powers, will determine the 
extent to which it operates as an entity that is more than the sum of its parts”. African 
integration constitutes one of the main regional cooperation efforts since the 1950s. 
“These efforts were inspired by the idea of Pan-Africanism, of African unity or even the 
United States of Africa. Several scholars have approached the topic of African 




(Michel, 2012:15). This section seeks to make a modest contribution by applying the 
so-called European integration theories to the case of African integration in pursuit of 
African unity. This section will focus on four main theories of European integration 
(federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) under 
the rubric of regional integration theory. These theories will be used to examine African 
integration and thereby dealing with the topic concerning the convergence and 
divergences in the debates on African unity by identifying, describing, and predicting 
the eventual outcome of the process of economic and political integration in Africa, 
which is aimed at leading to a united Africa predicated on Pan-African values”.”  
“The academic field of regional integration theories gained critical mass following the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the 
conclusion of the Rome Treaties in 1957 (Michel, 2012:17). Insofar as Africa is 
concerned, the search for African unity prompted Africans to turn towards RECs as 
stepping stones for continental unification (Mathews, 2018:35). According to Michel 
(2012:2), the Pan-African movement was the main driving force behind African 
integration in the 1950s and 1960s. This notion of a United States of Africa or a Union 
Government for Africa calls for the relocation of political power and authority, either 
entirely or partially, from national governments to a supranational body or entities.”  
The transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa in the early 1950s 
gave traction to the efforts of enhancing regional integration, which was not new to 
Africa. Hazlewood (1972:3), has described the colonial interterritorial links, which 
acted as a form of unity and regional integration as: “unity of Europe in Africa”, which 
reflected the “hegemony of the metropolitan country over its various countries” 
(Hazlewood, 1972:3),  . With the collapse of colonialism, the interterritorial links, which 
were formed by colonialists, for colonialism to succeed and for easy administration; 
inevitably collapsed with the institutions of colonialism.   
The early efforts to reconstruct the regional communities that would trickle down 
towards a fully-fledged United States of Africa proved fruitless. Over half a century 
later, the continent remains the least integrated, this is despite the high concentration 
of RECs in Africa over the past five decades dedicated to promoting integration for the 
ultimate goal of African unity (Jiboku, 2015:5). Furthermore, Jiboku argues that there 




integration in Africa. The concept of Regional Integration Theory (RIT) is commonly 
used as an umbrella term for theories that seek to explain, analyse and promote 
regional integration.  
According to Wapmuk (2009:647), “regional integration could be a means to an end 
for achieving the formation of a union government. Integration in Africa has always 
been objectified on the quest for African unity, freedom and emancipation. However, 
how to achieve integration, has been a subject of serious debate between the 
functionalists, federalists, intergovernmentalists and several other integration 
theorists”. 
2.6.1 Defining regional integration  
Before one can delve into RITs it is first important to discuss the concept of regional 
integration. The term ’regional integration’ is easily understood at the abstract level, 
as “to combine two or more things in order to become more effective” (Oxford 
dictionary). In his article; “Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an 
analytical framework”, Dosenrode (2010:4), defined regional integration as “a process 
transferring loyalty, expectations and political decision-making power, or sovereignty 
to a new centre”. On the other hand, Deutsch (1968:192), defined regional integration 
as a “relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly 
produce systems properties which they would separately lack”.  
A plethora of literature on the theory or theories of regional integration is dedicated to 
understanding integration within the European Union (EU) and as such, creating a gap 
in the literature when it comes to other regions that are integrated or seeking 
integration (Jiboku, 2015:5).  Furthermore, Dosenrode (2010:3) laments the lack of a 
general theory of regional integration, which will be applicable when analysing cases 
of regional integration across all regions. With that being said, regional integration in 
Africa is complex and it is not fully fledged, hence, no single theory can encapsulate 
the intricacies and nuances of regional integration in Africa.  
RIT, is aimed at explaining the establishment and development of regional 
international organisations (RIOs). The definition of RIOs stands on four legs: 
geographical proximity, multilateralism, state members, and organisational capacity. 
First and foremost, RIOs are established by two or more states for common purposes. 




staff. They have regulatory procedures such as meetings of their member states; with 
the capacity to make decisions and to enforce them. Third, their membership is 
determined through geographical proximity and limited.  
There are many reasons why states form or join RIOs and among these reasons are: 
political, economic, and national security interests. Inasmuch as states seek national 
interests, which Mingst (2004:320), defined as “the interest of the state, most basically 
the protection of territory and sovereignty”; what has to be remembered is that, states 
cannot function in isolation, hence, the first step towards forging partnership for 
collective interests are neighboring states. This does not, however, suggest that states 
cannot pursue their own national interests; what is suggested, however, is that the 
national interests can be amalgamated with regional interests for a positive endgame. 
A state’s national security means nothing when its neighbouring countries are facing 
security threats, either in the form of civil war, terrorism or interstate war. In the same 
vein, a country’s economy cannot successfully thrive when its neighbours’ economies 
have collapsed to nothingness.  
Regional integration can take different forms; most commonly economic and political 
integration. There is much literature that is dedicated to the concept and processes of 
economic and political integration. One of the prominent authorities on these concepts 
is Bela Balassa, hence, this study will lean on Balassa’s work in discussing the concept 
of economic integration and the stages entailed in the development of economic 
integration.   
2.6.2 Economic integration 
The concept of economic integration emerged in Western Europe post-1945. The 
European economies were ravaged by World War II, so, in an endeavour to 
rehabilitate the European economies the European leaders responded by considering 
economic integration. The Marshal Plan for the reconstruction of Europe brought to 
light for the first time the concept of economic integration.  Balassa (1961:19) defines 
economic integration as a “process and as a state of affairs”. 
El-Agraa (1989:9) defined economic integration as a “removal of all trade impediments 
between the participating nations and with the establishment of certain elements of 
cooperation and coordination between them”. Some scholars argue that the end in 




non-linear process, with various scholars pointing to different stages and processes of 
economic integration.  
Scholars have identified various stages of economic integration with a plethora of 
scholars taking a leaf from Bela Balessa’s work. For example, Willem Molle has 
identified three stages, while Michael Holden has outlined four stages, however, all 
these scholars have based their arguments on Balassa’s work. The Pan-African 
approach to economic integration is dissected in the Abuja Treaty which identified six 
stages over 34 years, reaching its apex in 2028.The stages that will be followed are: 
• “STAGE 1: Strengthening existing RECs and creating new ones where needed 
(5 years); 
• STAGE 2: Stabilisation of tariff and other barriers to regional trade and the 
strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the field of trade, agriculture, 
finance, transport and communication, industry and energy, as well as 
coordination and harmonisation of the activities of the RECs (8 years); 
• STAGE 3: Establishment of a free trade area and a Customs Union at the level 
of each REC (10 years); 
•  STAGE 4: Coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems 
among RECs, with a view to establishing a Continental Customs Union (2 
years); 
•  STAGE 5: Establishment of an African Common Market and the adoption of 
common policies (4 years); and 
•  STAGE 6: Integration of all sectors, establishment of an African Central Bank 
and a single African currency, setting up of an African Economic and Monetary 
Union and creating and electing the first Pan-African Parliament (5 years).” 
Figure 1 illustrates the five-step approach to economic integration, which culminates 
with the formation of a political union. Heywood (2019:673) has defined a Political 
Union as the transfer of a state’s sovereignty  to a central power. “A political union may 
be a unitary state; that is, all constituent states cease to have legal existence (except 
maybe as administrative divisions) and they are subject to the same law. Alternatively, 
a political union may be federal, in which the new state is given certain responsibilities 
and remaining powers stay with the previously independent states. Political unions 




Figure 1: “Levels of Economic integration”  
 
 
Source: Rodrigue (2020:456) 
African integration is viewed through economic lenses; hence this study aims to 
understand what economic integration is and how it links up to the quest of African 
unity. As aforementioned, different scholars have outlined different steps and 
approaches insofar as economic integration is concerned. With that being said, this 
study adopts the six stages outlined in the Abuja Treaty to enhance economic 
integration in its examination of economic integration in Africa. The African Continental 
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is one of the recent economic integration steps taken by 
African heads of states in pursuit of African unity.  
2.6.3 Political integration  
The concept of political integration preceded the concept of economic integration, and 
it was “developed by political scientists such as Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg”. This 
theory became a topical issue following the signing of the League of Nations Treaty in 
1919. Although this concept surfaced in the early 1900s, it was not until the mid-1950s 
with the end of World War II that it gained momentum in Europe. Leaders and scholars 




concept of economic integration emerged as a step towards the United States of 
Europe. Sannwald and Stohler argued that, "political integration can be facilitated by 
economic cooperation but mere economic union is unthinkable”. This conversation on 
the political integration was not only held by political scientists, but also by economists 
and socialists. There were divergent views among scholars across disciplines, with 
Wilhelm Ropke, who forcibly argued for a functional method of integration, going a 
step further, "economic integration - as far as its geographical extent and its intensity 
are concerned - always presupposes a corresponding 'social integration" (Ropke). 
The ideas of political integration were challenged by scholars such as Stanley Hoffman 
whose worldview was constructed through the realist lenses inspired by the ideas of 
nationalism and preservation of a nation-state which dates back to the French 
Revolution. Hoffman (1989), wrote "the most striking reality is not the frequent and 
well-noted impotence of the so-called sovereign state. It is its survival, despite the 
turmoil". Within the realists’ school of thought state sovereignty is revered and cannot 
be compromised. Although these scholars acknowledged the deficiencies found within 
the nation-state with evidence found in the desecrated graves of World War 1 soldiers, 
which was a direct result of nationalism entrenched in nation-states. The discussion 
on political integration brought about the coining of the term supra-nationalism. Beloff 
writes, "what supranationalism means is that there is a recognised interest within a 
political grouping of several nations which is different from, or distinguishable from the 
interests of any one of them and which thus claims institutional expression". In 
essence, this meant shifting of the citizen's loyalties and allegiances from nation-state 
to a new centre of regionalism.  
While this section is not an attempt to juxtapose the European integration process with 
that of Africa, it is, however, an attempt to understand how this concept of political 
integration evolved and what it entails. Many scholars have defined and identified 
various stages of political integration. One of these notable scholars is Haas (1958:16), 
who defined political integration as: 
“the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new 




national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over 
the pre-existing ones.” 
What can be deduced from the above definition is that there are key elements, which 
shape the concept of political integration:  
• It is a process 
• Decisions should be synonymous  
• Central authority 
Just like the economic integration, which is made up of steps, the same could be said 
about political integration. Dosenrode (2010:8) has outlined five stages to political 
integration, which usually starts from an intergovernmental cooperation and 
culminates with full integration.  
• “Ad hoc intergovernmental political cooperation, which could include, for 
example, South Africa’s offer to facilitate and to mediate between conflicting 
powers.  
• Institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation.  
• Institutionalised intergovernmental coordination.  
• Partial or supranationalised integration: The states have handed  over a part of 
their sovereignty to a supranational authority which has autonomy and may 
follow policies independently of the member state governments.  
• Full integration. The member states have handed over the major part of their 
decision-making power, their ‘sovereignty’ to the supranational entity and have 
stopped being direct subjects of international public law”.  
“The difference between supranational and national should be seen as processual. 
The supranational stages may end in a national one, when a majority of the policy 
areas of the member states are placed under supranational control, where the 
association has obtained the attributes – legally and de facto – of a state. Supra-
nationalism as a description of a way of making decisions stops making sense, when 
the state stops being independent in a public international law context. On the other 
hand, there is nothing, theoretically, hindering a group of countries delegating, for 
instance, their monetary policy to a supranational authority while remaining totally 




‘kinds of integration’ lies between  stages three and four, because the decision-makers 
are in the latter case no longer able to pursue independent political economies but are 
bound to the common markets. It should be noted that neither for economic nor for 
political integration is it the writer’s wish to indicate that the process is automatic or 
irreversible; integration processes are made by man, and can be destroyed or stopped 
by man (Haas, 1958).” 
2.6.4 Federalism theory  
A great body of literature has often overlooked federalism as a theory of regional 
integration (Dosenrode, 2010:3). Michel (2012:17), concurs with Dosenrode that, 
federalism is not a prominent theory of regional integration, especially when compared 
to functionalism, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.  Where it has been 
considered it has often been in light of promoting European integration, or as an 
ideological theory of action. The word federation has its origins in Latin foedus, which 
means “pact, alliance, covenant, an arrangement entered into voluntarily and 
suggesting a degree of mutual trust and duration” (Dosenrode, 2010:10). 
“Federalist theory was originally developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Ernst B. Haas 
and Leon Lindberg (McCormick 2005). Dosenrode (2010:11), argues that federalism 
theory attempts to explain, based on analysis, how federations emerge and how they 
are organised and are functioning and thus should not have a normative bend. 
Federalism theory is predicated on federal principles concerned with the combination 
of self-governance and shared governance. However, what distinguishes unitary from 
federal government is that in a federal government there are two or more levels of 
government. Meaning, a number of member states each forming part of a federal 
government have their own autonomous government, however, at least one policy 
area should be assigned by constitution to the member states and cannot be overruled 
by the central legislative power”. King (1982:20) defined federalism as:  
“an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and 
distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central 
government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some 
constitutionally entrenched basis.” 
On the other hand, Burgess (2009:26) defined federalism as “a particular way of 




constitute a new form of union based upon principles that, broadly speaking, can be 
summarized in the dictum ‘unity in diversity’”. Another scholar who captured the 
definition of federalism succinctly is Elazar (1993: 190) who argued that “federalism 
should be understood both in its narrower sense as intergovernmental relations and 
in its larger sense as the combination of self-rule and shared rule through 
constitutionalized power sharing in a noncentralized basis”.   
Despite its lack in popularity, “federalism theory plays a vital role in providing 
“explanations for integration in general and international collaboration be it in Europe 
or Africa” (Michel, 2012: 17). It should be noted that “a single theory of federalism can 
hardly be found, a characteristic that stems from the fact that many authors dealing 
with federalism have connected it to specific cases or political projects”. Some 
assumptions and aspects of this theory can, however, be traced to several academic 
writings and debates.” 
Michel (2012:19), postulates that the “desire for common security is one of the main 
contributing factors that play a role in the integration process according to federalism. 
However, not all scholars of federalism theory regard the threat of security as an 
important process of integration”. While the threat of security is often considered by 
the federalist scholars that lean towards the realist school of federalism; the same 
cannot be said about the liberal school of federalism. Be it as it may, Dosenrode 
(2010:13) has identified four factors that necessitate the regional integration: security, 
prosperity (economic well-being), geographic proximity, and commonness. These 
factors may lead to regional integration, however, without political willingness, strong 
political leaders or elites and political groups; regional integration might not happen.  
As argued by Franck  “the principal cause of failure, or partial failure [...] can only be 
found in the absence of a sufficient political-ideological commitment to the primary 
concept or value of federation itself” (as cited in Michel, 2012: 20). 
Like any other theory of integration, federalism theory is not perfect, and therefore, it 
is subject to criticism. According to Michel (2012:21), federalism theory is often 
criticised not for what it is, but for what it is missing. Scholars such as Moravcsik (2005) 
reduce federalism to an ideology citing it lacks explanatory power of the theory; while 
other scholars criticise the assumption that security threat/issue is the main reason 




that “federalism integration sees the starting point of integration in interstate bargains, 
which it is said are often presumed to provide some kind of a constitutional 
framework/setting in regulating all relationships among different levels of 
governments.”  
2.6.5 Functionalism and neo-functionalism theory 
Functionalism theory was ignited from the ashes of World War II to become one of the 
integral theories of regional integration. Functionalism opposed power politics and a 
state-centric approach in international affairs. This is premised on the assumption that 
state-centredness and power politics lead to “wars and conflicts in the international 
system, which is caused by states’ pursuit of varied national interests, protecting and 
defending their sovereignty” (Jibuko, 2015:9). Therefore, functionalism theory can be 
regarded as a “theory that seeks to promote peace and harmony among states” 
(Jibuko, 2015). The main argument of classical functionalism is that nationalist 
sentiments combined with regard for sovereignty becomes a threat to the international 
peace and security system.” 
Neo-functionalism theory 
Neo-functionalism theory is an offshoot of functionalism; however, it differs a lot from 
functionalism. Neo-functionalism was developed by Mitrany. “Neo-functionalism is 
regarded as one of the major European theories of integration. Neo-functionalist 
scholars believe in a gradual integration process. It emerged as a response to the 
creation of the ECSC in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. 
Michel (2012:21) argues that “the main focus of neo-functionalism is the concept of 
spillovers”. Generally speaking, the concept of spillovers provides a description of how 
international cooperation in one field can lead to or influence cooperation in other fields 
through different ways.”  
“This theory places importance in the role of any emerging international organisation 
as it considers it as an integral player in the future integration processes. Furthermore, 
supranational institutions “are also regarded as vital actors, because of their ability to 
develop their own interests and stimulate further integration” (Niemann and Schmitter 
2009). While the role of public support is important, it is, however, considered limited 
compared to the role and the importance of national elites in stimulating international 




at explaining regional integration, particularly European integration” (Niemann and 
Schmitter 2009).” 
“As Michel (2012:21) puts it, “Haas argued that the purpose of his theory was merely 
to describe, explain, and predict, [although] it was also meant to prescribe”, hence, 
was both explanatory and normative. Although there exist slightly different definitions, 
neo-functionalist theory was primarily based on a number of key assumptions and 
aspects. First and foremost, it was thought to be a “grand theory”, which means that 
“its applicability can be tested in, but not limited to, European regional integration”. 
Moreover, some scholars see integration as a process rather than a single event; and 
this is encapsulated in Dosenrode’s work as follows: “should be able to explain 
‘organic’ or slowly developing regional integration” (2010: 4). Moving on, neo-
functionalism belongs to the realist school of thought, but it is of a pluralist nature 
(Michel, 2012:21).”  
“States are regarded as decision-makers both in internal and external affairs. Within 
the realist school of thought, actors are considered to be rational and self-interested, 
despite that national societal and governmental, as well as international, elites are 
considered to constitute the main impetus for integration. Schmitter (2005: 259), adds 
to this the aspect that interests, rather than common ideals or identity are the driving 
force behind the integration process. These interests, however, should neither be seen 
as constant nor limited to the national level”.   
Neo-functionalism has not been spared criticism; just like any other theory of regional 
integration. Most of the criticism that has been levelled against neo-functionalism is 
based on its experience or application, especially in Europe. As noted by Michel 
(2012:22), in the 1970s, neo-functionalism was regarded as useless precisely because 
of its poor empirical record. At one point, there was a halt in European integration 
which became known as the “empty-chair-crisis” “started by then French President 
Charles de Gaulle. It was thus criticised for its failure to provide an adequate 
explanation of any form of setbacks or halts in the integration process.  However, the 
critics of this theory of integration took into account the assumptions as well as the 
applicability and the empirical record. Neo-functionalism was criticised for being too 
linear, as it did not take into account several factors such as unintended consequences 




the process of integration. These relate to changes in public and political attitudes 
about the underestimated role of national sovereignty and nationalism.” 
2.6.6 Intergovernmentalism theory  
Intergovernmentalism developed in response to criticism on neo-functionalism. “The 
main argument of intergovernmentalism is that states are the main actors in 
international cooperation and that they act both unitarily and rationally”. Andrew 
Moravcsik is credited “for developing the idea of intergovernmentalism and channeling 
it to an understanding of its place in the integration process. This was influenced by 
the renaming of the European Community to the EU during the 1990s” (Michel, 
2012:24).  
Intergovernmentalism shares core assumptions with its new liberal form, which is 
dubbed as liberal-intergovernmentalism. As it has been noted, “theories of regional 
integration have been closely linked with European integration or put differently, these 
theories were developed to understand European integration” (Ravenhill, 2016:37). 
Therefore, assumptions are often based on the experiences of European integration. 
Over the years intergovernmentalism has developed to be a leading theory in 
understanding regional integration, not only in Europe, but across the globe. Moravcsik 
(1998) defined regional integration as follows:  
“European integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices 
made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and 
opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic 
constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and 
the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments” 
(Michel as cited in Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 69). 
While examining the above quote, Michel (2012:25) made the following observations: 
First, the nation states in international affairs are no longer regarded as the only actors, 
which is a view strongly held by the liberal intergovernmentalism school of thought. 
Moreover, domestic preference formation is also noted as a process that is influenced 
by economic interdependencies and subnational actors. Second, national interests 
and preferences influence international negotiations; however, the outcomes are often 
influenced by different states’ ability to negotiate decisively. Finally, international 




“The advocates of liberal intergovernmentalism have regarded it as a “’grand’ theory”, 
which can best explain any regional integration process (Michel, 2012:25). Although 
this study has maintained that there is possibly no single theory that can best explain 
regional integration. Unlike other theories, liberal intergovernmentalism does not 
attribute initial European integration to security and ideational issues, however, it does 
support the hypothesis that possible economic gains resulted in nation states seeking 
cooperation. The economic gains stemmed from the greater interdependency that 
existed within Europe and the world. Be it as it may, economic gains are not the only 
driving factors for regional integration. On the other hand, Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig (2009:70), argue that “geopolitical interests (even more than 
ideology) also had an important impact on European integration” (cited in Michel, 
2012:25). Liberal intergovernmentalism theorists have identified the second stage to 
regional integration as Substantive Bargains, which deals with the negotiation 
processes that lead to international treaties”.  
The third stage of the integration process is Institutional Choice. Following in the 
footsteps of the regime theory, liberal intergovernmentalism’s key assumption is that 
“nation states during negotiations create international (even supranational) institutions 
in order to prevent unwanted consequences, tackle unforeseen outcomes, and reduce 
future transaction costs of cooperation” (Michel, 2012:25). However, instead of shifting 
loyalties and power resulting in the creation of supranational organisations, nation 
states’ interests to secure their own future benefits play the most important role. In the 
authors’ words, “states establish rules for the distribution of gains according to the pre-
existing bargain and reduce the costs of coordinating their activities, monitoring the 
behavior of others, and mutually sanctioning non-compliance” (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72).” 
2. 7 Conclusion  
This chapter has laid a conceptual and theoretical framework for this dissertation. It 
began by examining the concept of African unity, and it was maintained that the 
concept of African unity has also been evolving with the evolution of Pan-Africanism, 
since it is Pan-African-driven or inspired. Therefore, the concept of African unity has 
been changing according to the aspirations of the different generations of Pan-




unity from solidarity and cooperation against slavery;.a common act among African 
slaves was when they would come together to revolt against the institution of slavery. 
Another phase of African unity was punctuated by a call to return to Africa under the 
back to Africa movement, which was popularised by Marcus Garvey at the beginning 
of the 20th century, although this call began way before the 20th century. With the 
formation of the Pan-African Congresses another phase of African unity became an 
intellectual platform, which brought together peoples of Africa to discuss common 
issues facing Africans across the globe. It is important to note that the formation of the 
Pan-African Congresses was regarded as the first phase in the institutionalisation of 
Pan-Africanism. The second phase in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism 
demanded that African unity be represented by the formation of the United States of 
Africa/Union Government of Africa, which would take the form of political integration 
with a supranational government. The conceptualisation of African unity in the third 
phase is similar to the one presented in the second phase of the institutionalisation of 
Pan-Africanism.  
This chapter went on to discuss the theoretical framework which will guide this study. 
First and foremost, this chapter adopted Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance as 
theories to guide this dissertation. This chapter noted that these two theories are not 
often regarded as such, but they are rather viewed as ideologies and not theories 
equivalent to European theories of IR and Political Studies. Furthermore, this chapter 
discussed the so-called “European integration theories”, which would also assist in 













Centripetal and centrifugal forces during the first phase of African unity  
3.1 Introduction 
One of the foremost pantheons of Pan-Africanism the Afro-American scholar Dr 
DuBois famously observed: 
The idea of one Africa to unite the thought and ideals of all native people of the 
dark continent belongs to the twentieth century and stems naturally from the 
West Indies and the United States. Here various groups of Africans, quite 
separate in origin, became united in experience and so exposed to the impact 
of new cultures that they began to think of Africa as one idea and one land 
(cited in Thompson, 1969:7).  
As correctly observed by DuBois the agitation for a united Africa belongs to the 
generation of Pan-Africanists of the 20th century; however, its foundation goes deeper 
than this. Moreover, it did not end in the 20th century, the evidence of that is that 
Africans today refer to the 21st century as Africa’s century, which means “unity is the 
cornerstone of this pursuit” (Ndizera and Muzee, 2018:144).  
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the centripetal and centrifugal forces 
in the first phase of African unity debates. In order to do that, this chapter will be divided 
into sections and subsections, which will assist in achieving the aims of this chapter 
and ultimately that of this dissertation. The debates on African unity have often been 
dubbed as the “Pan-African unity debates”; hence, the researcher has adopted Pan-
Africanism as a theoretical framework to guide this study. For Nkrumah, “Pan-
Africanism means nothing unless it transcends the artificial colonial borders and 
boundaries” (Legun, 1962:54). The main architect of these artificial colonial borders is 
the great German leader Otto von Bismarck, who played a key role in unifying 
Germany in the 19th century, and paradoxically initiated the partition of Africa in 
November 1884 at the infamous Berlin Conference (Mazrui, 2010:1). As Lord 
Salisbury, the then British prime minister, postulated at Anglo-French Conference in 
1890:” 
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot 




other, only hindered by small impediment that we never knew exactly where the 
mountains and rivers and lakes were (Abegunrin, 2009:142).  
Discussing the colonial policy Otto von Bismarck said to Eugen Wolf on 5 December 
1888 “your map of Africa is all very fine, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is 
Russia and here is France, and we are in the middle; that is my map of Africa” 
(Adebajo, 2010:1;Ratcliffe, 2016).  
Ironically, the city of Berlin that hosted the scramble for Africa became one of the 
casualties of the Cold War, when it was divided into East Berlin and West Berlin, with 
the former belonging to the Eastern bloc under the influence of the Soviet Union, while 
the latter belonged to the Western bloc under the stewardship of the United States of 
America (USA) (Mazrui, 2010:i). However, the end of the Cold War led to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, which signaled not only the end of the Cold War, but also the 
balkanisation of Germany. Unlike the Germans, who forced the artificial border of 
Berlin to collapse, ushering in the unification of West and East Germany; on the other 
hand, Africans inherited their colonial borders, a decision that was endorsed at the 
Second OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964 (Abegunrin, 2009:146). According to Adebajo 
(2010), the effects of these colonial borders on Africa are so devastating, and they are 
punctuated by “imported political systems; fragmented and weak economies; artificial, 
insecure borders; and 16 landlocked countries”. Akinwumi described the Berlin 
Conference as: "the conference did irreparable damage to the continent. Some 
countries are still suffering from it to this day". Furthermore, Adebajo (2010:2) referred 
to these post-Berlin Conference challenges as the “Curse of Berlin”. Even though the 
African states inherited the arbitrarily drawn artificial colonial borders at the dawn of 
independence the proponents of African unity, such as Nkrumah, continued to view 
Pan-Africanism as a vehicle that would remedy the ills caused by the curse of Berlin. 
Seeking political kingdom became the foremost step towards the rectification of the 
damage caused by the Berlin Conference in Africa. When a nucleus of African 
independent states emerged, the quest to challenge the colonial borders was tabled 
rigorously by Nkrumah and other Pan-Africanists (Wapmuk, 2009:650).”    
The devastating impact of the Berlin Conference on Africa cannot be over- 
emphasised; however, the Berlin Conference was not the only calamity to befall 




“Europe and the Americas, colonialism was being entrenched in Africa under the guise 
of civilising the so-called “Dark Continent” (Esedebe, 1970:111). “Bergad (2007:xi), 
described the African slave trade and slavery as one of the “great human tragedies in 
the development of the Americas”. Furthermore, Bergad (2007:2) argued, “the 
transatlantic slave trade, led to the transportation of between 10 million and 12 million 
enslaved Africans across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas from the 16th to the 19th 
century”. The triangular trade as it was known, was fueled by slavery. In this “triangular 
trade, in which arms, textiles, and wine were shipped from Europe to Africa, slaves 
from Africa to the Americas, and sugar and coffee from the Americas to Europe”; 
African slaves were reduced to chattels, and as such treated like worthless beings. As 
observed by Bergad (2007:165), from the moment of enslavement the slaves had one 
aspiration, and that was to be free. Their endeavours to seek their freedom took many 
forms, ranging from buying of their freedom to organising uprisings, as well as carving 
out a space for themselves within the obnoxious system of slavery. These acts 
represented Pan-Africanism, because Pan-Africanism is a “protest, a refusal, a 
demand, and a utopia born of centuries of contact with Europe” (Legum, 1962:14).”  
Prior to the infamous transatlantic slave trade, and the resistance of those who were 
enslaved, Africa had witnessed invasion of the foreign Europeans as early as 1510. 
The invasion is known as South Africa’s first major war of resistance. As noted by 
Khoisan (2016) the Khoi and the San were the first to put their bodies on the battle line 
against the most powerful military of that time, the Portuguese, in defence of their 
territory.  
This was encapsulated by Professor Clarke in his address at the “Second World Black 
and African Festival of Arts and Culture” hosted in Lagos, Nigeria from January to 
February 1977 where he made the following remarks: 
For a period of more than a hundred years, African warriors, nationalists, most 
kings… out maneuvered and out-general some of the best military minds of 
Europe. They planted the seeds of African independence for another 
generation to harvest. Their Pan-Africanism was more military than intellectual, 
but it was Pan-Africanism. 
From the above quote it is unequivocal that the early Pan-Africanists resisted the 




African peoples with Pan-Africanism. Henceforth, at the dawn of African independence 
African leaders called for Pan-African unity as a catalyst for Africa’s political and 
economic emancipation, and development (Adogamhe, 2008:2). The quest for African 
unity rose to pre-eminence in the mid-1950s, yet its epistemological origins go deeper 
than this. Since the advent of the Pan-African Congresses at the beginning of the 20th 
century it had long been established by early Pan-Africanists, that the only way to 
dismantle the slavery and colonial oppression system was through unity. For Edward 
Blyden, Marcus Garvey and many other proponents of the back to Africa movement 
in the diaspora, unity meant going back to Africa. This can then be argued to have 
been the first pronouncement of the quest for African unity (Mathews, 2018:28).  
Chapter two of this study focused on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and 
in that chapter the theory of Pan-Africanism was discussed extensively. What became 
clear from the previous chapter is that Pan-Africanism has no single meaning, founder 
and base. However, what came out even more clearly is that the central components 
of Pan-Africanism have been: clear expression of the pride and achievement of 
Africans; the idea of returning to Africa, a notion mainly promoted by Africans in the 
diaspora; the liberation from colonialism and all forms of oppression; and the 
promotion of African unity as a primary objective in the struggle for liberation from 
European colonialism (Adogamhe, 2008:8).”  
In line with the aims of this chapter, the discussion will begin with the emergence of 
Pan-Africanism as a response to slavery and colonialism, with more emphasis on the 
debates on the back to Africa movement. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the 
Pan-African Congresses and their impact in shaping the debates on African unity. 
Moreover, this chapter will discuss the transplantation of Pan-Africanism to Africa, and 
how this theory/ideology influenced the debates on African unity. In this regard, the 
attention will be on the convergences and divergences embedded in the debates 
between the Monrovia, Casablanca and Brazzaville camps, which were advocating for 
their own distinctive approaches towards African unity. The central argument of this 
chapter is that the study of the Pan-African unity debates and its evolution should be 
examined through the broader history of Pan-Africanism. This is largely because one 





3.2 The rise of Pan-Africanism and the search for African unity   
The purpose of this section is to discuss the rise of Pan-Africanism and its quest for 
African unity; coupled with that are the debates on the back to Africa movement, which 
according to this study were the first debates on the quest for African unity. This 
section will be divided into two subsections. To begin with, the first subsection will 
discuss the origins and goals of Pan-Africanism. The second subsection will focus on 
Pan-Africanism and the debates on the back to Africa movement.   
Scholars have been generating a plethora of literature on the nature of state(s) in 
Africa before the advent of the slave trade and colonialism, which had unprecedented 
distraction on African society.  As noted by Adedeji (2008:1), the irony, however, is 
“that these external pressures and their disruptive effects also contained the seeds of 
new forms of solidarity and community. The slave trade also prompted the idea of Pan-
Africanism to galvanise united actions by a people who had been wronged by a dark 
moment in world history to remaster their destiny”. The notion of a nation-state by 
Western standards was non-existent in pre-colonial Africa, so to the credit of the 
unholy mission of civilizing the so-called “Dark Continent” the nation-states emerged 
in Africa.” 
To the contrary, Adedeji (2008:1), argues that the formation of state and nation-
building preceded the arrival of the Europeans in Africa. The forms of state and nation-
building were predicated on the “centrality of community, solidarity and inclusion of 
populations around emerging territorial spaces” (Adedeji, 2008:1).  Mazrui (2010) 
postulates that the pre-colonial African territorial boundaries were not regarded as 
permanent and untouchable walls that divided and separated the people.  However, 
“they also served as transactional spaces for mediating various social, economic, 
political and cultural flows. It was this fact that was lost when the forces of European 
colonialism gathered at the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 and partitioned Africa into 
a host of small politico-administrative units on the basis of the Westphalian concept of 
the nation-state” (Mazrui, 2010). 
The notion of Pan-Africanism is shared by the peoples of Africa and its diaspora going 
back over five centuries and more (Ackah, 1999:12). Pan-Africanism can be divided 
into two: first as an ideology and second as a movement (Thompson, 1969). As a 




ultimate unity of the people of Africa across the globe (Dung and Erhunmunsee, 
2017:81). As an ideology, “Guinean President Sekou Toure calls it a “spiritual 
decolonization”, hence, Pan-Africanism is regarded as a reaction to colonial 
enslavement in Africa and racial discrimination against the descendants of African 
slaves in America; it is an ideological and political means of fighting racialism and 
colonialism.” Although these views of Pan-Africanism are widely accepted, these two 
views are not adequate in encapsulating the concept of Pan-Africanism. Hence, the 
biggest questions that scholars have been grappling with insofar as Pan-Africanism is 
concerned are: What is Pan-Africanism, when did it begin, who are its founders, why 
did it emerge, where and how? Despite the fact that these questions have featured as 
research questions of many scholarly papers and books they remain contested by 
scholars and African leaders alike. Suffice it to say, “there are conflicting 
interpretations of Pan-Africanism and African unity as presented by scholars, 
politicians and civil society” (Adegunrin, 2016a:1).  
As aforementioned, one school of thought traces the roots of Pan-Africanism “to the 
beginning of the transatlantic slave trade which was abolished in the 19th century” 
(Killingray, 2012:394). Africans who were taken against their will, forced into unpaid 
labour and stripped of their human dignity by being turned into chattels for the benefit 
and the development of the New World revolted against this treatment marking the 
seeding of Pan-Africanism (Thompson, 1969: xxii). Hence, this narrative puts forward 
the idea that Pan-Africanism developed in the African diaspora as a revolt against 
slavery and subjugation. The proponents of this school of thought often define Pan-
Africanism “as a protest, a refusal, a demand, and a utopia born of centuries of contact 
with Europe” (Abegunrin, 2016a:1). 
On the other hand, another school of thought traces the roots of Pan-Africanism to 
Africa rather than in her diaspora. Although this school of thought is not so popular in 
academia, it remains an alternative narrative in understanding the roots of Pan-
Africanism. Central to this school of thought is the idea that the characteristics of Pan-
Africanism were exhibited in Africa before Pan-Africanism emerged in the African 
diaspora (Williams, 2005). Perhaps the biggest question at this juncture would be: 
what are the characteristics of Pan-Africanism, or put differently, what is it that 
constitutes Pan-Africanism? Ackah (1999:12), distinguishes between Pan-Africanism 




Thompson (1969:xxii) has also divided the origins of Pan-Africanism into two phases: 
first as a movement underpinned by physical revolts; and the second phase by 
intellectual revolts, targeted at restoring hope and self-confidence of the peoples of 
Africa who had been languishing under the hostile system of slavery with little or no 
changes after the liberation. Therefore, this study will make an attempt to present both 
schools of thought on the origins of Pan-Africanism and explore different definitions 
attached to Pan-Africanism in order to ascertain how Pan-Africanism has evolved, 
more particularly regarding the quest for African unity. 
Apart from the ambiguity found in literature on the origins of Pan-Africanism, scholars 
have been debating on who the pioneers of Pan-Africanism are in an endeavour to 
ascertain the origins of this phenomenon. Over and above this, to at least try and 
understand the founding mission and vision of this movement of actions and ideas 
through tracing its founders. In doing so, scholars have been studying a range of Pan-
Africanists who emerged over the years, endowed with different talents and 
enthusiasm driven by different goals and objectives of Pan-Africanism bestowed upon 
them by the needs of their time. These Pan-Africanists ranged from activists, scholars, 
politicians, philosophers, musical and literati activists. The message of Pan-Africanism 
was spread in various ways by these Pan-Africanists. The call for African unity and 
integration has been at the centre of Pan-Africanism agency expressed by a range of 
Pan-Africanists, however, the question that needs to be interrogated in this regard is 
whether African unity and integration as underpinned by Pan-Africanism has had a 
consistent meaning or whether it has also evolved with the evolution of Pan-
Africanism. Although this question was addressed in chapter two of this study, this 
section will be building up from the discussion in chapter two insofar as the evolution 
of Pan-Africanism and one of its central pillars: African unity.” 
Pan-Africanism has gone through various stages and phases from the time of its 
inception. As noted in chapter one of this dissertation, Murithi (2008:1) and Mathews 
(2011:28; 2018:16) categorised these phases of Pan-Africanism into three phases that 
signify the evolution or growth of Pan-Africanism. These stages are identified as 
follows: The five Pan-African Congresses hosted between 1900 to 1945 denotes the 
first phase. Although it should be noted that within the literature there is a debate on 
the figure and the dates of the Pan-African Congresses. The establishment of the OAU 




and the transition from the OAU to AU in 2002 is regarded as the third phase or stage. 
According to Murithi (2008:3), if the pursuit of forming the Union of Governments 
became successful, which was deliberated further in the Accra Declaration in 2007, it 
would be counted as the fourth phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism. As noted by 
Esedebe (1970:110), although the debate on the question of an African Union 
Government is regarded as one of the pivotal developments or phases in the 
development of Pan-Africanism, there is, however, a tendency to regard Pan-
Africanism as a creation of contemporary African politicians especially in their debates 
on the Union of Governments. However, the roots of Pan-Africanism are deeper than 
the debates on the African Union Government, but this study maintains that the earlier 
generations that called for African unity might not have called it the African Union 
Government debate, but rather the “back to Africa debate”. Therefore, this makes the 
unification debate as old as Pan-Africanism. For early Pan-Africanists unity denoted 
going back to Africa to be united with their fellow brethren in the motherland. Having 
said that, the following subsection will discuss the origins and goals of Pan-Africanism. 
As Sherwood (2012) reminds us, the goals of Pan-Africanism have never been static, 
which means the goals of Pan-Africanism have been evolving with the evolution of 
Pan-Africanism.  
3.2.1 Understanding Pan-Africanism: Origins and goals  
It is very rare to find a scholarly work, especially in social sciences, that does not give 
a historical account of a phenomenon under study. More particularly a phenomenon 
that has a long and contested history such as Pan-Africanism. As Carl Sagan once 
famously put it “you have to know the past to understand the present”. Andrew 
Billingsley in his seminal essay titled: ’Edward Blyden: Apostle of Blackness’, urged a 
young generation of black scholars to pick up the spear from Blyden to fight for global 
recognition of blackness as worthy and important. He argues that this “young 
generation cannot undertake this momentous task by only looking to the future, but 
rather, should do so by also looking backwards” (Billingsley,1970:4). It is for these 
reasons that this research has focused on understanding the concept of African unity 
and the debates thereof by discussing the history of Pan-Africanism; because African 
unity cannot be fully understood without Pan-Africanism. With that being said, the 




It is fashionable nowadays to speak as if Pan-Africanism is an entirely new and exotic 
phenomenon that began in 1900, or to speak as if the Du Boisian congresses 
constituted its sum total.” Esedebe (1972:108) as a leading authority on the subject of 
Pan-Africanism has cautioned about this, when he said:  
it is misleading to concentrate exclusively on the role of Du Bois and his 
congresses, important as these were in the development of the Pan-African 
idea: His role, of course, in the emergence of Pan-Africanism was profound: but 
the scholarly study of the phenomenon, in all its multifarious complexities, will 
suffer if too much emphasis is placed on his role and his writing. We still need 
to know more about the pre-1919 forces and personalities. 
Scholars such as Esedebe have cautioned us about being parochial when it comes to 
tracing the roots of Pan-Africanism by exclusively associating it to the Pan-African 
Congresses under the stewardship of Du Bois. This study does acknowledge the 
paramount contribution made by the Pan-African Congresses, especially under the 
stewardship of DuBois, however, this study is also not oblivious to other contributors 
and factors that led to the development of Pan-Africanism. After the transplantation of 
Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa, the scope of Pan-Africanism has been 
narrowed to the formation of the OAU and the role played by Nkrumah in the spreading 
of ideas of Pan-Africanism and African unity. Similar sentiments can be expressed 
about this approach, which also limits one’s understanding of Pan-Africanism. 
Henceforth, the best approach to fully understanding Pan-Africanism is by looking at 
it holistically, although that too can pose a momentous challenge in that Pan-
Africanism is also an elusive concept.  
As indicated in the above argument, Ackah presents a balanced view in the narrative 
of the roots of Pan-Africanism between the African continent and its diaspora as being 
the cradle of Pan-Africanism. While the scope on the origins of Pan-Africanism has 
been widely covered in the vast literature on Pan-Africanism; for the purpose of this 
study it is necessary to detail the origins of Pan-Africanism more particularly in search 
of the evolution of the African unity debate and attempts.  
The history of Pan-Africanism and the desire for African unity stretches beyond African 
shores and it is a history shared by billions of Africans and African descendants on the 




of Pan-Africanism, so, to avoid repetition, this section deals with the origins and goals 
of Pan-Africanism as a movement and ideology seeking to promote African unity. 
However, it is important to note that there will be overlaps between the 
conceptualisation chapter and this subsection on the origins and goals of Pan-
Africanism. It became clear in chapter two of this study that Pan-Africanism “has no 
single founder, or a specific date of when it was launched, who launched it, where and 
when; and it remains a mystery” (Esedebe, 1970:110). Nevertheless, there is  
consensus among scholars that the word Pan-Africanism was coined by Henry 
Sylvester Williams leading up to the first Pan-African Congress in 1900 (Adi and 
Sherwood, 2003).  
K. M. Panikkar regarded Pan Africanism as “one of the gifts of the new world to the 
old”. Furthermore, Panikkar argues that Pan-Africanism was 
designed and developed by the descendants of the slaves settled in the United 
States, and the French and British West Indies. The major theoreticians of the 
movement till recently were all from the Western World - W. E.B. Du Bois, the 
American poet; Dr Price Mars, the Haitian; and Mr George Padmore, the West 
Indian. Only recently, has Pan Africanism taken root in Africa (cited in Saha, 
1967:7).  
Esedebe (1970:111), concurs with Panikkar, that Pan-Africanism originated in the New 
World linking it to the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which became a 
beacon of hope for descendants of slaves. He further asserts, “Pan-Africanism was a 
reaction to the racial doctrine that marked the era of abolitionism”. Nkrumah, who is 
regarded as a high priest of Pan-Africanism, expressed the profound role played by 
the African diaspora in the development of Pan-Africanism: 
We take their presence here as a manifestation of their keen interest in our 
struggle for a free Africa. We must never forget that they are part of us. These 
sons and daughters of Africa were taken away from our shores and despite all 
centuries which have separated us they have not forgotten their ancestral links. 
Many of them have made no small contribution to the cause of African freedom. 
Names which spring immediately to mind in this connection are those of Marcus 




our own degradation these men fought for African national and racial equality 
(Cited in Drake, 1959:7).     
These scholars argue that the seeding of Pan-Africanism was as a response to 
subjugation and oppression of Africans in the diaspora during the days of slavery and 
even when African slaves were freed from the chains of slavery their conditions never 
improved (Ackah, 1999:12; Thomson, 1969). Therefore, these conditions precipitated 
revolts from free Africans in the diaspora to fight against the oppressions suffered 
outside the institution of slavery and more importantly to call for the liberation of those 
slaves who were still languishing in slavery. According to Esedebe (1970:111), “Pan-
Africanism in the diaspora found expression in the independent African church 
movement also dubbed Ethiopianism and in revolts and protests against European 
colonialism in Africa”.  
The primary purpose of Pan-Africanism has been to fight for the rights of Africans 
either in Africa or across the oceans (Sherwood, 2012: 106). Having said that, this 
study is not oblivious to the fact that there is another strong narrative that traces the 
roots of Pan-Africanism to Africa rather than its diaspora. The argument brought forth 
by scholars such as Williams (2005) is that the characteristics of Pan-Africanism were 
exhibited in Africa before Pan-Africanism emerged in the African diaspora. 
Furthermore, scholars advancing this argument provide pre-slavery and pre-colonial 
clashes between Africans and Europeans as evidence of their argument. The 
argument that is presented by these scholars is that Pan-Africanism emerged as a 
rebellion to the invasion of Africa by foreigners prior to the European’s enslavement of 
Africans. This particular narrative negates the perspective that associates the origins 
of Pan-Africanism with the response to the enslavement of Africans. Given these basic 
assumptions that Pan-Africanism started in the diaspora it should also be noted that 
the grand scale of Africans taken across the Atlantic Ocean to be enslaved in the 
Western world and their revolts against enslavement might not have been the first 
instances in which Africans resisted or fought Western domination either in the form 
of slavery or invasion.  Inasmuch as this study considers that the narrative of Pan-
Africanism originating in Africa is undoubtedly correct, this understanding of Pan-




As noted by Dung and Erhunmwunsee (2016:81), “the principal tenet of Pan-
Africanism is a belief that African people, both in the motherland and in the diaspora 
do not only share a common history, but a mutual destiny”.  It is this principle that has 
fueled the desire to unite the African continent, not only itself but, also to unite with its 
diaspora. In chapter one, this study divided Pan-Africanism into two, the old Pan-
Africanism and the new Pan-Africanism. Insofar as new Pan-Africanism is concerned, 
this study alluded to African Renaissance as the new Pan-Africanism. However, in 
other literature, new Pan-Africanism is referred to as the Pan-African movement, which 
began in the diaspora. On the other hand, the old Pan-Africanism refers to the ancient 
African triumph epitomised by great Egyptian societies’ contributions to either 
knowledge of medicine, mathematics and geometry; to mention but a few. This form 
of Pan-Africanism is well captured in the work of the Senegalese scholar Cheikh Anta 
Diop.  
Pan-Africanism as a movement and ideology has undergone various stages in its 
evolution and development. In its evolution, Pan-Africanism has witnessed a 
geographical shift from the diaspora to Africa. Moreover, it has also witnessed the 
establishment of the first African continental organisation, the OAU, which was later 
replaced by the AU. These evolutions and developments have been driven by different 
goals and objectives of Pan-Africanism. At the core of these Pan-African goals is 
liberation of Africans across the globe from all forms of racial oppression. Coupled with 
this goal of ending racial oppression of Africans is the goal of political and economic 
freedom. There have been other goals of Pan-Africanism, such as sustainable 
development. African unity is not only a goal of Pan-Africanism, it is also a modus 
operandi towards the attainment of other Pan-African goals. Nkrumah argued that “no 
sporadic act or pious resolution can resolve our present problems. Nothing will be of 
avail, expect the united act of united Africa”. This view was further endorsed by Julius 
Nyerere who argued that “unity will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for 
Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated” (Nyerere, 1997).   
3.2.2 Joining the dots: Pan-Africanism and the return to Africa debate  
The back to Africa movement has generated debates over the years between the 
protagonists and antagonists of this movement. A debate that started in the abolitionist 




duBois became a household name in these debates. In his autobiography Dr duBois 
wrote: 
As I face Africa, I ask myself: what is it between us that constitutes a tie that I 
can feel better than I can explain? Africa is of course my fatherland. Yet neither 
my father nor father's father ever saw Africa or knew its meaning or cared 
overmuch for it. But the physical bond is least and -the badge of colour relatively 
unimportant save as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social 
heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds 
together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and 
into the South Seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa (Cited in Legum, 
1962:7). 
DuBois was not in favour of the idea of migrating back to Africa, a view that placed 
him in confrontation with Marcus Garvey. Paradoxically, Garvey never set his foot in 
Africa, while on the other hand, DuBois’ burial place is on the African soil. Their 
debates on the back to Africa movement will be explored in detail in the following 
discussion. The quest for African unity started as a call to return to Africa by the 
diaspora, who felt marginalised (Thompson, 1969:6). As encapsulated in the words of 
Lott Cary when he lamented the unfair treatment despite his meritorious conduct and 
pleasing character:  
I am an African and in this country, however meritorious my conduct and 
respectable my character, I cannot receive the credit due to either. I wish to go 
to a country where I shall be estimated by my merits not by my complexion, and 
I feel bound to labor for my suffering race (Cited in Fisher, 1922; Esedebe, 
1970:112). 
Similar sentiments were echoed by DuBois who adversely opposed the idea of going 
back to Africa. DuBois argued that “in my own country for nearly half a century I have 
been nothing but a nigger” (Legum, 1961:26). DuBois was of the view that African 
Americans can improve their conditions in their adopted countries. The call for the 
return to Africa was not only motivated by the mistreatment of Africans in the diaspora, 
but also by a feeling of longing for home. According to Adeleke (1997: 107), this feeling 
of longing for Africa among the black diaspora is due to African consciousness and 




consciousness and values were passed on from one generation of the African 
diaspora to another. Adeleke (1997: 107), states that “for the articulate free blacks, 
Africa represented a source of hope and identity, the negation of pro-slavery 
socialization. Perhaps most importantly, Africa was also the beacon light that 
illuminated the path to ultimate freedom”. The feeling of longing for Africa was captured 
in the words of Claud McKay’s Outcast:  
For the dim regions whence my fathers came My spirit, bondaged by the body, 
longs. Words felt, but never heard, my lips would frame; My soul would sing 
forgotten jungle songs. I would go back to darkness and to peace. But the great 
western world holds me in fee, And I may never hope for full release While to 
its alien gods I bend my knee. Something in me is lost, forever lost, Some vital 
thing has gone out of my heart, And I must walk the way of life a ghost Among 
the sons of earth, a thing apart. For I was born, far from my native clime, Under 
the white man's menace, out of time (Cited in Legum, 1962:15).  
Years have passed since Africans in the Americas and Europe broke free from the 
chains of slavery, but the longing for Africa remains alive to this day among the African 
diaspora. In 2018, Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo personally launched The Year 
of Return (TYOR) project in Washington DC. For years, Ghana has been a home to 
most of the returnees and continues to receive more Africans from the diaspora than 
any other country. However, as it will be discussed below, there is a long history of 
Africans returning to Ghana and other African countries inspired by a non-dying spirit 
of the return to Africa.   
This study has consistently referred to Pan-Africanism as a movement and as an 
ideology. The preceding chapters and sections of this dissertation have distinguished 
between Pan-Africanism as a movement and as an ideology, therefore this subsection 
will not delve into that. Suffice it to say, within the back to Africa movement there were 
two groups: the theorists and the pragmatists. This subsection will examine both 
groups, and their successful and unsuccessful attempts to unite Africa through the 
back to Africa movement.  
One of the most challenging aspects of Pan-Africanism either as a movement or an 
ideology is putting a date to it, especially the beginning of the events. Also, coupled 




that is not so challenging, one cannot downplay the fact that the pioneers of certain 
ideas are often unknown. This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that the history 
of Africans, either under the institutions of slavery or in the motherland, was never 
recorded. However, there is an increase in the study of African history and Pan- 
Africanism that aims at closing gaps in the literature of African history and that of Pan-
Africanism.  
Frantz Fanon (2004) famously argued that “each generation must discover its mission, 
fulfill it or betray it, in relative opacity”. Pan-Africanism is one of the oldest movements 
and ideologies in the world, it undoubtedly boasts several missions, which have been 
bestowed upon several generations of Pan-Africanists from the generation of slaves 
in the Americas and Caribbean plantations to the post-independent Africans. A 
mission that has transcended generations of Pan-Africanists has been that of African 
unity. Generations of Pan-Africanists have shared a common vision of a united Africa; 
despite having a common vision, they have grossly differed on the navigation towards 
the attainment of African unity.  The subsequent discussion will delve into the debates 
on African unity under the banner of the return to Africa. 
Perhaps the biggest question at this juncture would be: what makes the return to Africa 
movement and its debates a part of the quest for African unity? To answer this 
question, one would have to juxtapose the underlying goals and aims of the back to 
Africa movement with that of African unity. Has the return to Africa by the diaspora 
community to this day been a representative of African unity? What are the 
distinguishing features between the search for African unity of the 18th century in the 
form of African unity and the one that was sought after by Nkrumah and later Gaddafi 
and Mbeki, which is further envisioned in Africa’s Agenda 2063?     
In June 2017, the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) hosted 
a three-day conference on ’The Pan-African Pantheon’ − at which world-class scholars 
assessed 40 key figures of Pan-Africanism from Edward Blyden to Miriam Makeba. It 
goes without saying that Edward Blyden is undeniably recognised as one of the early 
beacons of Pan-Africanism. Therefore, following in the footsteps of the IPATC which 
kicked off its conference on the Pan-African pantheon by discussing Blyden, this study 
will also examine the debates in the back to Africa movement as a quest for African 




The back to Africa debate had two major camps, those who called for African unity 
through the return to Africa and those who opposed the return to Africa, rather opting 
for the unity of Africans in their adopted countries. On the other hand, those who called 
for African unity through the return to Africa had also two major opposing views. There 
was a camp which was led by Edward Wilmot Blyden, which called for the return to 
Africa by all Africans living in the diaspora. On the other hand, there was another camp 
led by Martin R. Delaney, which advocated for the return to Africa in a gradual form 
starting with the highly skilled Africans (Ackah, 1999:15). Those who were against the 
idea of returning to Africa were led by Frederick Douglass and they called for rights in 
their adopted countries.” 
Blyden was calling for the immediate total return of the peoples of African descent in 
the diaspora, while on the other hand, Delaney was calling for the gradual approach, 
meaning all African descendants should return to Africa, but not all at once. His 
argument was that, those with skills should be the first ones to migrate back to Africa 
to assist with preparing Africa and the Africans for the grand return of its descendants. 
Frederick Douglass and later DuBois were against the idea of migrating back to Africa. 
While this study aims at analysing the debates between those who were in favour of 
African unity,  it does not ignore the voices of those who opposed the idea of the return 
to Africa or of forging African unity through the return to Africa (Ackah, 1999:15).  
Blyden’s argument was predicated on the concept of “African personality”, which he 
developed in response to the notions of African inferiority. Blyden's African personality 
concept was based on his conviction that human beings were fundamental cultural 
beings − a fact borne out by contemporary cultural anthropology (Legum, 1962:20).  
Blyden’s argument can be summed up in brief from his address:  
African must advance by methods of his own. He must possess a power distinct 
from that of the European. It has been proved that he knows how to take 
advantage of European culture and that he can be benefited by it. Their proof 
was perhaps necessary, but it is not sufficient. We must show that we are able 
to go alone, to carve out our own way. We must not be satisfied that, in this 
nation, European influence shapes our polity, makes our laws, rules in our 
tribunals and impregnates our social atmosphere. It will be our aim to increase 




amount of those distracting influences to which I have referred as hindering the 
proper growth of the race. The true principle of mental culture is perhaps this: 
to preserve an accurate balance between the studies which carry the mind out 
of itself, and those which recall it home again. In looking over the whole world I 
see no place where this sort of culture for the Negro can be better secured than 
in Africa ;where he may, with less interruption from surrounding influences, find 
out his place and his work, develop his peculiar gifts and powers; and for the 
training of Negro youth upon the basis of their own idiosyncracies, with a sense 
of race individuality, self-respect, and liberty (Cited in Legum, 1962:20). 
Dr Blyden went on to say on another occasion: 
All our traditions are connected with a foreign race. We have no poetry or 
philosophy but that of our taskmasters. The songs that live in our ears and are 
often on our lips are the songs which we heard sung by those who shouted 
while we groaned and lamented. They sang of their history, which was the 
history of our degradation. They recited their triumphs, which was the history of 
our humiliation. To our great misfortune, we learned their prejudices and their 
passions, and thought we had their aspirations and their power. Now, if we are 
to make an independent nation - a strong nation - we must listen to the songs 
of our unsophisticated brethren as they sing of their history, as they tell of their 
traditions, of the wonderful and mysterious events of their tribal or national life, 
of the achievements of what we call their superstitions; we must lend a ready 
ear to the ditties of the Kroomen who pull our boats, of the Pesseh and Golah 
men, who till our farms; we must read the compositions, rude as we may think 
them, of the Mandingoes and the Veys (Cited in Legum, 1962:21). 
From the above quotations, it can be deduced that Blyden’s notion of African 
personality influenced his ideas of the return to Africa. He felt that the voices of the 
slave-masters and their influence would make it hard for Africans in the diaspora to 
assert their own rights in their adopted countries. The founding fathers of the United 
States (US) predicated their Constitution on values of human rights, equality for all, 
freedom of speech and inalienable rights to justice, freedom and fair opportunities. 
However, Africans and the indigenous population found themselves alienated from 




schools, churches, shopping centres and not allowed to marry their white counterparts. 
To make matters worse, slavery was still in full swing in other parts of the US, 
especially in the south. African Americans had countless attempts to counter the 
system of oppression and segregation.  
Africa was that safe haven for these African descendants who felt marginalised and 
alienated in the diaspora. There are many other factors which propelled these African 
descendants to yearn for home. Although this back to Africa movement gained 
currency during the era of Marcus Garvey, it did not start then nor were there 
contestations (Del’a, 2000:15). The transplantation of Pan-Africanism to Africa gave 
birth to the call for African unity with Kwame Nkrumah being the leading exponent of 
a united Africa symbolised in the form of an African Union Government, a single federal 
system (Adogamhe, 2010).   
As aforementioned, Marcus Garvey became a formidable force in the struggle for the 
return to Africa. A view, which placed him in confrontation with DuBois who strongly 
believed that Africans in the diaspora should leave no stone unturned to liberate their 
brethren in the motherland. However, he opposed the idea of migrating back to Africa, 
although “he lamented the unfair treatment of the African descendants in America and 
across the globe”. Writing on the rivalry between Garvey and DuBois, Thompson 
(1969:42) argued that “the differences in their upbringing shaped their lenses and 
worldview. DuBois was a notable and revered university professor, a showman and 
great speaker; on the other hand, Garvey was an influential mass leader and largely 
self-taught. Because of his education, DuBois was diplomatic in his approach, while 
Garvey was aggressive”. 
DuBois was in favour of the idea of securing the rights of participation by Africans in 
governments in their respective countries. Moreover, in instances where Africans were 
regarded as not ready to self-rule, he called for a trusteeship system, although he was 
not against the idea of self-rule by Africans. Garvey, on the other hand, advocated for 
African unity, which he believed would create a bridgehead on the African continent 
from which the colonial struggle could be waged and leading to Africa becoming a 
united nation. Garvey argued that a gradual approach in the transporting of Africans 




Garvey established the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the 
Pan-African League upon his return to Jamaica in 1914 to promote his ideas of self-
governance of the peoples of Africa in Africa and abroad. He developed the motto 
“Africa for Africans at home and abroad” for his two organisations (Del’a, 2000:14).   
The goals of his organisations were to: 
• “Create a global entity, which would accommodate all peoples of Africa.  
• Inject self-pride among all the peoples of Africa. 
• Civilise the uncivilised Africans  
• Establish committees and agencies that would represent Africans across the 
globe.” 
As aforementioned, Garvey was a leading proponent of the return to Africa movement 
during his time. To attain his goal Garvey aimed to create unity between America and 
Africa, and in doing so, he believed that he would be presenting Africa to the world 
and also America to mankind. However, his ultimate goal was to make a home for 
America’s Negroes in Africa (Del’a, 2000:15). Given the oppression that African 
descendants faced in America and Europe, Garvey believed that the only solution 
would be to repatriate all American Negroes to Africa. On the other hand, Britain and 
France would be forced to hand over their colonies to American Negroes and the 
Carribeans (West Indians) who fought on their side in World War I (Del’a, 2000:14; 
Dagnini,2008). He further argued that these two major colonial powers would have to 
relinquish their control in West Africa as a repayment of the debt they owed the US. 
He identified Liberia as the foothold in Africa.  
To attain these goals, Garvey established the Black Star Line, which served as a link 
to Africans across the globe. He also took an initiative to write and send 
representatives to the Liberian authorities requesting a piece of land, wherein a 
community would be built for returnees. The request was declined on the basis that 
the Liberian president was skeptical of Garvey and feared that he would stage a coup 
d'état in Liberia, since he was calling himself the president of the United States of 






3.3 Pan-African Congresses and the quest for African unity 
The purpose of this section is to not only enumerate the Pan-African Congresses, 
which have often been representative of the evolution of Pan-Africanism, but to draw 
the connections between the Pan-African Congresses and the search for African unity. 
Coupled with that, is to examine the resolutions taken at the Pan-African Congresses 
on African unity. It is important to note from the onset that the issue of African unity in 
a sense of political and economic union/integration was never adopted in the 
resolutions of the Pan-African Congresses (Sherwood, 2017:64). The unity that was 
pursued within the Pan-African Congresses was not similar to the one the post-
independent Pan-Africanists sought, but rather it was a unity in an ideological and 
cultural way of solidarity.  
The roots of African unity can be traced to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when 
the idea of Pan-Africanism developed as a response to colonialism and racism (Ackah, 
1999:13). This led to a series of Pan-African Congresses hosted between 1900 and 
1945 to provide a platform for discussion among black leaders, intellectuals and 
members of the African diaspora (Michel, 2012:35). The bulk of the literature traces 
the roots of Pan-Africanism to the first Pan-African Congress in 1900 (Mathews, 
2018:16). This study has adopted the same approach; however, this study went further 
back in its trace of the origins of Pan-Africanism apart from the Pan-African 
Congresses. Although this research takes into consideration that the development and 
the evolution of Pan-Africanism as a movement or ideology is central to the Pan-
African Congresses, this study included the Pan-African Congresses as one of the 
platforms in which the topic of African unity was evoked.” 
One of the eminent scholars of Pan-Africanism, Thompson (1969:23), argued that the 
entire history of Pan-Africanism since 1900 reflects the endeavour of “Africans to 
establish some form of unity as a bulwark against the inroads which persons of 
European origin have made into the lives of Africans”. The first Pan-African Congress 
was organised in London by Henry Sylvester Williams; there is a debate on whether 
the 1900 Pan-African Congress was indeed the first Pan-African Congress, or if it was 
the second Pan-African Congress. There are different narrations from scholars of 
history as to when the first Pan-African Congress took place (Abegunrin, 2016b:17). 




Congress, also known as the Manchester Congress, as being the fifth or sixth Pan-
African Congress. 
While this study leans on the literature that regards the 1900 Pan-African Congress as 
the first Pan-African Congress, this study does acknowledge the literature that traces 
the roots of the first Pan-African Congress to the Chicago Congress. The proponents 
of this school of thought “have based their argument on the notion that the word Pan-
Africanism was born at this conference in 1893”. Scholars such as Abegunrin  
(2016b:17), have taken a leaf from Esedebe’s work wherein he dismisses W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s assertion that, the Pan-African meeting summoned in London in 1900 which put 
the word Pan-African in the dictionaries for the first time, is largely responsible for the 
orthodox view that the gathering was the first Pan-African convention ever. As argued 
by Esedebe (1976:30), “the Chicago Congress on Africa of which our authorities 
appear to be unaware, has a better claim”. Not only does this argument by Esedebe 
nullify the argument that the 1900 Congress was the first Pan-African Congress, but it 
also dismisses the claim that the word Pan-Africanism was first used by Henry 
Sylvester Williams. While this study does not aim to get entangled in these debates or 
digress from its main aims, it does acknowledge the significance of the Chicago 
Congress on the debates on African unity.     
Among many other prominent attendees at the conference was the ardent advocate 
of the back to Africa movement, Bishop Henry Turner. Abdegunrin (2016b:18), has 
described the 1893 Chicago Congress as an academic congress, because the 
congress focused on academic papers. Henry Turner presented a paper titled: “What 
do American Negro owe to their kin beyond the sea”. In that paper, Henry Turner 
argued that the development of Africa and its people depends on the migration of 
Africans to the motherland. In another paper titled: “The American Negro and his 
fatherland”, he argued that “there is no manhood future in the United States for the 
Negro”.  
On 24 September 1895, the African Association which was later renamed the Pan-
African Association, was formed by Henry Sylvester Williams in London (Thompson, 
1969:23). Its main purposes were:  
To encourage a feeling of unity and to facilitate friendly intercourse among 




African descent, wholly or in part, in British colonies and other places, especially 
in Africa; by circulating accurate information on all subjects affecting their rights 
and privileges as subjects of the British Empire; by direct appeals to the Imperial 
and local Government (Thompson, 1969:23; Abegunrin, 2016b:.20).   
The formation of the Pan-African Association paved a way for the London Pan-African 
Congress held from 23 to 25 July 1900 (Sherwood, 2012). The convener and organiser 
of this congress, Henry Sylvester Williams, was aggrieved by the conditions of the 
Africans in South Africa. He learnt of the sufferings of the natives after his encounter 
with Alice Kinloch of South Africa (Killingray, 2012:394). This conference was attended 
by 32 candidates from Europe, Africa, the US and the Caribbean. This conference 
took the same format as the Chicago Congress, in which academic papers were 
presented on various topics (Sherwood, 2012).  
According to Abegunrin (2016b:20), the London Pan-African Congress drafted the 
resolution titled ’To the Nations of the World’ which centred around the freedom of 
Africans across the globe.   The next conference was held in Paris, France in February 
1919 by W.E.B DuBois. The speeches which were presented by the attendees ranged 
from seeking collaboration among Africans to finding ways of waging a war against 
racism and colonialism (Sherwood, 2012). The Pan-African Congresses revisited 
London in 1921 and 1923. The objectives of the 1921 Pan-African Congress were: 
“the conference was called to discuss segregation, the racial problem of Black 
Americans, and South Africa, the land question, especially in Africa, and the method 
of cooperation among the peoples of the African world” (Abegunrin, 2016:25).  
The 1923 Pan-African Congress was divided into two sessions. The first session was 
hosted in London from 7 to 8 November 1923. The second session was held in Lisbon, 
Portugal. Although all the sessions were intended to be held in Lisbon, due to financial 
constraints the Congress had to be divided into two sessions (Abegunrin, 2016b:29). 
It was decided at this congress to expand the work of the Pan-African Congresses by 
establishing committees in various countries: Britain, South Africa, Brazil, British West 
Africa, Haiti, British Caribbean, Liberia, Portugal and the US. Moreover, these 
committees would be tasked with assisting with organising the Pan-African Congress 
planned for 1925; however, “due to financial constraints this conference did not take 




While financial difficulties played a significant role in abandoning the plans of 
organising the 1925 Pan-African Congress, there were, however, other reasons that 
jeopardised those plans. There were divergent views between the Francophone 
Africans and other African groups, which included the Anglophone Africans and 
Caribbeans. The issue of divergence was Blaise Diagne’s views that Africans should 
identify and develop in the colonial system. A view which was highly contested by 
other Africans who argued that “Africans should be allowed to self-govern” (Abegunrin, 
2016b:30). Moreover, it was alleged that the Pan-African Congresses were hijacked 
by Marcus Garvey, and because of his radical position some of the 1923 Pan-African 
Congress attendees distanced themselves from the Pan-African Congress. This 
further jeopardised the prospects of going ahead with the proposed 1927 Pan-African 
Congress.  
The competing views in the 1923 Pan-African Congress did not only lead to the 
abandoning of the 1925 Pan-African Congress, but it also threatened the existence of 
the Pan-African Congresses. Nevertheless, the Pan-African Congresses were 
reinvigorated by an organisation of black women organising and funding the 1927 Pan-
African Congress hosted in Harlem, New York. A total of 208 delegates attended and 
DuBois chaired the Congress. They echoed the resolutions of the previous 
Congresses, which are: 
1. “The right to participate in colonial government institutions and development of 
steps towards eventual self-government. 
2. Restoration of African rights to land and natural resources. 
3. Development of adequate educational and health facilities throughout the 
colonies.  
4. The right of Africans to participate in international commerce and trade.” 
Following the successes of the 1927 Pan-African Congress, it was thus proposed by 
DuBois that the plan of establishing committees in various parts of the world where 
black communities are found in large numbers as proposed at the 1923 Pan-African 
Congress should be made a reality. Furthermore, to enhance the participation of 
Africans it was proposed that the next planned 1929 Pan-African Congress be held on 
African soil. Tunis, which is the capital city of Tunisia was chosen as a site to host this 




selection of Tunis: first, it is easily accessible by shipping lines, and second, it would 
allow both the Africans in the motherland and those in the diaspora to participate. This 
decision was heavily challenged by the French government, which feared that this 
could lead to some form of unrest. The French government proposed that the 
conference could be hosted in Paris, which would be easy for planning and other 
logistics. Moreover, there were other factors that made it hard for the proposed 1929 
Pan-African Congress to take place, such as the economic depression caused by the 
Wall Street crash which exacerbated the financial woes of the Pan-African movement. 
Another factor besides the financial predicaments was the ideological battle between 
those who were in support of Marcus Garvey and those who supported DuBois, so 
this division made it difficult to reach an agreement about the proposed 1929 Pan-
African Congress. It was thus decided to abandon those plans (Thompson, 1969:43).  
The Pan-African movement was almost forgotten until the end of World War II when 
George Padmore, Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, C.L.R James and others organised the 
1945 Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England. This was the fifth Pan-
African Congress, and it had a tremendous impact on the transplantation of Pan-
Africanism from the African diaspora to the African continent. This is encapsulated in 
the words of Nkrumah (1970:134):  
Pan-Africanism and African nationalism really took concrete expression when 
the Fifth Pan- African Congress met in Manchester in 1945. For the first time 
the necessity for well- organized, firmly-knit movements as a primary condition 
for the success of national liberation struggle in Africa was stressed. 
The 1945 Manchester Congress will go down in the history of Pan-Africanism as one 
of the turning points not only for its ability to inspire the decolonial project in Africa, but 
also, in that it led to the transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to the 
continent (Sherwood, 2012:106). Nkrumah’s name became synonymous with the 
phrase “United States of Africa”, an ideal he cherished until his death. His advocacy 
for African unity did not come until Ghana’s independence in 1957. One of the 
outcomes of the Manchester Congress was the creation of the journal Pan-Africa, 
which in one of its publications had on its cover page “United States of Africa” written 
in bold.  As noted by Shepperson (1986:40), there was no mention of the United States 




was also no mention of the United States of Africa in any previous Congresses. 
However, this does not suggest that there was no mention of African unity.  
3.4 Pan-Africanism on the African shores: In search of Nkrumah’s political 
kingdom and African unity  
The Manchester Conference of 1945 was a turning point in the history of the Pan-
African Congresses in that it brought out not only a geographical shift of Pan-
Africanism from the diaspora to Africa, but it also brought about a concentrated focus 
on Africa’s decolonial project. In 1957, Ghana broke free from the colonial chains with 
Nkrumah as its first president. Nkrumah’s first foreign policy was to converge all the 
independent states of Africa in 1958 in Accra. Although there was no mention of 
African integration or the United States of Africa at the first conference of independent 
African states, “this featured greatly in subsequent conferences” (Legum, 1962:42). 
In line with the above arguments, this section will discuss the experiences of Pan-
Africanism on the African shores with a main focus on the role of Pan-Africanism in 
the struggle against colonialism and the quest for African unity. It will begin by 
examining the role of the first Conference of Independent African States, Accra, 1958 
in setting the Pan-African agenda. Moreover, it will examine the impact of the “All-
African Peoples’ Conferences” in laying the path for future engagements on the 
question of African unity.” 
The baton of Pan-Africanism was passed on to the Africans in the motherland with the 
fundamental responsibility of untangling the continent from colonial shackles. 
Nkrumah became a custodian of the Pan-African Congress as its secretary between 
1945 and 1947, a responsibility he held for almost three years. With this momentous 
task of liberating the continent, Nkrumah felt that only through united efforts would the 
whole continent be liberated. The seeds which were planted years ago of liberating 
the continent germinated in 1957 with the decolonisation of Ghana, which became the 
first sub-Saharan state to achieve independence. “Ghana was joined by several more 
countries, and by the end of 1963 approximately 80% of the African states were freed 
from colonialist rule (Ayittey 2010).” 
When Pan-Africanism reached the African shores, it had already acquired from the 
diaspora a programme of ideas and action which Legum (1962:38) summed up in nine 




1. “Africa for Africans”: call for the total liberation of Africa and Africans in the 
motherland and in the diaspora. 
2. “United States of Africa: the ideal of a wholly unified continent through a series 
of inter-linking regional federations within which there would be a limitation on 
national sovereignty”. 
3. “African renaissance of morale and culture: a quest for the “African personality”, 
a determination to recast African society into its own forms, drawing from its 
own past what is valuable and desirable, and marrying it to modern ideas. 
Modernism is heavily accentuated”. 
4. “African nationalism to replace the tribalism of the past: a concept of African 
loyalty wider than `the nation' to transcend tribal and territorial affiliations”. 
5. “African regeneration of economic enterprise to replace colonial economic 
methods: belief in a non-exploiting socialist or communalistic type of socialism; 
International Communism is rejected outright”. 
6. “The belief in democracy as the most desirable method of government based 
on the principle of one man one vote”. 
7. Rejection of violence as a means of attaining liberation, but this is in proportion 
to the methods used by the colonialists.  
8. Solidarity of black peoples across the globe. This solidarity is based on the 
belief that Africans share a common history and destiny. 
9. Positive neutrality, which was then known as non-involvement in power politics, 
but this stance was not applied to matters that affects African interests. 
10. The return to Africa: the above nine points, are in one way or another an 
offshoot of this idea and movement, which became dubbed as the “back to 
Africa movement”. Thus, this movement is one of the bases/pillars of the African 
unity debate as well as Pan-Africanism. 
Most of these programmes of ideas and actions stemmed from the resolutions taken 
at the Pan-African Congresses from 1900 to 1945. Important also to note is that some 
of these ideas and actions were discussed at the Pan-African Congresses but never 
featured or formed part of the resolutions. While acknowledging the influence of the 
Pan-African Congresses on the Pan-African ideas and actions, this should not be over-
exaggerated. With the geographical shift of Pan-Africanism emerged other 
programmes of actions, while others were never prioritised or neglected all together. 




always featured, but not in the manner conceived and exposed by Nkrumah and other 
Pan-Africanists on the continent. Perhaps the closest to Nkrumah’s conception of 
African unity in the diaspora was the back to Africa movement, which was proposed 
in the 1900s by Marcus Garvey. In his seminal book, “Africa must unite”, Dr Kwame 
Nkrumah (1963:132-133), wrote that his ideas of Pan-Africanism were influenced by 
American writers such as William E DuBois, Henry Sylvester-Williams and Marcus 
Garvey. Among all these pantheons of Pan-Africanism who influenced Nkrumah, 
Garvey, a Jamaican, who first proposed the idea of a United States of Africa inspired 
the Ghanaian leader (Sturman, 2007:3). 
 
Nkrumah famously advised his African counterparts to “seek ye first the political 
kingdom, and all else will be added unto it” (Adebayo, 2010:22). In an endeavour to 
assist African countries to break free from the colonial chains, Nkrumah “ordered the 
creation of a Pan-African Secretariat within the Ghanaian government, which had the 
responsibility for two series of conferences”: first, Nkrumah organised the Conference 
of Independent African States to stimulate independence movements in other 
colonies. Second, the All-African Peoples’ Conferences (Accra, 1958; Tunis, 1960; 
Cairo, 1961) “to establish a diplomatic framework for the political unification of Africa. 
These conferences played a key role in the African integration process and it is 
important to take a closer look at them” (Thompson, 1969:127).” 
3.4.1 First Conference of Independent African States, Accra, 1958  
At his independence speech Kwame Nkrumah outlined Ghana’s foreign policy, which 
was predicated on helping other African states break free from colonial shackles. The 
first step that Nkrumah took was to convene the first conference of independent 
African States, in April 1958, in Accra. This was a formal launching of the Pan-African 
movement in Africa. This conference was attended by eight independent African 
states, with five of the eight countries being mainly Arab and Muslim (Libya, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan); the other three belonged to “black Africa”, these were 
Ghana, Liberia and Ethiopia (Legum, 1962:44).”  
One of biggest questions that faced the Pan-Africanists in Africa was whether they 
would be able to hold firmly onto the Pan-African core principle of non-racialism, which 




off it became apparent that neither the Sahara nor Islam constituted an insuperable 
barrier. Another factor that was observed from this first conference was that “some 
black African states had much more in common, politically, with some Arab states, 
than they had with their own immediate neighbours”” (Legum, 1962:44). Ali Mazrui in 
his classical work “the triple heritage” details how often the issues of religion, race and 
colour threatened to fuel division in the continent.  
According to Legum (1962:42), the independent African states committed to direct 
involvement in securing the emancipation of the continent at the Accra Conference. 
Furthermore, they declared war on South Africa and colonialism across the African 
continent. They also gave their full support to the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
struggle in Algeria”. Legum (1962: 42), argues that: 
 In foreign affairs there was the beginning, too, of a new policy of non-alignment 
as between the two antagonistic blocs in the world; and a determination to 
establish an African Personality in world affairs by working for a fundamental 
unity' between African States on foreign questions. 
Prior to the first Conference of Independent African States in 1958, there was a 
Bandung Conference (1955), which had very little to do with Pan-Africanism, but rather 
it was indication of Asia's arrival on the global political scene (Legum, 1962:39). 
As stated above, the Pan-Africanists had no key role to play in the Bandung 
Conference. Only Ethiopia and Arab independent African states were in attendance; 
the Gold Coast which was still languishing under the colonial yoke sent observers. 
Nonetheless, the Bandung Declaration was adopted into Pan-African thinking. 
Henceforth, “this unity was to be based on the Bandung Declaration, the Charter of 
the United Nations (UN), and on loyalty to UN decisions. The resolution on racialism 
not only condemned its practice by others but recommended to African states that they 
themselves” “should take vigorous measures to eradicate, where they arise, vestiges 
of racial discrimination in their own countries”. It was agreed that all members would 
observe and respect each other's political and territorial integrity, and when it comes 
to settling their differences, “if they arise, then conciliation and mediation within the 





3.4.2 All-African Peoples’ Conferences: In search of African unity 
The Conference of Independent African States, held in Accra in April 1958 was a 
success, and as such, it prompted Nkrumah to convene another meeting in December 
1958. This time around it included representatives of African liberation movements 
and it was at this conference that Nkrumah first uttered his aspiration of the United 
States of Africa.  Apart from being a stepping stone to more series of All-African 
People’s Organisation (AAPO) the first AAPO conference tabled three issues, which 
would shape the course of the Pan-African movement in Africa (Michel, 2012). First, 
the question of the use of violence in the struggle for independence was raised. It was, 
however, decided that a peaceful means to the quest for freedom was an appropriate 
approach, but it pledged support equally to those who “in order to meet the violent 
means by which they are subjected and exploited, are obliged to retaliate” (Legum, 
1962:42).  
The second issue that was raised related to inter-racial cooperation. As 
aforementioned, Pan-Africanism was never a racial movement nor an ideology 
predicated on the supremacy of one race over the other, rather it was founded on the 
basis of fighting racial discrimination. Coupled with that, an all-time Pan-Africanist 
slogan “Africa for Africans” was put under a microscope.  Welcoming the participants 
to the first AAPO conference Dr Nkrumah said: 
We are not racialists or chauvinists. We welcome into our midst peoples of all 
other races, other nations, other communities, who desire to live among us in 
peace and equality. But they must respect us and our rights, our right as the 
majority to rule. That, as our Western friends have taught us to understand it, 
is the essence of democracy (Cited in Antony (2013:113). 
Mr Tom Mboya, who was the Accra conference chairman, announced from the onset, 
“Once the principle of ’one man, one vote’ is established, we will not practice racism 
in reverse” (Thompson, 1969:133). On the Pan-Africanist slogan, Dr Nkrumah argued: 
When I speak of Africa for the Africans this should be interpreted in the light of 
my emphatic declaration that I do not believe in racialism and colonialism. The 
concept ’Africa for the Africans’ does not mean that other races are excluded 
from it. No. It only means that Africans, who naturally are in the majority in 




Similar sentiments were echoed by Dr Azikiwe who said: 
It should be obvious that unless we accept a broad definition of terms there can 
be no worthy future for Africanism. That being the case I would like to speak of 
the peoples of Africa in general terms to include all the races inhabiting that 
continent and embracing all the linguistic and cultural groups who are domiciled 
therein. 
A third issue that was teased out briefly at the Accra conference relates to the question 
of African unity and Ghana’s independence, which Nkrumah regarded as meaningless 
without the total liberation of the continent. As noted by Legum (1962:44), many 
believed that it was not to be taken seriously. However, Nkrumah used this platform 
to “present his idea of political development in Africa in four stages: the first aim was 
the attainment of independence; second this independence was to be consolidated; 
third the creation of a community and unity among the freed states was aspired; and 
the fourth step considered the economic and social construction of Africa” (AAPC 
1962: 429).” 
Before the second All-Africa People’s Conference (AAPC) was held in 1960 in Tunis, 
Tunisia, there were two important events. First, The Conakry Declaration of 1 May 
1959. This declaration was between Guinea and Ghana, in which they “solemnly 
agreed to seal the Ghana-Guinea Union in practice”. However, “the Conakry 
Declaration went on further to envisage the Ghana-Guinea Union as the stepping 
stone for a Union of Independent African States. The use of the term union rather than 
regional federation or association, shocked Liberia's President Tubman” (Legum, 
1962:45). 
Despite being skeptical of a union, the Liberian President Tubman convened the 
second event in a small Liberian village Sanniqeullie. This event brought together M 
Sekou Toure and Dr Nkrumah alongside their host, President Tubman at Sanniquellie, 
Liberia, where they produced the Sanniquellie Declaration. These heads of states 
formulated six principles for achieving ’The Community of Independent African States’, 
it is important to note that the word union was substituted with “community”. From the 





Each state and federation, which is a member of the Community, shall maintain 
its own national identity and constitutional structure. The Community is being 
formed with a view to achieving unity among independent African States. It is 
not designed to prejudice the present or future international policies, relations 
and obligations of the States involved. 
According to Boateng (2013), the Liberian official said: 
 before the [Sanniquellie] conference could take place, Nkrumah and Sékou 
Touré had already decided to form a Union of African States and had asked 
Tubman to become a member, offering him the position of ‘dean’ of the 
independent African states. Tubman, who was an astute politician, made no 
commitment to them. 
As noted by Legum (1962:45), “the adoption of the Sanniquellie Declaration marked a 
new phase in the argument between Pan-Africanists about the best way of developing 
African unity. As aforesaid, the second AAPC was convened in 1960 in Tunis, Tunisia 
and about 180 delegates from over 30 countries attended this conference. The 
independence of Africa and unity featured as the main agendas of the conference. 
Basing their arguments on dependency theory, the resolutions of the conference 
called on the former colonial powers to abandon their methods of neocolonialism, for 
example, the economic exploitation of supposedly free African states. When the 
Sanniquellie Declaration was raised at the Second Conference of Independent African 
States, division erupted”. “The Conference of Independent African States did not 
endorse the Sanniquellie Declaration. In the end they merely requested the President 
of the conference to address heads of African states to initiate consultations through 
diplomatic channels with a view to promoting African unity, and to consider the item at 
their next meeting in 1962”” (Michel, 2012; Legum, 1962:45). 
The membership had since “increased from eight at the first meeting to 15: Algeria 
Provisional Government, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic (UAR). Togo and 
Congo Leopoldville failed to attend. Ghana's Foreign Minister, Mr Ako Adjei, 
commending the Sanniquellie Declaration for adoption said””: 
 It is clear from this declaration of principles that the Union of African States 




Union. Such a political Union in their view, will provide the framework within 
which any plans for economic, social and cultural co-operation can, in fact, 
operate to the best advantage of all. To us in Ghana the concept of African 
Unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective in our policy. We sincerely 
believe that the Independent African States can, and may some 70 day, form a 
real political Union-the Union of African States . . . It does not matter whether 
you start with an Association of African States or whether with economic or 
cultural co-operation . . . we must start from somewhere, but certainly the Union 
can be achieved in the end. 
Not everyone supported Mr Ako Adjei’s view except for delegates from Guinea, the 
main antagonist to this idea was Mr Yussuf Maitima Sule from Nigeria. In his response 
to his counterpart from Ghana, Mr Sule said: 
Pan-Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa. No one in Africa 
doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism… But we must not be sentimental; 
we must be realistic. It is for this reason that we would like to point out that at 
this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature. On the 
other hand, we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of 
those people who advocate it. But we feel such a move is too radical -perhaps 
too ambitious-to be of lasting benefit. Gradual development of ideas and 
thoughts is more lasting… it is essential to remember that whatever ideas we 
may have about Pan-Africanism it will not materialise, or at least it will not 
materialise as quickly as we would like it to if we start building from the top 
downwards. We must first prepare the minds of the different African countries-
we must start from the known to the unknown. At the moment we in Nigeria 
cannot afford to form union by government with any African States by 
surrendering our sovereignty… President Tubman's idea of the association of 
states is therefore more acceptable for it is as yet premature to form a Union of 
States under one sovereignty. 
Mr Sule also said: “if anybody makes the mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who 
has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear, be 
defeated”. At this juncture, there was a notion that Nkrumah had ulterior motives for 




Africa. According to Boateng (2013) this notion was fueled by Western forces. This 
point will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter.  
What became clear from Mr Sule’s speech was that he disagreed with Ghana’s 
approach to African unity. Second, he brought something new to the African 
assemblies, which was an unveiled attack on Nkrumah. Although Ghana was known 
across the continent as the epicentre for Pan-Africanism with Nkrumah revered across 
the continent as one of the foremost high priests of Pan-Africanism; Mr Sule 
demonstrated that Nigeria was no stranger to Pan-Africanist ideas (Legum, 1962:45).  
“From Mr Sule and Mr Ako Adjei’s speeches it became clear that there were 
contrasting views on Africa’s right path towards African unity; “with Ghana playing the 
role of the revolutionary unafraid to impel change from the top − a spirit in consonance 
with ideas of centralist democracy and Unitarianism. While Nigeria demonstrated 
Nigeria played the role of the Fabian, arguing from the standpoint of the federalist 
seeking to build from the bottom upwards. As noted by Legum (1962:46), these 
attitudes became two poles in the Pan-Africanist world;  dividing the unitarians from 
the federalists, the revolutionaries from the reformists, in economic as well as in social 
questions; and the promoters of a `political union' from those who favoured a slower, 
functional approach”.” 
3.5 Understanding the emergence of the rival groups: Origins and goals  
The emergence of rival groupings in the early 1960s was precipitated by various 
factors stemming from territorial disputes, for example, Somalia and Ethiopia’s 
disputes over Somaliland. Moreover, “the dispute between Mauritania and Morocco 
sparked a rift between Tunisia and Morocco because of the former’s support for 
Mauritania. “Despite their disagreements, all the independent African states continued 
to share the same platforms through the Conference of Independent African States, 
AAPO and even through the Secretariat of the African Group at the UN” (Legum, 
1962:48)”. Moreover, in support for different liberal struggle movements from the same 
country, the case that really divided the independent African countries involved Congo 
and the FLN in Algeria.   
Over and above the points highlighted above, there were other factors that led to the 
division among independent African states, and these were: Nigeria’s independence, 




the Congo, and last but not least, the role of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions in Africa. On the issue of the independence of the French colonies, 
Legum (1962:48), argued that prior to their independence, many of the French-
speaking leaders were regarded by African states within the Pan-African organisation 
as stooges of their former colonisers. While the scope of this study does not allow one 
to delve into each point that sparked the rival factions within the Pan-African 
organisation, other points will be explored below. With that being said, the discussion 
below will examine origins, aims and approaches of these rival groups and their 
position on the question of African unity. Although the latter will be explored in detail 
in the following section.  
3.5.1 The Brazzaville group 
The Brazzaville group also known as “The Union of African States and Madagascar” 
was born at a meeting convened by the Ivory Coast in Abidjan in October 1960 which 
was aimed at discussing the possible ways for French-speaking African territories to 
mediate between France and Algeria. For these countries, this was an essential and 
urgent step in their endeavours of applying for membership of the UN. After their 
meeting in Abidjan, the Brazzaville group convened another meeting in Brazzaville in 
December I960, at this meeting “a decision was taken to form a more permanent 
association, and this decision was realised at a meeting in Dakar in January 1961” 
(Legum, 1960:50). 
The Brazzaville group consisted of Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, Ivory Coast, 
Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Gabon, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Madagascar and Cameroon. However, not all the members agreed to joining the 
French Community. The Brazzaville Declaration called for peace in Algeria by 1961; 
upheld Mauritania's independence; and opted for mediation in the Congo. On the other 
hand, it opposed a political union in the form of integrated institutions, however, it 
accepted a permanent Inter-State Economic Secretariat (Thompson, 1969:163). 
The above developments “introduced two new elements into African politics: for the 
first time invitations were extended to a restricted list of independent states, and a 






3.5.2 The Casablanca group 
The position taken by the Brazzaville group had a direct impact on the formation of the 
Casablanca group. What brought this group together was their support for Lumumba 
in the Congo, a decision which necessitated the need to coordinate their policies. 
Within the African group at the UN the Casablanca group constituted a minority group, 
and as such, they were keen to reassert their initiative taken at the earlier stages of 
Pan-African developments. Morocco convened the Casablanca Conference in 
January 1961, in reaction to the Brazzaville power’s sponsorship of Mauritania. The 
list sent out for invitation was selective, however, the invitation was later extended to 
other states, but the organisers kept their original list of invitations a secret (Legum, 
1962:51). “Seven African delegations − Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the UAR 
(Egypt), Libya, and the Algerian Provisional Government and Ceylon − were 
represented”. 
Four key issues were tabled at the conference: Mauritania, Israel, Congo and the 
concept of political union. Over and above these four issues a discussion also revolved 
around  a constitutional framework of the Casablanca group. Algeria, Ghana and Libya 
had not thrown their weight behind Morocco’s attitude towards Mauritania. In fact, 
Ghana had supported its admission to membership of the UN but, because of Ghana’s 
commitment to “greater unity” “it subsequently reversed its previous stand. Libya once 
again changed its position at the subsequent Monrovia Conference. The limited scope 
of this study does not allow for a full discussion of all these issues. The issue that will 
be discussed in detail relates to the formation of a political union”.  
The “broad principles of agreement reached at the Casablanca Conference were 
subsequently incorporated into the Casablanca Charter; its Protocol was signed at a 
meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cairo in May” 1961. However, Libya opted not to sign 
the Protocol. The Protocol was made up of 19 articles that regulated “the executive 
machinery of the Charter and provided for four permanent committees to be 
established: economic, political, cultural and a Defence Supreme Command”. The 
“Economic Committee consisted of the Ministers of Finance of member states, and 
the Political Committee was made up of the Heads of State, or their representatives, 
and was scheduled to meet periodically to coordinate policies.  On the other hand, the 




The “Supreme Command was made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the various Armed 
Forces. Bamako, Mali's capital, was designated as the headquarters for the 
secretariat, with a Moroccan as its first Secretary General. The Charter prohibited 
accession to foreign military pacts and laid down that all signatories should strictly 
adhere to policies of non-alignment. Any independent African state could accede to 
the” Charter. 
3.5.3 The Monrovia group 
According to Legum (1962:52), “in the same way as Brazzaville had led to 
Casablanca, so Casablanca in its turn led to Monrovia”. On 8 May 1961, a conference 
of 20 states, was convened in the Liberian capital, Monrovia.  The conference included 
the 12 Brazzaville states, the host nation (Liberia), Ethiopia, Nigeria, Togo, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, and Libya, which had deviated from the Casablanca group. In 
attendance as well was Tunisia, which chose an observer status. The Sudan 
boycotted this conference in as much as it did in Casablanca, because of its objection 
“to Mauritania's presence. Neither Congo (Leopoldville) nor the Stanleyville regime of 
Gizenga was invited to either of the two Conferences, which were in essence part of 
the reason way the rival groups had emerged.”  
The Monrovia declaration on promoting better understanding and cooperation among 
African states defines five principles:  
1. “recognition of each state's equality and sovereignty; 
2. freedom from annexation; 
3.  the right for any state freely and voluntarily to join with another without 
hindrance;  
4. respect for the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 
5. respect for territorial integrity, and condemnation of any state harbouring 
dissident elements who might wish to carry on subversive activities against 
another state” (Thompson, 1962:172).” 
Dr Leopold Senghor, Senegal's president was the original initiator of the Monrovia 
Conference, because of his concern about his country’s isolation. This is despite the 
fact that Senegal belonged to the Brazzaville group, but it was not entirely secured in 
this association. Understanding the division this would cause, President Senghor 




to further consultations with “President Tubman of Liberia and Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa of Nigeria, the three heads of states decided to act as sponsors, and convinced 
Cameroon and the Ivory Coast to join as co-sponsors. Attempts had been made to  
convince Guinea and Mali to be  co-sponsors as well, however, put under pressure by 
Ghana these two withdrew under the pretext that the conference was inopportune and 
that it should consist only of heads of state” (Thompson, 1969:161; Legum, 1962:52). 
In contrast, “the Monrovia Group consisted of both Anglophone and Francophone 
countries, and it was more conservative, preferred maintaining close ties with France, 
the US and other Western powers, and not unnaturally, was opposed to Lumumba”. 
Furthermore, the group sought unity of aspirations and action based on “African social 
solidarity and political identity, urging cooperation only in the economic, cultural, 
scientific, and technical fields, but opposed to political union, united defence, and 
foreign policy”” (Thompson, 1969:162). 
Welcoming the delegates President Tubman highlighted some of the aims of the 
Conference as well as the anxieties that had led up to its being convened: 
It should be crystal clear to every leader that Africans cannot live in isolation if 
they expect to allay suspicion, fear and tension. The idea of primus inter pares, 
first among equals, is destructive of African Unity and Peace… The sense of 
oneness should be deeply rooted in the breast of every African. But the whirls 
of circumstances and ambition can make it difficult for us to fit ourselves into 
the picture of a unified Africa, the foundation for which we hope will be laid 
before this Conference closes. I come now to the question of leadership of 
Africa. In this connection I have observed that there seems to be three schools 
of thought on this subject. There are those who feel that Liberia should assume 
leadership based on the fact that she is the oldest African Republic and is riper 
in political experience; but it will require more than age and political experience 
to assume leadership of Africa. There are others who assume that Ghana 
should assume that role because she is physically more developed and 
embraces larger territories. It will require more than development and larger 
territory to assume leadership of Africa. And there are yet those who opine that 
Egypt with its rich traditions dating back to the remotest antiquity should do so. 




the aggregate of the best that is in all compounded in such a manner as to 
represent the divisibility of Africa indivisible (Legum, 1962:53). 
This was the largest conference to ever be assembled by African states. Moreover, 
for the first time this conference brought together French-speaking states with a 
majority of the English-speaking states. This conference followed in the footsteps of 
the AAPO and other militant Pan-Africanist groupings by throwing its weight behind 
the countries which were still languishing under colonialism and condemning 
colonialism in all possible terms. Among other issues that were covered at this 
conference were the atomic tests in the Sahara, which were conducted by France, 
and which were not condemned by French-speaking countries. Furthermore, it 
supported the economic sanctions against South Africa (Legum, 1962:52). The scope 
of this study does not allow one to delve in detail into the issues raised at this 
conference.   
The absence of the Casablanca powers was highly regretted at this conference, but 
the option was given to the Casablanca powers to join the follow-up conference, which 
was scheduled to be hosted in Lagos, Nigeria. “No event did more to flutter the 
dovecotes in Africa's capitals than the Monrovia Conference. Ghana's Press was livid”. 
This conference was attacked by the Casablanca powers, especially Ghana’s pro-
government media, which in its publications noted nothing of significance about the 
conference, except noting the absentees. 
The very moment the BBC and other imperialist broadcasting brass bands 
began their phoney adulation of the so-called virtues of the Monrovia slave-
mentality operated slogan of ’unity without unification’, students of African 
history suspected with considerable concern the genesis of this new brand of 
His Master's Voice, just to discover that it was only the hand that was of Esau 
(Legum, 1962: 54). 
“An article in the Ghana Evening News further suggested that “the imperialists chose 
Monrovia because they believed that Liberia is still pulling the economic apron-
strings”. Liberia was referred to as being “in the economic mess-pot with her split, 
deformed and distorted personality”; and President Tubman was called upon to admit 




In response to the attacks from the Ghanaian media the Nigerian Press wrote on 18 
May 1961: 
One single parliament for all Africa would be the ideal thing but, unlike Dr. 
Nkrumah, we would not strive to attain the unattainable. The Ghanaian leader 
talks sense most of the time but when he goes amiss he does so in a big way. 
We know that he is a great advocate of African unity but that does not mean 
that he is always right in his approach to African affairs. Dr. Nkrumah launched 
a blistering attack on the Monrovia Conference the other day. He was not there 
and yet this was an opportunity for all leaders of Africa to get together. Dr. 
Nkrumah is an advocate of unity. He was not there because he and his minority 
group could not, as they planned, impose their will on the conference. Dr. 
Nkrumah says Pan-Africanism means nothing unless it transcends the artificial 
barriers and boundaries imposed by colonialism. Ghana is in union with Guinea. 
They do not yet have one parliament or currency. Ghana is a very different 
country indeed, from Guinea, and the so-called union remains a scrap of paper. 
The Ghanaian Messiah has not yet succeeded in removing "artificial barriers 
imposed by colonialism (Legum, 1962:54). 
The attack went on to say:  
As an advocate of unity, Dr. Nkrumah has failed to rally the Ashanti region of 
Ghana behind him. The lash of the Preventive Detention Act has created an 
artificial unity. Without his police and para-military groups such as the Builders' 
Brigades and the Young Pioneers, Dr. Nkrumah knows he will be facing a revolt 
any day. Yet this is the man who goes before the world, preaching unity. Dr. 
Nkrumah chooses to believe that the Monrovia powers do not represent the 
majority of African States. Twenty-one States were represented at Monrovia. 
There are only five countries in the Casablanca bloc. The truth is that dr. 
Nkrumah must be at the head of anything or outside it because he must always 
lead. He is the Messiah and no camp follower, this man. Dr. Nkrumah must be 
told that his reckless pursuit of his ambitions for expansion will lead him 
nowhere. His real aim is to swallow up little Togo and chew off parts of Ivory 
Coast. This talk of an African parliament and an Africa without boundaries is 




Ghanaian leader, it is our duty to warn him to desist from the pursuit of false 
principles (Legum, 1962:52). 
The West African Pilot launched another staggering editorial attack accusing Ghana 
of using “Cold War tactics” in relation to the struggle for African leadership. It went on 
to argue that Africa had undergone developments and changes, and went as far as to 
say: “Until recently it was a tournament between Nasser and Nkrumah but Africa today 
contains many stars and meteorites, all of them seeking positions of eminence”.  
The Press war was soon joined by politicians; “the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) issued a special Press statement calling upon Ghana, Guinea 
and Mali to join forces with the Monrovia states”. Nkrumah took it upon himself to 
douse the fire between the presses, which was raging, and he instructed the Ghana 
press to “unilaterally” end its campaign. “As noted by Legum (1962:55), the important 
thing about the spilling of ink was that for the first time many of the things that had 
previously only been said in private were now a matter of public discussion with the 
benefits that go with open disagreements openly discussed.” 
3.6 The first Grand African Unity Debate: Examining the centripetal and 
centrifugal forces  
In its simplest form, the debate on African unity has been on how Africa should unite 
or, in the name of African unity, should the boundaries be withdrawn or not? And if 
they are withdrawn, how would this unity be administered and by whom? Moreover, 
who will be responsible for the sovereignty of each member state and how much power 
will be given to member-states should the union be formed? Thus far, this study has 
provided a background history of how the debate on African unity came about and 
how the rival groups were formed. While this study has endeavoured to cover all the 
key role players in the debates on African unity, it is, however, unequivocal that some 
names will reign supreme over others. As Ali Mazrui said, “Nkrumah will be 
remembered more as a Pan-Africanist than a Ghanaian” (Adebajo, 2010). “While 
Nkrumah’s idea of African unity was novel, it was, however, not embraced by other 
African leaders. Leaders such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere 
of Tanzania and Sourou-Migan Apithy of Benin agreed in principle on the idea of unity  




(Thompson, 1969:163). In contrast to Nkrumah’s idea, these leaders advocated for a 
step-by-step approach to a continental unity.” 
As aforementioned, among many other things that led to the fragmentation of 
independent African states into three rival camps (Monrovia, Casablanca and 
Brazzaville) were their differing opinions on how Africa should pursue its political unity 
(Cervenka, 1977:ix). It, however, became apparent that these divisions and 
memberships were not permanent. To demonstrate this point, Legum (1962:55), 
provided an example involving Ghana and Liberia, who signed the Sanniquellie 
Declaration in 1959 with Guinea; however, two years later Ghana’s press was busy 
denouncing the Liberians as “Western agents of America”. This is because Liberia had 
forsaken its membership within the Casablanca group by hosting the Conference, 
which culminated in the formation of the Monrovia group. Hence, the attack from the 
Ghana press.  
Emperor Haile Selassie who played a key role in thawing the relations between the 
Casablanca and Monrovia group argued that: 
Ethiopia considers herself a member of one group only- the African group. We 
contend, accordingly, that no wider and unbridgeable gap exists between the 
various groupings which have been created. It is our belief, to the contrary, that 
a close and careful analysis of the policies adopted by the African nations today 
on a wider range of questions emphasises, not the differences among them, 
but the large number of views which they share in common (Thompson, 
1969:175). 
To try and understand the above questions, this study will take a close look at the 
positions articulated by the protagonists and antagonists of these rival groups while 
also examining the resolutions taken at the conferences of these three rival groups. 
While this study aims to examine the difference of opinions as well as points of 
agreements in relation to African unity, it does not neglect the fact that the formation 
of these rival camps was not sorely based on the question of African unity. Henceforth, 
when examining the centripetal and centrifugal forces on the question of African unity, 
this study will also examine other factors that sowed division among these groups. 
The decolonial wave in Africa coincided with the Cold War, and soon after that, Africa 




were dedicated to the ideas of liberalism and democracy. On the other hand, the Soviet 
Union supported the liberation movements that were aiming to enforce socialism and 
communism policies upon taking over the government.  Congo and Angola were fertile 
grounds for proxy wars, and the independent African states quickly chose sides, often 
influenced by the Cold War ideologies that some identified with. This exacerbated the 
division and, in some cases, led to members of one camp joining another camp. For 
example, the Casablanca group supported Lumumba’s regime; while the Monrovians 
supported Kasavubu. Casablanca supported Morocco's claim on Mauritania; while 
Monrovia opposed it. Moreover, the Casablanca group proclaimed its support for 
socialism in Africa and wished to form a socialist continental government. On the other 
hand, the Monrovia group viewed socialism with suspicion (Thompson, 1969:158; 
Legum, 1962:56).  
Another divergence between these two rival camps lies in that the Casablanca bloc 
supported non-alignment as its foreign policy with the international community; while 
on the other hand, the Monrovia group negated that idea (Legum, 1962:55). For 
example, Nigeria signed a Defence Pact with Britain in 1960, and then the former 
French colonies signed with France.  On the question of common defence in the form 
of an “African High Command”, which the Casablanca group had been agitating for, 
the Monrovia group was not in favour of that idea (Thompson, 1969:171). This is 
expressed in the statement of the former Nigerian Prime Minister,  
Some people have suggested that we should organise ourselves into a defense 
bloc…that we should embark on the arms race in Africa. All of us know very 
well that we are at present incapable of joining in such a race. We should not 
be talking about an arms race. All we should [talk] about, Sir, is how to stop it 
(Balewa, 1964).  
But “it would be misleading to brand all the Monrovians as pro-Western: they 
represented different attitudes, ranging from Somalia's strict non-alignment to 
Madagascar's Francophilism” (Legum, 1962:55). 
As noted by Legum (1962:56), Monrovia agreed to the idea of promoting cooperation 
throughout Africa, but subject to conditions of “non-acceptance of any leadership”. On 
that note, the Monrovia group’s conception of cooperation was not synonymous with 




of the Monrovia bloc on Pan-African unity read: “The unity that it is aimed to achieve 
at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African States, but unity of 
aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity 
and political identity”. Moreover, “they accepted, in principle, that an inter-African and 
Malagasy Advisory Organisation should be created. A move in that direction involved 
setting up Committees of technicians to plan cooperation in the economic, educational, 
cultural, scientific, technical” and communications fields. 
“How does all this differ from the Casablanca group's proposals of African unity? To 
begin with, the Casablanca Charter goes only so far as to say: “we affirm our will to 
intensify our efforts for the creation of an effective form of co-operation among the 
African States in the economic, social and cultural domains”. Over and above, the 
Casablanca Charter provided for the immediate establishment of four joint 
Committees: political, economic, cultural and a military command. However, these 
were purely consultative and had no power of any kind. Scholars have questioned 
what was intended by “an effective form of cooperation”. Does this cooperation mean 
the same as that envisioned by the Monrovia group? Within the Casablanca Charter 
there was no mention of abandoning sovereignty, or the formation of a political union. 
Although Dr Nkrumah argued strongly at the Casablanca Conference that “the future 
of Africa lies in a political union-a political union in which the economic, military and 
cultural activities will be coordinated for the security of our Continent”. These were the 
views of Nkrumah, and not that of the Casablanca powers. Hence, his proposal for a 
political union was rejected by other Casablanca powers” (Legum, 1962:57).  
“As noted above, the idea of political union within the Casablanca group belonged to 
Nkrumah who had become the leading and, indeed, virtually the only prominent 
advocate in Africa for political union. While Guinea and Mali pledged to form a union, 
which they hoped would breed the United States of Africa starting in West Africa, they 
were less specific on the issue of the United States of Africa, except in their approach 
to the Union of West African States. His book, “I Speak of Freedom”, Nkrumah, is 
dedicated to “Patrice Lumumba, late Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, and 
all those who are engaged in the struggle for the political unification of Africa” 
(Thompson, 1969:148).  Nkrumah offered one recipe to all the disturbing problems in 




and cultural   differences “strong political unity” and “the African race united under one 
federal government” (Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2018:1).” 
This “debate on African unity raged not only in the higher spheres of Pan-African 
politics, but also in the national parliaments. For example, the then Nigerian official 
opposition, the Action Group which was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, introduced a 
motion into parliament in September 1961, promoting the idea of a Union of West 
African States” (Legum, 1962:57). Chief Tony Enaharo criticised government policy 
for supporting “functional co-operation among African States at a time when the 
climate of progressive opinion throughout Africa is overwhelmingly in favour of organic 
union” (Legum, 1962:57). 
Despite the opposition’s attack on the government’s policy when it came to African 
unity, however, the opposition did not support the idea of political union as advocated 
by Dr Nkrumah. This became obvious from a Press Statement made by Chief 
Awolowo on behalf of the Action Group in June 1961. Outlining the Action Group’s 
position on the question of African unity, Chief Awolowo said: “The first principle which 
I advocate is that, in the present context of the world, the black man qua the colour of 
his skin, is confronted with certain knotty and intractable problems which are peculiar 
to him” (Legum, 1962:58). Henceforth, Chief Awolowo went on to call for “the creation 
of an Organisation for the African Community which must be first and last a 
revolutionary body . . . it must openly advocate the overthrow of all white rule in Africa, 
whether such rule is by white settlers or by white colonial powers” (Legum, 1962:58). 
As observed by Legum (1962:58), the Action Group’s proposals to achieving African 
unity, did not amount to political union as envisaged by Nkrumah. Nevertheless, it 
conceded that confederation should be considered. Nigeria’s government dismissed 
Chief Awolowo’s proposal for African unity as “political propaganda”. Be it as it may, 
to show how important the idea of African unity was/is an opposition party called upon 
the Nigerian government to adopt it in its foreign policy. 
“The then Governor-General, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, of course a doyen of the Pan-African 
leaders of his time in August 1961, in an address delivered in London, he submitted 
his idea for what he called” “a concert of African States”. 
Granted that political union is desirable”,' he said, “the question arises whether 




it be a tight or a loose one, in which case it will be desirable to know whether it 
is intended to surrender internal or external sovereignty, or both? In this context 
we cannot overlook the struggle for hegemony as indeed has been the case in 
the last few years. Hand in glove with the struggle for hegemony goes the 
manoeuvre for the control of the armed forces for the effective implementation 
of policy (Legum, 1962:58). 
“Dr M I Okpara, “who became Dr Azikiwe's successor as Premier of the eastern 
Region of Nigeria, also aired his thoughts on the question of African unity in London 
in August 1961 at the end of an extensive tour through Asia and Europe. First and 
foremost, he proposed that Africa should be organised into five Economic Regions 
(North, East, Central, South and West) with common customs, currency, transport and 
research organisations; second that these economic regions should be welded into 
political unions; and third, that the five political units should form either a Federation 
or a Confederation, or even a Common Market”(Legum, 1962:59). He argued: 
My contacts during my journeys through Asia and Europe have confirmed my 
view that the Union of African States will make for rapid economic advance on 
this Continent. Its political advantages will be enormous, as the Continent will 
be completely liberated, and a source of constant temptation to the Imperialist 
will be removed. Unless there is a rapid and complete change of policy such as 
we have seen on the West Coast [of Africa], the West will definitely lose Africa. 
To hasten this change Africans must band themselves together into a Union. It 
is important that we should carry all along with us if we are to arrive at the goal 
of a United Africa in peace and not in pieces. Only by the fullest discussion and 
persuasion is this possible. Coercion or precipitate action will achieve nothing; 
indeed, it might imperil this vital objective of African unity. This is the lesson of 
Nigerian unity (Legum, 1962:58). 
It is important to note that his argument was not only confined  to West Africa, but 
rather to the  entire African continent; also, airing a warning for a diverse society like 
the one of Nigeria.  Another figure that shared his valuable thoughts on the question 
of African unity is Mr Dunduza K. Chisiza, “the then Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of Finance in Nyasaland and one of Dr Hastings K Banda's most effective 




Pan-Africanism, as a strategy for emancipation, is unquestionably effective, but 
we must build from down upwards, not from up downwards: the fabric of the 
regions must be knitted together not merely tacked. As a unifying agent for 
regional co-operation Pan-Africanism is superficial; it is an “operation roof-top”. 
This is not a counsel for gradualism in the attainment of independence, which 
must come quickly, but of realism after it. Ideas about stages vary with writers 
not only in politics but also in other disciplines such as economics. The writer 
suggests the following I. Attainment of independence. 2. Vigorous 
modernisation of economies. 3. Encouragement of regional economic co-
operation and regional consciousness. 4. Political regrouping of neighbouring 
countries (Legum, 1962:59).   
The “views of the Monrovia group were captured in the speech presented by the former 
Prime Minister of Nigeria, the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa at the inaugural 
summit of the OAU in Addis Ababa” in May 1963: 
There have been quite a lot of views on what we meant by African unity. Some 
of us have suggested that African unity should be actualized by the political 
fusion of the different states of Africa, some of us feel that African unity could 
best be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, political and scientific 
and cultural cooperation and by trying first, to get the Africans to understand 
themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult 
arrangement of Political Union (Balewa, 1964:159).   
In response to the Nigerian Prime Minister, Nkrumah of Ghana stressed the urgency 
and imminent threat to swallow and squash the hard-won independency of African 
states, but also do delay the independence of those who were still languishing under  
colonial and apartheid rule. To Nkrumah, that threat was the imperialist forces, which 
he believed were unmasking neocolonialism to continue the project of colonialism. 
Nkrumah issued a strong warning arguing that: 
The resources are there. It is for us to marshal them in the active service of our 
people. Unless we do this by our concerted efforts, within the framework of our 
combined planning, we shall not progress at the tempo demanded by today’s 
events and the mood of our people. The symptoms of our troubles will grow, 




Pan-African Unity to secure for us stability and tranquillity in our labours for a 
continent of social justice and material well-being. Unless we establish African 
Unity now, we who are sitting here today shall tomorrow be the victims and 
martyrs of neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1963). 
Nkrumah’s reasons for advancing the agenda for African unity was simple. For him, 
the development of a single independent African state was impossible without a 
complete political unification of the continent. “The Monrovia group criticised 
Nkrumah’s position on the basis that Africa could not achieve any meaningful political 
merger because of the non-existence of the so-called necessary conditions (common 
culture, language, infrastructure, etc.). In his defence, Nkrumah acknowledged the fact 
that there existed some level of fragmentation, but then again Africans have much 
more in common to necessitate unity” (Nkrumah, 1970). Nkrumah was referring to the 
“harmonisation of the continent’s natural and human resources” (Biney, 2008, 2011; 
Olaosebikan, 2011).”  
Another of the key issues that stimulated the debate and caused skepticism on 
Nkrumah’s unification agenda was the sovereignty of the newly independent African 
states which some felt would be eroded. Coupled with that was the question of 
leadership under Nkrumah’s ideal United States of Africa, or put differently, who would 
be the “President of the United States of Africa?” Ghana and Nkrumah were viewed 
with suspicion, with some arguing that Nkrumah wanted to be the President of the 
United States of Africa and Ghana the administrative city of the Federated Africa 
(Thompson, 1969; Legum, 1962). In the Monrovia Conference the question of 
leadership was tabled and in his opening speech at this conference, President 
Tubman divided the question of leadership into three schools of thought, which he 
alleged were some of the proposed plans if the political union was formed:  
I come to the question of leadership of Africa. On this issue, I repeat what I said 
on July 26, 1958, when there were fewer independent African states. In this 
connection I observed that there seem to be three schools of thought on the 
subject. There are those who feel that Liberia should assume leadership based 
on the fact that she is the oldest African Republic and is riper in political 
experience; but it will require more than age and political experience to assume 




that role because she is physically more developed and embraces larger 
territories to assume leadership in Africa. And there are yet those who opine 
that Egypt with its rich traditions dating back to the remotest antiquity should do 
so. It will require, in my opinion, the aggregate of all three or the best that is in 
all compounded in such a manner as to represent the diversity of Africa 
indivisible (Thompson, 1969). 
Sir Milton Margai addressed the Monrovia Conference on behalf of English-speaking 
countries, and expressed the concerns of this group about the question of leadership. 
He argued:  
We have come to this conference with preconceived ideas either to claim 
leadership or to accept the leadership of any one state, because we support 
the views expressed that leadership is a moral quality rather than one based 
solely on territorial size, wealth or other historical antecedents (Thompson, 
1969:163).  
On the question of sovereignty, the Casablanca group had resolved to surrender either 
fully or partially their sovereignty to a wider Pan-African Union. A move which the 
moderates rejected in totality. Moreover, the Casablanca bloc strongly believed in the 
notion of African personality; while the Monrovia group dismissed the idea of African 
personality. Nigeria’s former Prime Minister declared at the formation of the OAU that 
he did not believe in African personality (Thompson, 1969:170). “Tanzanian president 
Nyerere, who was part of the gradualist approach group, declared at the first ordinary 
summit in 1964 that” “we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental 
Government and will patiently work for its realization, removing obstacles, one by one; 
and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union Government’ for the purpose of 
propaganda” “(as cited in Biney 2008: 138). It is not hard to tell that this attack was 
directed at Nkrumah and his fellows.” 
Despite the different views on how best to achieve African unity and what form of unity, 
there was, however, a desire for tackling common challenges which at that time 
included: freeing other African states from colonialism and preserving the hard-won 
independence of African states (Wapmuk, 2009:651). On the other hand, both groups 
had declared themselves emphatically against the remnants of colonialism and 




about was the development of economic and technological cooperation, which was 
first developed and adopted by the Casablanca group in January 1961, but a few 
months later, the Monrovia group adopted a similar approach (Thompson, 1969:171).   
3.7 Finding the middle ground between African nationalism and Pan-Africanism 
While this study has been able to build a histography of the debates on Africa unity, it 
is also important to point  out a conflict, which confronted and continues to confront 
those who seek to unite Africa. Julius Nyerere summed it up eloquently in his speech 
delivered in 1966, in Zambia, titled: ’The Dilemma of Pan-Africanists’: 
On the one hand is the fact that Pan-Africanism demands an African 
consciousness and an African loyalty; on the other hand, is the fact that each 
Pan Africanist must also concern himself with the freedom and development of 
one of the nations of Africa. These things can conflict. Let us be honest and 
admit that they have already conflicted (Nyerere, 1966). 
Perhaps the biggest question at this juncture would be: is it possible for one to be a 
Pan-Africanist and an African nationalist at the same time? From the above quote it 
appears as if this is impossible, however, to answer this question one would have to 
have a close examination of Julius Nyerere’s speech. Nyerere (1966), argues that the 
construction of a road in Zambia or a hospital in Kampala is an empowerment of the 
peoples of that country, but also, it is an enrichment to the continent of Africa at large 
because it means that the continent has an extra hospital as well as a road for its 
people. While these remain national symbols, their benefit could transcend the 
borders.    
On the other hand, Nkrumah expected a seamless melding of Pan-Africanism and 
African nationalism, he argued that “the fundamental purpose [of both ideologies] was 
identical: national independence leading to African unity” (Nkrumah, 1963:135). On 
the other hand, Shivji (2009) notes that “Nyerere found himself supporting 
contradictory ideas around contesting the imposition of colonial borders while 
emphasising the centrality of states' sovereignty”.” 
3.8 Conclusion 
The African unity debates have been a subject of many research papers, books, 




the lenses of three groups; namely, the Casablanca group, Monrovia group and 
Brazzaville 12. This study has endeavoured to understand the origins, goals and 
ideologies of these groups before examining the centripetal and centrifugal forces 
imbedded in their debates on African unity. However, before that, this study examined 
the origins of Pan-Africanism, which it has been maintained  was an inspiration behind 
the quest for African unity. An examination of the origins of Pan-Africanism led to 
discussions on the evolution of Pan-Africanism. Furthermore, this study identified the 
back to Africa movement as the first attempt to attain African unity.  It also noted the 
debates which were held around the notion of returning to Africa.  
This study has placed the debates of Pan-Africanism and African unity in a historical 
context.  As it has been maintained by Azikiwe Mnandi (1962):  
Slavery played its shameful role in depopulating Africa; capitalism denuded it 
of its wealth; colonialism deprived it of birthright, and imperialism emasculated 
its will to live as a human being and to enjoy its fair share of the bounties of the 
good earth. 
In this chapter it was argued that Pan-Africanism emerged as a remedial action to all 
the atrocities caused by slavery and colonialism upon Africa and its people across the 
continent and its diaspora.  It was further maintained that “Pan-Africanism is a 
philosophy in which Africa is regarded as the spiritual home of a united African people, 
thus the emphasis on solidarity and ‘brotherhood’ among all people of African origin 
gained momentum with some calling for the return to Africa”. This chapter also made 
a bold claim that the evolution of the Pan-African unity debate began with the return 
to Africa movement, which also had its own firm share of contestations.   
This chapter went on to discuss the experiences of Pan-Africanism in the New World, 
which has been maintained throughout this chapter that it was the birthplace of this 
old movement and ideology; without discrediting the literature that regards Africa as a 
birthplace of Pan-Africanism. Furthermore, this chapter also noted the contribution of 
the Pan-African Congresses in the African unity debate, although there were never 
any resolutions to the effect of African unity in a sense of political integration. There 
was, however, unity in collaboration and coming together to discuss issues that 
affected the peoples of Africa across the globe. These Pan-African Congresses were 




diaspora, and the Fifth Pan-African Congress, which famously became known as the 
Manchester Congress played an instrumental role in Africanising Pan-Africanism and 
also transplanting Pan-Africanism to Africa.  What was also significant about the Pan-
African Congresses, especially the first Pan-African Congress hosted in London in 
1900 is that it put the word Pan-Africanism in the dictionary. Moreover, “the importance 
of the Fifth Pan-African Conference was that it strengthened the spirit of unity among 
the peoples of Africa and of African descent and committed them to the complete 
independence of the African continent” (Adedeji, 2008:3). 
Present at the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester was Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Abraham  from South Africa among many others. 
Nkrumah played a vital role in the transplantation of Pan-Africanism and in organising 
the final Pan-African Congress to be hosted in the African diaspora (Ackah, 1999:15). 
Not long after the Fifth Pan-African Congress was hosted the wave of decolonisation 
in Africa took off, with Ghana becoming the first sub-Saharan African country to break 
free from colonial rule in 1957. Soon after that, other African countries broke free from 
colonialism, and Ghana’s foreign policy which was predicated on Pan-Africanism, 
soon demanded the collaboration of Africans against colonialism in order to free those 
who were still living under colonial rule.”   
Nkrumah’s allegiance to the freedom of the peoples of Africa led him to organise the 
first conference of the independent African countries in 1958. This was a stepping 
stone for other conferences to follow, and the issue of African unity in a form of political 
union/integration first surfaced at the first AAPO conference. Nkrumah’s quest for 
African unity would ultimately become one of the factors that led to the fragmentation 
of the African independent countries into three rival camps: the Brazzaville, Monrovia 
and Casablanca groups. Nkrumah became the mouthpiece of the Casablanca group, 
which called for immediate African unity in the form of the Union of 
Governments/United States of Africa. On the other hand, the Monrovia group which 
was led by Nigeria, called for an incremental or gradual approach towards African unity 
(Legum, 1962; Murithi, 2008; Michel, 2012).  
This chapter observed that within the Casablanca group Nkrumah’s radical stance on 
African unity was also not well received by others. This chapter went as far as to make 




that Nkrumah was the lonely voice within the Casablanca group, which means other 
members of the Casablanca group became associated with Nkrumah’s radical call for 
African unity by virtue of being signatories to the Casablanca Declaration.  
Perhaps the most central part of this chapter is an analysis of the centripetal and 
centrifugal forces in the Pan-African unity debate, which this study undertook by 
comparing the position of the Monrovia group to that of the Casablanca group on the 
question of African unity. It was argued that the Casablanca group under the 
stewardship of Nkrumah was determined to form a political union, while on the other 
hand, the Monrovia group opted for economic cooperation, which would also witness 
the cooperation in technology.   
Conclusively, it should be remembered that although the Casablanca group was 
dubbed the radical Pan-Africanists because of their demand for immediate political 
unity, it is, however, worth paying attention to the fact that, it was only Ghana under 
the stewardship of Nkrumah that had openly assumed that position. So, it is by default 
that all those who associated with Ghana and signed the Casablanca Declaration 
became known as the radical Casablanca group. One could further go on to argue 
that any state that failed to attend the Monrovia conference was classified as being 
under the Casablanca group. The preceding chapter discussed the reasons of some 
of the Casablanca members to boycott the Monrovia Conference, which it was hoped 
could be attended by all independent African states at that time. Moreover, it should 
also be remembered that Nkrumah was deposed in 1966 through a coup d'état in just 
less than three years since the OAU was formed; however, Nkrumah continued to 
engage Africans through his writings on the quest for African unity. What this suggests, 
is that there was no vigorous voice left within the OAU chambers that challenged the 










Converging and diverging views during the second phase of African unity  
4.1 Introduction  
The first phase in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism was geographically 
concentrated in the African diaspora, and hence the debates on African unity were 
centred around the return to Africa. However, this took another dimension with the 
transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the African diaspora after the 1945 Manchester 
Congress. Given the classification outlined in the preceding chapter, the post-1945 
quest for African unity took place in the first phase of the institutionalisation of Pan-
Africanism. This shift was marked by Pan-Africanism’s pursuit of the emancipation of 
African countries from European colonialism and imperialism, led by Africans in the 
motherland. Therefore, the quest for “African unity”, which was regarded as a vehicle 
that would propel Africa’s emancipation immediately, became a focal point of Pan-
Africanism on the continent. The 1960’s “Grand Debate on African Unity” ushered in 
the second phase of African unity, which was the formation of the OAU in May 1963. 
The OAU “became Africa’s first continental organisation tasked not only with 
establishing guidelines for and to facilitate strong relationships between independent 
African states”, but also fostering the total liberation of Africa and uniting Africa 
(Sturman, 2007:1). African unity was very important to this first African organisation, 
like its name suggests.   
The second phase in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism began in 1963 with the 
formation of the OAU, and it culminated in 2002 with the formation of the AU, which 
replaced the OAU. Under this chapter, the focus will revolve around understanding the 
role played by the OAU and its organs in the promotion of African unity by examining 
how the African unity debate sharped the formation and functional duties of the OAU 
and its organs. The formation of the OAU was a momentous moment in Africa’s pursuit 
for unity, however, the newly independent African states were met with numerous 
challenges. In the words of Nyerere who said “we spoke and acted as if, given the 
opportunity for self-government, we would quickly create utopias. Instead injustice, 
even tyranny, is rampant” (Shivji, 2011). Ayoob (1995:16) has described post-colonial 
states as “weak, vulnerable and insecure – with these traits being the function of both 




Ayoob goes on to argue that “this external and internal insecurity stems from their late 
entry into the state system, and that their precarious sovereignty is based on colonial 
demarcations of their boundaries”.  
In 1967, Arthur Hazlewood wrote “despite the speeches, the conferences, the 
resolutions, the quest for African unity seems to approach little nearer to its goal”. Over 
five decades later Hazlewood’s words remain relevant; however, over the years lots 
of strides have been made towards attaining the goal of African unity. One of the first 
significant steps taken in pursuit of African unity was the formation of the OAU, which 
was later replaced by the AU.  At the formation of the OAU in 1963, Nkrumah argued 
that “a united Africa would ultimately be the most effective vehicle for Africa’s social, 
political and economic emancipation” (Murithi,2008:1). Moreover, Nkrumah warned 
the heads of independent African states that failure to unite would risk falling into a 
“condition which has made Latin America the unwilling and distressed prey of 
imperialism after one and a half centuries of political independence” (Obeng, 1997:20). 
Although Nkrumah’s message was punctuated with applause, other heads of 
independent African states had contrary views to Nkrumah’s conception of African 
unity and integration. This brought about competing and interplaying conceptions on 
African unity and integration that had taken centre stage in the early 1960’s Grand 
Debate between the three main groups:  the Cassablanca, Brazzaville, and Monrovia 
groups. Each group had its own distinctive understanding and strategic plan for 
achieving continental integration and unity (Cervenka, 1977:1). However, there were 
convergences and divergences in their “conceptions and road maps towards 
continental unity”. Suffice it to say, a common denominator among these groups, was 
their ideological underpinning, which is Pan-Africanism. The central pillars of Pan-
Africanism from its inception are unity, solidarity and self-reliance. Hence, these three 
groups never disagreed on the issue of unity but disagreed on when and how Africa 
should unite.  
Unity and integration became buzzwords as many African countries gained their 
independence from colonial rule (Welch, 1966:4). The seeding of ideas of unity and 
integration were deeply planted in the minds and hearts of Africans when they came 
in contact with the ideas of Pan-Africanism (Ackah, 1999:17). Pan-Africanism as an 
idea and movement traces its roots to the African diaspora. It emerged as a counter 




Africanism evolved until it reached the African shores, in Africa it became a torch that 
extinguished the darkness of colonialism and apartheid (Ackah, 1999:12).  
As noted above, Pan-Africanism is underpinned by unity, solidarity and self-reliance, 
hence, when the baton was passed on to Nkrumah and other African attendees at the 
Manchester Congress in 1945 it was expected that it would unite Africans in their 
struggle against colonialism, forge solidarity among Africans on the continent and in 
the diaspora. As encapsulated in the African proverb, “if you want to go quickly, go 
alone. If you want to go far, go together”. This message echoed loudly in Nkrumah’s 
independence speech when he declared that “the independence of Ghana is 
meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent” 
(Biney, 2011:135). Indeed, Africans wanted to go far and Pan-Africanism became a 
means for Africans to come together to march towards tackling the post-independent 
challenges and help untangle the remaining countries from colonial chains. Moreover, 
it was expected that Pan-Africanism would translate into self-reliance and the United 
States of Africa (Murithi, 2008:1). 
In the 1950s, Nkrumah famously urged his African counterparts to “seek ye first the 
political kingdom and all things will be added to it” (Adebayo, 2010:22). Thus, the OAU 
as the first Pan-African organisation on the continent became a beacon of hope to the 
peoples of Africa who were still languishing under colonial rule. And for those who had 
attained Nkrumah’s political kingdom it was regarded as a vehicle that would help 
speed up development, solidarity and self-reliance. Nkrumah’s political kingdom 
culminated in the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa which ushered in a 
democratic dispensation in April 1994 (Adogamhe, 2008:15). However, very little was 
added to Nkrumah’s “political kingdom” as post-independent Africa witnessed unrest, 
civil wars, interstate conflicts, violation of human rights, undemocratic removals of 
governments and socio-economic ills (Adedeji, 2008:1). This questioned the 
effectiveness of the OAU as the beacon of hope and the organisation that would 
facilitate African unity.  
It is against this backdrop of conflicting ideas that one can most usefully study the 
attempts made so far to achieve African unity. This research will contribute to this 
ongoing debate on African unity by drawing together the views of the three rival camps 




could best be achieved in the Grand Debate of the 1960s. The difference of opinions 
on African unity had a tremendous impact on how the OAU was constituted and its 
organs, policies and agenda. To begin with, this study will discuss the formation of the 
OAU and the quest for African unity. This will then be followed by a discussion on the 
RECs as stepping stones towards African unity. Furthermore, this chapter will examine 
the impact of the Cold War on the quest for African unity and also the African unity 
debates. Finally, this chapter will analyse the LPA and Abuja Treaty as policies of 
African unity.  
4.2 The formation of the OAU and the quest for African unity 
The OAU was formed at a time when newly independent African states were starting 
to grapple with the intricacies of what it means to be free and while politicians were 
anxious to consolidate their power. Although formed as part of a compromise between 
the Casablanca group, Brazzaville 12 and the Monrovia group, which were at 
loggerheads over the question of how Africa should unite (Murithi, 2008:3); the OAU 
became a necessary step towards achieving a high degree of cooperation among 
African states. However, this cooperation is not the one Nkrumah had hoped for, but 
instead the founding fathers of the OAU opted for a superficial unity, which brought 
together heads of states, but not the peoples of Africa (Adogamhe, 2008:12). A type 
of unity which guaranteed sovereignty of independent states, and as such giving 
member states of the OAU the right to pursue their own national policies devoid of or 
not influenced by the continental priorities (Cernenka, 1977:ix). Apart from its 
weaknesses and challenges in responding effectively to the post-independent 
challenges which were largely legacies of colonialism, the OAU struggled to achieve 
unity (Mathews, 2018:6).  
In line with the above argument, this section aims to discuss the formation of the OAU 
and its pursuit of African unity. To begin with, this section will examine the events that 
led to the formation of the OAU, followed by the objectives and goals of the OAU. 
Furthermore, this section will examine the OAU’s institutions and policies that hindered 
or promoted African unity.  
4.2.1 Understanding the formation of the OAU: Pulling and pushing forces  
In the preceding chapter, an attempt was made to show how the question on African 




was also acknowledged that the question of African unity was not the only dividing 
factor, but it proved to be one of the main factors, especially for Nkrumah and his 
radical group, the Casablanca, which were pursuing the project of African unity. This 
division proved to be the main stumbling block for Nkrumah and those who were 
committed to the idea of African unity. The Lagos Conference of January 1962 was 
not only a turning point for the Monrovia group, but it was also a turning point in the 
quest for African unity. It was at this conference that the Emperor of Ethiopia openly 
lamented the division that existed. He said: 
To escape exploration, and to overcome the political deficiencies which beset 
us, Ethiopia urges that while we press ahead with all urgency and speed in 
those economic areas in which rapid advances can be achieved, parallel steps 
should simultaneously be taken to explore the possibilities of achieving 
increasing future political unity among us. Ethiopia is committed to the principle 
of political unity among African states- indeed, we believe that we all are, and 
that we differ only in our assessment of the speed with which this most desirable 
of goals can be attained. The task now is to devise the means whereby this 
basic agreement may be most rapidly advanced. The furtherance of political 
unity, then, would be a fundamental objective of the Organisation of African 
States (Thompson, 1969:175). 
This speech by the Emperor set the tone for the May 1963, Addis Ababa Conference. 
In the same speech, the Emperor lamented the absence of the Casablanca group, 
whose reasons for declining the invitation to this conference were deliberated on in 
the previous chapter. The Emperor said: 
We must express our regret that representatives of the Algerian Provisional 
Government are not numbered in our midst, and that their absence has caused 
a number of other nations whose representatives should be seated in these 
halls to decline invitation extended to them. We cannot but feel that our tasks 
are made more difficult because several African nations are unrepresented in 
these halls. But we feel even more strongly that no African escape the 
circumstances which brought us together in Lagos or evade his solemn duty of 




“ourselves to labour unhesitatingly in the discharge of this obligation during the 
days ahead (Thompson, 1969:175). 
Ethiopia used a reconciliation diplomatic approach in ensuring that it acted as a 
mediator between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups, and while attending a 
preparatory work for the Conference of Independent States scheduled for Tunisia, 
1962, the Emperor said: 
We ask that this same step be taken and that the states not present here be 
asked and urged, in the name of Africa and African unity, to send members to 
participate in the work of this committee (Thompson, 1969:175). 
Haile Selassie further argued that: 
It was the duty and privilege of the delegates to rouse the slumbering Giant of 
Africa, not to the nationalism of Europe of the nineteenth century, not to regional 
consciousness, but to the vision of a single African brotherhood bending its 
united efforts towards the achievement of a greater and nobler goal. While we 
agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must 
at the same time recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its 
achievement are at once numerous and formidable (Abegunrin, 2009:145). 
In the preceding chapter, this study noted the level of tension these differences of 
opinions had created. Henceforth, the question to be asked at this juncture is: who 
and what brought these rival groups under one roof to discuss the possible formation 
of the first continental organisation?  It was a diplomatic approach that was taken by 
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to get these three rival groups to meet and discuss 
a way forward. Also, the Casablanca group felt ostracised and outnumbered within the 
UN Africa Group, so to try and gain influence on the continent they accepted the 
invitation. Furthermore, the relations between Nigeria (leader of the Monrovia group) 
and Ghana (leader of the Casablanca group) had deteriorated to an irreconcilable 
state, therefore, Nkrumah saw this as an opportunity to thaw the relations between 
these two African giants. Moreover, the Casablanca group played a key role in the 
transplantation and propagation of Pan-Africanism in Africa, so there was a threat that 
its influence could be erased by the raising of the Monrovia group, especially Nigeria, 
which proved to be familiar with this ideology as was demonstrated in the previous 




As aforementioned, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia played a tremendous role in 
uniting the two rival camps. His efforts were complemented by presidents Sekou Toure 
of Guinea and Leopold Senghor of Senegal at Labe, Guinea (Thompson, 1969:174). 
These leaders were also committed to the idea of uniting these two groups, and in 
June 1962, they accepted an invitation from Emperor Haile Selassie who was also 
keen to foster unity among these two factions. With President Sekou Toure 
representing the Casablanca group, while President Leopold Sedar Senghor 
represented the Monrovia group, they met to iron out their differences. All these efforts 
by the Emperor and his counterparts paid off when Ethiopia hosted the Addis Ababa 
Conference of May 1963, which brought together all three rival groups under one roof.  
It was on 25 May 1963, when a group of independent African states convened in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia to give birth to the OAU, which became the first formal step towards 
continental unity and integration of all independent African states. The OAU was born 
out of a compromise between those calling for the immediate continental integration 
and those who wanted to retain a degree of national sovereignty and autonomy in 
administrating their own national affairs.  The latter group felt that the immediate 
continental integration would take away their newly acquired sovereignty, and 
therefore opted for a gradual process towards continental integration that would 
protect the state sovereignty (Thompson, 1969:162). The former felt that the earlier 
the better as anchored in the words of the leading protagonist of this school of thought, 
Nkrumah, who argued that Africa’s remedy to all her malaises were “strong political 
unity” and “the African race united under one federal government”.  
In his opening remarks at the May 1963, Addis Ababa Conference, Emperor Haile 
Selassie said:  
Through all that has been said and written and done in these years, there runs 
a common theme. Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about means; we 
discuss tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument 
among us. We are determined to create a union of Africans. In a very real 
sense, our continent is unmade, it still awaits its creation and creators. It is our 
duty and privilege to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa, not the nationalism 
of Europe of the nineteenth century, not to regional consciousness, but to the 




achievement of a greater and nobler goal. But while we agree that the ultimate 
destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must at the same time 
recognise that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are at once 
numerous and formidable (Cited in Thompson, 1962:182). 
As aforementioned, at the formation of the OAU the Casablanca group led by Nkrumah 
of Ghana advocated for the immediate creation of the Union of African States that 
would transcend the colonial borders and transform the fragmented state system. 
Furthermore, the Casablanca group contended that the post-colonial state system 
would be politically divisive and economically wasteful, a contention that proved to be 
prophetic (Thompson, 1969:163). On the other hand, Nigeria leading the Monrovia 
group called for an incremental approach towards the attainment of African unity. The 
tension between the radical Pan-Africanist idea and the fragmented state system is 
implicit in the compromise solution embedded in Article II of the OAU Charter, which 
advocates” “the promotion of solidarity and cooperation among African States as well 
as for the defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity”. 
Despite the enthusiasm and convincing speeches by the proponents of African unity, 
it was, however decided that African unity remained illusory, and therefore, serious 
consideration should be given to decolonisation because there were still surviving 
pockets of colonialism (Thompson, 1969:182).  Adedeji (2008:4), argues that the 
matter of African unity was not thrown out completely and no one disputed the desire 
and even the eventual inevitability of African unity. However, what was in question was 
the modality for realising it, the speed with which it should be achieved and the form 
that it should take”.  While Landsberg (2007: 2), postulates that even though a 
compromise was reached, it was nevertheless unequivocal that the OAU reflected the 
interests of the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups. This was evident in the adoption of 
the following as its guiding principles: the policy of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of fellow member states, good neighbourliness among African states; this is  
further proof that African leaders opted for the protection of state sovereignty over 
federal government (Adedeji, 2008:6). However, this compromise did not help resolve 
the question of the continental political order, but merely postponed it. It was therefore 




The radical Pan-Africanists had agreed to join the OAU with the hope that they would 
be able to transform it from within to reflect their interests. To some degree, their 
resilience and determination proved fruitful on a few occasions. For example, when 
they successfully persuaded the OAU to grant equal importance of the OAU Liberation 
Committee to the Council of Ministers (Thompson, 1969:170). The previous chapter 
detailed the debates leading to the formation of the OAU, which although it was not 
what the radical Pan-Africanists had hoped for, nonetheless, it was a step in the right 
direction. The OAU’s main objectives were to:  
• “promote the unity and solidarity of African states; 
•  coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for 
the peoples of Africa;  
• safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states;  
• rid the continent of colonisation and apartheid;  
• promote international cooperation within the UN framework; and 
• harmonise members’ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, 
health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies” (Cervenka, 1977:12). 
“The OAU has been criticised  over the years for its failure to achieve African unity and 
to transform the continent’s socio-economic status. However, to its credit, it 
successfully waged a struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Africa (Mathews, 
2018:5).  As observed by Murithi (2008:3), most post-independent African leaders paid 
lip service to the notion of Pan-Africanism and its quest for African unity.  “The newly 
independent African states realised that they would need to work together if they 
wanted to enhance their socio-economic development of their countries and continent 
as a whole.” 
The OAU was mandated with liberating as well as uniting the continent. Paradoxically, 
one of the first policies to be adopted by the OAU reaffirmed and protected the colonial 
borders. “In 1964, the OAU met in Cairo, Egypt and that meeting was called the Cairo 
Summit, which is remembered mainly for the declaration of the heads of state of 
independent Africa to respect the borders inherited from colonialism. This principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs of member states of the OAU had been enshrined 
in the OAU Charter (Wapmuk, 2009:652). This principle also became an obstacle for 




declared as the lost decade due to the number of conflicts that raged across the 
continent (Adedeji, 2008:5).”  
As it has been observed “without peace there is no development, and without 
development there is no peace”. These two factors are inextricably intertwined, but the 
OAU failed to keep peace on the African continent, and as such, it affected 
development. Mazrui famously remarked “now that the imperial order is coming to an 
end, who is keeping the peace in Africa?” (Mazrui, 2004).  It was expected that the 
OAU would keep that peace, however, because it had discarded Nkrumah’s advice of 
having a standing army, it thus failed. While this cannot be regarded as the sole reason  
why the OAU failed in keeping the peace in Africa, it is important to note another factor, 
which has already been mentioned, and that is, the OAU’s policy of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of member states (Mwanasali, 2018:42). As Williams stated, the 
OAU was prepared to go to great lengths in condemning European “minority” regimes 
in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) for abuses 
unleashed against the natives of those countries. Yet it remained silent on abuses by 
African regimes. It was “willing to promote human rights, but not protect them” 
(Williams, 2007: 268). 
On the question of African unity, the OAU continued promoting policies that would 
stimulate African unity using a gradualist approach. The LPA and the Abuja Treaty are 
some of the policies that the OAU put forth to promote African unity through the 
creation of RECs. These policies will be interrogated in the following sections of this 
chapter.  Having said that, it is argued that the OAU did not have a clear vision and 
strategy to realise its ambition for African unity and thus this had an effect on its 
structures, organs and performance in general (Ndizera and Muzee, 2018:143).  
Other factors that affected the OAU’s effectiveness involve its inability to deal with 
inter- and intra-state conflicts. In the early-1960s, Africa had experienced civil wars in 
several countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, 
Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Chad, Guinea and Somalia (Adogamhe, 
2008:13). These wars exacerbated poverty, underdevelopment, refugees, and also 
ravaged the embryonic economic infrastructures of an underdeveloped continent. In 




The territorial disputes among African countries was the primary factor in the formation 
of the rival groups of the 1960s, and to help minimise the intra-state wars the OAU 
established the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration to settle border 
and territorial disputes among member states. For example, in the case involving the 
Ethiopia/Somalia border conflict of 1977-8 the Commission performed extremely well; 
however, when it came to intervention in cases of military conflict, the Commission did 
not perform well. For example, in the Chadian civil war between 1979 and 1982, the 
OAU raised an inter-African military force to enforce peace, but it failed (Adogamhe, 
2008:12). 
After almost 40 years in existence, it became clear to African leaders that the OAU 
had lost its credibility as it was dubbed “the dictator’s club”. “The OAU charter could 
not adequately address the dire security and economic problems facing Africa. It was 
against this background that the African leaders decided to dissolve the OAU and 
reconstitute it as a new organisation that would address the problems of the continent 
(Adogamhe, 2008:14). The following discussion will examine the regional integration 
approach as one of the stepping stones to achieving continental integration”.” 
4.3. Regional integration as a stepping stone to continental integration in Africa 
At the formation of the OAU the President of Gabon, Mr Leon Mba remarked; “I should 
like to lay special emphasis on the importance of economic co-operation as an 
approach to African unity” (Cervenka, 1977:176). It should be stressed at this juncture 
that the majority of the founding fathers of the OAU were in support of economic 
cooperation as an approach to African unity. Nyerere went as far as to say economic 
cooperation should be viewed as the “stepping stones towards African unity”. The 
economic cooperation was to be arranged in RECs, which would ultimately lead to the 
African Economic Community (AEC) (Apuuli, 2016:148).  
Although the concept of integration in Africa is not a new phenomenon, it existed pre-
independence and it accelerated post-independence. The difference is that in pre-
independence it was to the benefit of the colonisers at the expense of the colonised. 
This form of integration helped to facilitate and “harmonise the colonisers’ endeavours” 
in different regions of the continent for easy administration. With the collapse of 
colonialism emerged the cracks in this integration (Hezlewood, 1967:3). In line with 




steppingstone to Africa’s quest for African unity by examining the policies that were 
adopted to promote African unity.  
The Casablanca camp under the leadership of Nkrumah, who was calling for the 
immediate unification of Africa under the formation of the Union of Governments, was 
compromised when the OAU was established. It was agreed as part of the 
compromise that the quest for African unity would be pursued through regional 
integration (Cervenka, 1977:176). Michel argues that “Regional organisations differ 
regarding the degree of autonomy they have as actors or agents in IR independently 
of their member states. In other words, the extent to which the organisation has a 
supranational identity, and supranational institutions and powers, will determine the 
extent to which it operates as an entity that is more than the sum of its parts”. 
The preceding section has detailed the opinions of various groups that outlined their 
positions of how Africa should unite; while also pointing out some of the challenges 
the OAU was faced with, especially in the area of development, peace and security 
and human rights. The question of economic emancipation was given serious thought 
within the OAU, and hence, it formed one of the key objectives of the OAU and the 
Pan-African movement holistically (Thompson, 1969:184). Keeping with the 
compromise of 1963 when it was formed, the OAU adopted strategies and policies for 
political unity that included building from the bottom-up through the formation of the 
RECs (Michel, 2012:30). Despite the obvious reasons why the OAU chose the route 
of the RECs in its endeavour for political and economic integration, there are, however, 
other reasons. But, given the limited scope of this study, a discussion on the factors 
that prompted the African leaders to adopt the strategies and policies that promoted 
the RECs should be precise and concise.” 
The African leaders showed support for regional integration at the formation of the 
OAU, embracing regional integration as an integral component of Africa’s 
developmental strategy. However, there are few success stories. African regional 
integration arrangements were generally ambitious schemes with unrealistic time 
frames towards political union. African RIOs are usually neighbourhood arrangements. 
As observed by Ndizera and Muzee (2018:144), “these various strategies and 
frameworks for economic development were agreed on by the continent’s leadership 




problems in Africa had reached crisis proportions”. The OAU’s pursuit of African unity 
through the formation of RECs created a crisis between the OAU and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which had been established 
before the formation of the OAU (Cervenka, 1977:177). This tension is dealt with in 
numerous research papers and books, and this is not the place to examine them in 
detail. Suffice it to say, there was already an economic plan outlined for Africa by the 
UNECA. 
The 1960s emerged as a new scholarship that was dedicated to examining the 
relationship between the developed first world countries and the underdeveloped third 
world countries. The Argentinian scholar and statesman Raul Prebisch coined and 
popularised the dependence theory, which divided the world into three: the centre, 
semi-periphery and the periphery. Prebisch was soon joined by scholars such as 
Walter Rodney who wrote the book titled ”How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” 
deliberating on how Africa became an appendage of Europe’s development and how 
that created dependency. Rodney wrote this book at the time Africa was going through 
economic crisis, so responding to the 1970s economic crisis, the OAU strengthened 
its partnership with the UNECA in 1979 and worked around the clock to forge a vision 
and plan to address the crisis.  
After World War II there were many countries breaking free from colonial and 
imperialist control; mainly the Asian and African countries. Given the economic 
conditions and the dependency that existed between these countries and their former 
colonisers the UN declared the 1960s as the “Development Decade” (Apuuli, 
2016:148). Hence, “a call was made for a New International Economic Order at the 
6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly which adopted two resolutions on 1 
May 1974.  The first resolution was called ’Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order’ and the other “Programme of Action”” (Cervenka, 
1977:182). These resolutions laid down the principles of a new relationship between 
the developed rich and the underdeveloped poor countries. Moreover, in 1964, the 
UNECA recreated the African Development Bank (ADB) (Apuuli, 2016:184). The OAU 
reacted to these resolutions by organising a summit in Kampala in July 1975. It was 
decided at this summit that the development of Africa was the responsibility of the 




the initiative to resuscitate African economies and, in some cases, build them from 
scratch.   
The above developments encouraged and sustained the efforts of several African 
countries towards regional economic cooperation with an intention of pooling national 
and external resources to achieve collective self-resilient development (Apuuli, 
2016:184). Determined to synergise, the OAU member states in 1980 adopted the 
LPA and the Final Act of Lagos with the aim of establishing the AEC (Apuuli, 
2016:148). In 1991, the Abuja Treaty established the East African Community (EAC), 
which came into force in 1994. The EAC reflects Africa’s desires, as a UNECA report 
notes, “to transform itself from a continent of individual least developed and developing 
economies to a strong, united bloc of nations” (Apuuli, 2016:148).  
The Pan-African unity debate before the formation of the OAU was ideological and 
concerned with illustrating a road map for Africa’s political unification, and now that the 
OAU had been formed as a formal organisation, it would provide a platform for policy 
debates. The analysis of the debates between the gradualists and maximalists would 
turn from ideological debates to policy debates. Perhaps an appropriate question at 
this juncture would be: were the rival camps of the early 1960s maintained within the 
OAU, if yes, then how did this impact the policies? If no, then was there harmony in 
the decisions which were taken at the OAU?  
Apuuli (2016:144) argues that after the formation of the OAU the Casablanca and 
Monrovia blocs were dissolved. However, this did not bring an end to the African unity 
debate. There are many purposes for the regional integration in Africa besides 
development. One of them is to enhance structural transformation and facilitating 
Africa’s smooth integration into the global economy, especially after the end of the 
Cold War. Just like the RECs were pillars of the OAU in its quest for African unity, so 
the same can be said about the AU. This is evidenced in the OAU’s Charter and the 
Constitutive Act establishing the AU by identifying regional integration as one of the 
foundations of African unity.  
As aforesaid, the decision by the African leaders to pursue  self-reliant development 
through promoting a regional and continental integration scheme was done in an 
attempt to achieve economic emancipation and industrial development. The reason 




enhance Africa’s bargaining power in  global affairs (Adogamhe, 2008:12). It could 
safely be said that the OAU was tiptoeing around Nkrumah’s ideas for Africa, but in a 
gradual manner.  The following subsection will examine the framework of Africa’s 
regional integration under the OAU, through its policies.  
4.3.1 Examining the framework of Africa’s regional integration under the OAU  
The evolution of the Pan-African unity debate from an ideological point of view to a 
policy debate demonstrates the willingness of the African leaders to leapfrog towards 
total continental integration.  However, it does not suggest that the debates on the 
policy formation of the OAU were devoid of ideological underpinnings. The two most 
important policies that the OAU adopted in pursuit of economic and political integration 
are namely: the LPO and the Abuja Treaty. Apuuli (2016:148), argues that “the RECs 
developed individually and had different roles and structures. Mostly, the purpose of 
the RECs is to facilitate regional economic integration between members of the 
individual regions and through the wider AEC, which was established under the Abuja 
Treaty (1991). This Treaty, which has been in operation since 1994, ultimately seeks 
to create an African Common Market using the RECs as building blocks”.  
The global economic environment was changing, especially after the end of the Cold 
War and there were visible signs that the OAU was failing on all fronts. Hence, the 
OAU in 1991 launched the Abuja Treaty which came into effect on 12 May 1994, in an 
attempt to expedite development and foster gradual unity, among other reasons. The 
following subsections will discuss the LPA and the Abuja Treaty respectively, in an 
endeavour to demonstrate how the Pan-African unity debate evolved into a policy, 
which set out the framework for the attainment of economic emancipation coupled with 
the ultimate goal of attaining African unity.  
4.3.1.1The Lagos Plan of Action  
The OAU adopted the LPA in 1980, based on an economic strategy anchored on the 
idea of endogenous or self-centred development. Its principle can be summed up as: 
counting on one’s own strengths. Adopted in April 1980 by the OAU”, the LPA inspired 
by the work of African economists and experts, was aimed primarily at “national and 
collective self-sufficiency in the economic and social fields, with a view to the 
establishment of a new international economic order”. It set forth a vast programme of 




“From the early 1970s there were signs of economic collapse across the African 
continent and coupled with that was the prevalence of dictatorships and undemocratic 
governments. The ECA Secretary General, Dr Adebajo Adedeji in his address at the 
ECA annual meeting held from 24 February to 4 March 1977 in Kinshasa lamented on 
the economic situation in Africa describing it as “alarming” (Cervenka, 1977:189). 
Globally, there were also significant changes that were taking place with the Bretton 
Woods institutions (BWIs) responding to the economic crisis of the 1970s by adopting 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which were the policies requested by the 
International monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) as condition for financial aid 
when dealing with an economic crisis.  Figure 2 below shows how crippled the 
economy of Africa was.”  
Figure 2: The African economy during the OAU  
 
Source: (Adedeji, 2008) 
The graph above depicts the level of economic crisis, which was faced by the African 
countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In response to these challenges  the OAU 
came up with the 1979 Monrovia Declaration, the precursor to the 1980 LPA, which 
was geared towards self-introspection (the OAU and its member states) and also by 
looking for home-grown solutions to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis and to 
assert their autonomy, which was slowly chipping away due to conditions that were 
set out in the SAPs. The signing of the Economic Community of West African States 




Francophone states, became a contributory catalyst to the 1979 Monrovia Declaration 
Strategy and the 1980 continent-wide LPA. The OAU recognised eight RECs, the: 
• “Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
•  Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN–SAD) 
•  East African Community (EAC) 
• Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC)”(AUC, 2019. 
As noted in the AU Commission report on African Regional Integration (2019:6), the 
LPA was designed to be a proactive strategy predicated on stronger local economies, 
sovereignty over natural resources, food self-sufficiency, industrial growth and, above 
all, mobilising people. The main components or measures of the LPA consisted of 
realising a continental transport and communications strategy and intensifying intra-
African trade and financial exchanges. The LPA encouraged the development of new 
technologies and training. In the tradition of policies pursued since independence, 
public authorities were to play a key role, but this time, as part of a continental action 
plan couched on regional cooperation.” 
In spite of its ambitious and innovative nature, unfortunately none of the LPA’s 
objectives could be achieved. Thus, the LPA was abandoned only a few years after it 
had been adopted because it could not really be executed. The key contributor to the 
LPA’s failure was lack of funds; however, there were other reasons besides funding 
such as the OAU’s mechanism which was not designed for economic policies at 
continental level. Furthermore, there were also competing international initiatives, in 
particular the WB’s Berg report, which was a response to the LPA, and which 
contributed to making the African LPA obsolete. The African crisis was seen as the 
product of external dynamics, particularly the unequal exchange in the international 
economic order. But the Berg report saw the African crisis as internal, triggered by 
mismanaged economies creating macroeconomic imbalances. “The Bank’s vision 




almost the entire continent between 1983 and 1999, sweeping the Lagos Plan off its 
feet” (AUC, 2019:5). 
4.3.1.2 Abuja Treaty 
The end of the Cold War precipitated major political change in Africa, including 
democratic changes. The first formal indication of the OAU’s declining relevance in 
this new political landscape came in the form of the 1990 Declaration on the Political 
and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa, which acknowledged that the “era of focusing 
mainly on ‘political liberation and nation building’ should make way for a new era of 
greater emphasis on economic development and integration”. This economic 
development agenda was concretised in 1991 with the adoption of a treaty 
establishing the AEC – known as the Abuja Treaty. Its primary objective was “to 
promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African 
economies” through the gradual coordination of the continent’s existing RECs and the 
establishment of new policies, programmes and institutions.” 
Under the Abuja Treaty, the AEC was to be established in six stages over a period of 
34 years (Apuuli, 2016:148). “The Abuja Treaty relies on eight building blocks – the 
RECs to achieve its goals of establishing the AEC” (Apuuli, 2016:148). As 
aforementioned, this was in response to the mediocre economic performance of 
African countries in the late 1970s. African economies were all defined by high 
inflation, fiscal and trade deficits and poor growth, with concerns about Africa’s ability 
to accelerate globalisation. It was also during this period that the debt crisis emerged.”  
The Abuja Treaty was adopted in June 1991 and entered into force in May 1994, it is 
endowed with the vision of the Heads of State and Government, which is the 
realisation of integration to kick off meaningful economic development on the African 
continent. To expedite its effectiveness and efficiency, the Abuja Treaty was to be 
rolled out in six main stages: creating and strengthening the RECs, eliminating tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, creating the free trade area, creating a continental customs 
union, creating an African common market, and creating an African economic and 






Figure 3: The Phases of African Continental Integration Agenda 
 
Source: (AUC, 2019) 
The above diagram shows the six stages outlined in the Abuja Treaty.  
The Abuja Treaty was also under threat from more or less the same factors that led to 
the collapse or failure of its precursor, the LPA, however, the Abuja Treaty raised 
hopes when it helped to transform the OAU into the AU.  
4.4 The effects of the Cold War on continental integration and unity  
The transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the diaspora to Africa coincided with the 
rise of the Cold War, which gained critical mass during the wave of independence in 
Africa. The early 1960s saw a great number of African states breaking free from the 
colonial yoke, while in the northern hemisphere the West and Eastern blocs were 
fighting over the sphere of influence. The Cold War threatened to derail Africa’s 
transition to independence by turning Africa into a proxy war; Angola and Mozambique 
being the prime examples. While the East and Western blocs were on the verge of 
confrontation in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Africans were debating on how Africa 




had influence to some degree in shaping the debates; especially in the liberation of 
Africa and types of governments that were adopted post-independence.  
Tom Mboya famously remarked that: 
both Westerners and Russians look at Africans through the same pair of 
glasses: the one lens is marked pro-West; the other pro-Communist. It is not 
surprising that, looking at Africans in this way, most foreigners fail to understand 
the one great reality about our continent- that Africans are neither pro-West nor 
pro- Russian; they are pro-African (Cited in Legum, 1962:13). 
The bulk of African scholarship during this Cold War era was punctuated by sentiments 
such as pro-Communist Gizenga, pro-British Nigeria, anti-British Nasser and pro-
Western Kasavubu. Very few wrote about pro-Africa or pro-Pan-Africanism, however, 
this does not suggest that there were no activists or leaders who were pro-Africa. What 
this suggests is the inroads the Cold War had made in the lives of the peoples of Africa 
(Legum, 1962:13).  
In chapter three, this study detailed the division and skepticism the Cold War brought 
to the African unity debate. For example, the Casablanca faction had envisioned a 
Union Government of Africa/United States of Africa predicated on the socialist values; 
while the Monrovia bloc were skeptical of socialism because to them it meant little 
freedom or no freedom at all (Thompson, 1969:170). Moreover, the rival groups often 
sided with the liberation movements that were in support of their ideology, either 
socialism and democracy (Jackson, 2010:233). To illustrate this point, one would have 
to examine the Casablanca group’s support for Lumumba instead of the Kasavambu 
government, which they alleged was an imperialist project. Imperialism in this regard 
was synonymous with the West and its allies (Thompson, 1969: 167; Legum, 
1962:55).   
The Congo, serving as the second largest country on the continent and located in the 
heart of Central Africa, was seen as a threat to the West if the communist ideology 
continued to spread at the height of the Cold War in Africa. Unlike many African 
countries that adopted an approach of non-alignment, Lumumba was unrepentant 
about his communist ideology and friendship with the former Soviet Union.” The Congo 
became a theatre in the Cold War and by far it was not the only African country to be 




the Casablanca bloc, which had already called for African unity through a socialist 
government, further led to the divisions between the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs 
(Jackson, 2010:229; Thompson, 1969:167).   
Boateng (2013), cautions that any discussion on either the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the OAU should consider the role of external interests, as that would 
paint a clear picture. Proxy wars were not the only impact the Cold War had on Africa, 
and according to Boateng (2013), the formation of the Monrovia group, which became 
a counterforce in Nkrumah’s call for African unity, was the creation of the Western 
forces. He further postulates that the Western powers used the old tactic of divide and 
rule to cause division among Africans, promoting a propaganda that Nkrumah’s call 
for African unity was for personal gratification. Notwithstanding Nkrumah’s domestic 
critics (African leaders), one must also not forget the external machinations of the 
imperialists against Nkrumah’s vision for a united Africa. In fact, Boateng (2013) 
revealed that Nkrumah’s overthrow from power in 1966 was to some extent 
orchestrated by the imperialist forces.” 
The Cold War division also played out within the OAU, and a case in point is the one 
involving Gaddafi when he was due to be appointed as the chairperson of the OAU; 
however, this was prevented by what Abdul-Raheem (2009:1) called “an unholy 
alliance of internal reactionary leaders and external Cold War-driven campaigns 
against the then fiery revolutionary leader led by the West, with the US as the principal 
Force of opposition”. Many African leaders who were allies of the West decided to 
boycott the OAU summit that was hosted by Libya and a quorum could not be 
obtained. As a result, the outgoing chairperson,  Daniel Arap Moi, had his term 
extended. Moi was regarded as a “’model’ African leader”, by London and Washington.  
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the convergences and divergences in the Pan-African 
unity debate in the second phase of the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism. This 
second phase was marked by the formation of the OAU in 1963. Moreover, this 
chapter deliberated on the evolution of the African unity debate from an ideological 
debate to a policy formation debate. This evolution was enabled by the formation of 
the OAU in 1963, which became Africa’s first continental organisation. Although it was 




able to provide a platform for all independent African states to discuss matters of 
common interest.  
At any given moment in history, 'the soul' of a nation is found inside individuals; 
individuals who carry the collective aspiration of the same nation. At times, it is not 
even individuals but it can also be one man. Nkrumah did not carry the collective 
aspirations of the Ghanaians only, but also that of the Africans. Nkrumah’s call for a 
united Africa was embraced by his counterparts although opting for a gradual 
approach. While the formation of the OUA remains a testimony to Africa’s commitment 
towards unity, it was, however, unsuccessful in realising Nkrumah’s dream of the 
United States of Africa, which he articulated in this body of work.  
The OAU has been heavily criticised for its inability to achieve Nkrumah’s vision of a 
united Africa. The formation of the OAU was a milestone as it marked the second 
phase in the evolution and institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism, which had emerged 
in the African diaspora as a movement and ideology to advance the interests and 
aspirations of the peoples of Africa and its diaspora. As it has been argued from the 
above deliberations the debate on the question of the United States of Africa, which 
had been envisioned by Nkrumah, hinges on whether it is conceived of as a sovereign 
state replacing the existing state system in Africa, or a supranational organisation 
along the lines of the EU. The OAU charter proves that the founding fathers of the 
OAU were determined to approach unity in a gradual manner and along the lines of 
the EU. 
Although political independence was achieved for African states with the help of the 
OAU, economic independence and political stability proved far more difficult. One 
important step the OAU took towards solving the economic crisis of the continent was 
adopting the LPA in 1980, which was aimed at restructuring the economic foundation 
of Africa based on the principle of “collective self-reliance”. The LPA diagnosed that 
Africa’s economic crisis was caused by the historical injustice suffered by Africa under 
colonialism and its continued dependence on external forces”. As much as the LPA’s 
overall strategy was inward-looking, self-reliant and self-sustaining, its partial 
disengagement from the exploitative global economy was not permanent but rather 
strategically and tactfully informed. This was to strengthen Africa foundationally so that 




previous chapter’s discussion, the context within which the LPA was formulated; this 
chapter has argued that there was a historical incremental  process informed by 
Africa’s resistance to slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism that coalesced in the 
coining of the term Pan-Africanism.  
This chapter also noted the role of the external forces, especially during the Cold War, 
in influencing the debates on African unity. The formation of rival camps was partially 
influenced by their ideological affiliation to either the Western or Eastern bloc. This 
had a paramount influence on what form of unity  Africa should pursue. The end of the 
Cold War ushered in an era in  global politics, and soon African countries realised that 
they needed to look more inwardly on all fronts, starting with the liberation movements. 
At the beginning of a new millennium a new generation of Pan-Africanists emerged 
armed with the African Renaissance ideology which called for the transformation of 



















Pull and push forces during the third phase of African unity debate 
5.1 Introduction 
The fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994 signaled among many other 
things the culmination of Ghana’s independence. When Ghana gained its 
independence in 1957, the then president Dr Nkwame Nkrumah declared Ghana’s 
independence meaningless without the total liberation of Africa. South Africa was the 
last African country to be freed from the undemocratic domination of the majority by 
the minority, which was in the form of apartheid. Therefore, South Africa’s 
independence did not only signify the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, but 
it also signaled the total liberation of Africa, completing Ghana’s independence. In his 
inauguration speech as the first democratically elected president of South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela said; “never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land 
will again experience the oppression of one by another” (Mandela, 1994). Mandela’s 
words were not only in reference to South Africa, but to the rest of the continent. 
According to the second democratically elected president of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki, “the sustained combined action of Africans ensured that the wave of African 
liberation reached the southernmost tip of Africa, 110 years after the European powers 
and the US agreed in Berlin to share Africa among themselves”” (Mbeki, 2002). 
South Africa, which became the last state to join the independent African states, 
became the last country to host the OAU meeting, and it also had the honour to host 
the first AU meeting (Mathews, 2018:21). What was symbolic about this is that, South 
Africa’s independence was closing a chapter of liberation struggle in Africa and an 
opening of a new chapter of economic emancipation, promotion of democracy and the 
golden dream of uniting Africa among many other missions of the AU (Muchie, Osha, 
and Matlou, 2012:10). The transition from the OAU to the AU signaled a new era in 
the evolution of Pan-Africanism and the quest for African unity. In his opening remarks 
as the host at the formation of the AU former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki 
had the following to say:  
By forming the Union, the peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal 




destiny. Together, we must redefine this destiny for a better life for all the people 
of this continent. The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, 
cooperation among peoples of Africa and African states. We must build all the 
institutions necessary to deepen political, economic and social integration of 
the African continent. We must deepen the culture of collective action in Africa 
and in our relations with the rest of the world (Mbeki, 2002). 
The above words from the opening speech of President Mbeki bears testimony to the 
fact that the AU has more commitment to the agenda of African unity. However, this 
does not suggest that the OAU was less committed to the pursuit of African unity nor 
does it mean that it failed in its quest for African unity. It became clear from the 
previous chapter that the OAU was equally committed to the attainment of African 
unity; however, this could not take precedence over the primary goal of attaining 
political freedom across the length and breadth of Africa. Having said that, the 
transition from colonialism to independent states proved to be a challenging 
experience for most African states who soon after the honeymoon phase of 
independence were faced with challenges of development and democratisation 
(Adedeji, 2008:10).   
The new generation of African leaders led the transition from the OAU to the AU, which 
marked a significant turning point in Africa’s political and economic trajectory 
(Mathews, 2018:21). The AU is underpinned by the African Renaissance championed 
by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdulaziz Bouteflika 
of Algeria, Alpha Oumar Konare of Mali, to mention but a few (Mathews, 2018:20). 
The main objective of the AU is the promotion of integration and cooperation on the 
continent. The AU realised that one of the main components of integration and 
cooperation is the promotion of peace and security, good governance, human rights 
and democratic principles (Landsberg, 2018:3). The AU did away with the policy of 
non-interference to adopt the policy of non-indifference; making it compulsory for the 
AU to intervene in cases such as genocides, war crimes, unconstitutional removal of 
governments as well as crimes against humanity (Mwanasali, 2018:43; Mathews, 
2018: 23). The AU is strengthened by institutions such as the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), African Standby Force (ASF), APRM, Continental Early Warning 




are in line with the idea of African solutions to African problems. This will help Africa 
assert her voice and influence in the global political arena (Mathews, 2018:2). 
After over four decades since Nkrumah called for a united Africa, the leadership of the 
AU, the successor organisation to the OAU, convened in Accra, Ghana, from 1 to 3 
July 2007 for the 9th Ordinary Session of the AU AHSG (Murithi, 2008:1; Lecoutre, 
2008:45). This was to excavate the manuscript of the Grand Debate to interrogate the 
feasibility of moving towards the African Union Government, a position that was held 
by Nkrumah. At the end of the 9th Ordinary Session the AU Assembly issued the Accra 
Declaration wherein it expressed that the “ultimate objective of the African Union is the 
United States of Africa with a Union Government as envisaged by the founding fathers 
of the Organization of African Unity and, in particular, the visionary leader, Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana” also “the need for common responses to the major challenges of 
globalization facing Africa and boosting regional integration processes through an 
effective continental mechanism” (African Union 2007). Even though the end in mind 
was to get to Nkrumah’s promised land of a United States of Africa, in its road map to 
that predetermined destination it opted to use the template of the Monrovia and the 
Brazzaville groups.  After over a decade since the Accra Declaration was adopted the 
AU leadership is still grappling with the issue of whether to forge an African Union 
Government or a United States of Africa, or a Union of African States (Landsberg, 
2007:1).  
In September 1999, the OAU in Libya took a decision to create a new continental 
organisation to build on its work (Wapmuk, 2009:658). In July 2002 in Durban, South 
Africa the AU was officially launched (Mathews, 2018:15). The vision of the AU is 
outlined in the AU Handbook 2019: 
An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens 
and representing a dynamic force in the global arena. Agenda 2063, 
officially adopted by the AU Assembly in 2015, provides a collective 
vision and roadmap to build a prosperous and united Africa based on 
shared values and a common destiny. 
In line with the aims of this dissertation, the purpose of this chapter is to interrogate 
the pull and push forces during the third phase of African unity. To begin with, this 




The first section will discuss the transition from the OAU to the AU, particularly 
interested in the AU’s quest for African unity. The second section will examine the 
organs of the AU and their attempts towards expediting Africa’s quest for African unity. 
It would be naïve to assume that all the AU organs were created for the same purpose, 
but to some extent, these organs were created as building blocks for the promotion of 
African unity. The third section of this chapter is dedicated to examining the Accra 
Debate, which gave birth to the 2007 Accra Declaration, which endorsed the idea of 
the formation of the African Union Government. The fourth section will describe the 
role of  Agenda 2063 in the pursuit of African unity.  
5.2 The transition from the OAU to the AU: In search of African unity 
The OAU had shown considerable signs of failure that threatened the future of the 
African continent as it entered the 21st century. Its image had been tarnished by the 
lack of democratisation, political instabilities, bad governance, civil wars, economic 
dependency and poverty. To make matters worse, Africans were at the bottom of the 
world’s food chain, with Africans poorer than they were at the dawn of independence 
(Mathews, 2018:18). Colonialism and the external actors were often used by African 
leaders as scapegoats to justify their own incompetence, so the new generation of 
Pan-Africanists called for a paradigm shift. These leaders expressed a need to stop 
blaming colonialism and what Dambisa Moyo called ‘dead aid’ and called upon 
Africans to take control of their affairs (Mathews, 2018:20).  
The AU represents the institutional desire for political and economic integration in 
Africa (Okhonmina, 2009:86). As Olusegun Obasanjo (2001:64) argued, “the African 
Union is the final goal of African unity that leaders have been pursuing for more than 
forty years”. As aforementioned, the  quest for African unity in the form of political and 
economic integration began in May 1963 with the establishment of the OAU. The 
determination to attain African unity is spelled out in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which 
gave legal backing to the AEC, serving as a stepping stone towards the realisation of 
the AU (Okhonmina, 2009:86). 
South Africa, which had just been admitted into the OAU, noted Africa’s ascent into a 
‘new era of renaissance’ predicated on Africa’s own endeavours to transform Africa’s 
social, political and economic conditions for the better. President Mandela expressed 




Tunisia, in 1995. South Africa’s democratic transition from the oppressive apartheid 
rule to democratic majority rule paved a way for South Africa’s foreign policy. Under 
the stewardship of President Mandela South Africa’s foreign policy became 
underpinned by the promotion of democracy and human rights. Alfred Nzo, the first 
foreign minister of the new South Africa, said, “Human rights are the cornerstone of 
our government policy and we shall not hesitate to carry the message to the far corners 
of the world. We have suffered too much, ourselves not to do so”. As noted by 
Abegunrin (2009:153), South Africa’s post-independence foreign policy paved the way 
for the transition from the OAU to AU.  
President Mandela played a pivotal role in setting South Africa’s African-centred 
foreign policy; however, his successor President Mbeki took it to another level with his 
African Renaissance. The OAU’s track record on human rights and democracy was 
unsatisfactory.  It was within this context that at his first appearance as South Africa’s 
president at the OAU Summit held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999 Mbeki demanded 
the reorganisation of the OAU, which had been referred to in the international media 
as a “Dictators’ club” (Abegunrin, 2009:154). The democratisation of Africa was 
accelerated with the end of the Cold War; however, President Mbeki felt that the image 
of the OAU was not reflective of the democratic wave in Africa. President Mbeki 
believed that the organisation could be strengthened “so that in its work, it focuses on 
the strategic objective of the realisation of the African Renaissance”. As noted by 
Landsberg (2000:109), the coming to power of President Mbeki coincided with that of 
his counterpart President Obasanjo of Nigeria. Obasango and Mbeki played a leading 
role in influencing other African Heads of State and Government to take drastic steps 
towards democratisation in theory and practice. The first step was to realign the OAU 
to allow the promotion of “strong and democratic institutions”. The second step was to 
“exclude from the OAU member states whose Governments came to power through 
unconstitutional means, particularly through military coup”. The third step was to help 
democratise the military regimes that may exist on the African continent Abegunrin 
(2009:153).”  
Explaining President Olusegun Obasanjo’s support for Thabo Mbeki, Abegunrin 




It was based on the understanding that it would make the latter receptive to his 
own OAU reform agenda. The reform package of Obasanjo provides guidelines 
for the conduct of governance in Africa and to reposition the OAU at the center 
of Africa’s developmental issues. The essential elements of President 
Obasanjo’s reform package are well articulated in the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the “Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA),” adopted at the OAU Summit in Durban, 
South Africa in July 2002. With the acceptance and adoption of the Obasanjo 
reform package, a new innovation and institutional approach to prevent and 
manage conflicts in Africa has been incorporated into the AU. 
Aware of the partnership of Africa’s two most powerful leaders, Presidents Mbeki of 
South Africa and  Obasanjo of Nigeria in their endeavours to reorganise the OAU to 
reflect their own interests, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya intervened during the discussion 
on the item on collective security and conflicts on the African continent (Abegunrin, 
2009: 161). Gaddafi saw an opportunity to steer the debate in his own direction by 
inviting African leaders to convene at an Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya from 6 
to 9 September  1999 to discuss methods and strategies of making the OAU effective. 
Gaddafi’s invitation was graciously accepted by the OAU AHSG. In explaining why 
President Obasanjo and Mbeki agreed to this Extraordinary Summit called by Gaddafi 
despite Gaddafi’s long-standing opposition to most of the issues on which Presidents 
Obasanjo and Mbeki sought to refocus the attention of the OAU, Abengurin (2009:159) 
argued   that both Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki welcomed Gaddafi’s decision to 
host the summit because they realised that it was a good opportunity to relaunch the 
OAU to reflect their foreign policy goals without having to meet the huge cost involved 
in hosting an Extraordinary Summit by the OAU Secretariat. For President Mbeki, the 
summit was a good opportunity to strengthen the OAU to pursue the goal of the African 
Renaissance, which he had initiated; while Obasanjo saw the summit as a good place 
to persuade African leaders to accept his reforms agenda to further Nigeria’s historical 
role” “as a big brother and giant of Africa, providing security and attempting to spread 
prosperity as a public good of a benevolent hegemony” (Abengurin, 2009:164).   
Gaddafi also had his personal reasons for convening the Extraordinary Summit of 
September 1999. Primarily, he wanted to claim the credit for the relaunching of the 




win back the trust and confidence of black Africans, which he had lost in the early 
1980s. To be precise, in 1982 Gaddafi was prevented from becoming chairperson of 
the OAU by both internal and external alliances. The external alliance, which has been 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter was led by the West under the stewardship 
of the US driven by its Cold War campaigns. Gaddafi was operating on an open-
cheque diplomacy, which made him a pariah to many Westerners and their puppets 
of African allies (Abdul-Raheem, 2009:5).  When the turn for Libya to host the OAU 
summit in 1982 arrived many African leaders decided to stay away, which led to a 
quorum not being obtained. As a result, the outgoing chairperson, Daniel Arap Moi’s 
term was extended. Henceforth, Gaddafi saw this opportunity of hosting perhaps one 
of the most important summits in the history of the OAU as a golden opportunity to 
redeem his trust among  black Africans (Abdul-Raheem, 2009:1).  
Another reason for wanting to host the summit, which would pave a way for the 
relaunching of Africa’s continental organisation was showing his commitment to 
African unity and to the peoples of Africa. To illustrate the above claim, this study 
examines one of the incidents, which has also been dealt with extensively in the 
previous chapter; however, for the purpose of this argument, it is important to mention 
a point or two from that incident. The imperialist forces fought Libya for years using 
many tactics to foster a regime change in Libya, however, all attempts were 
unsuccessful, expect for the Lockerbie disaster that finally led to sanctions being 
imposed on Libya for 10 years. These sanctions nearly brought Libya to its knees. 
It was Pan-African diplomatic and political solidarity that helped Libya to find a 
diplomatic solution. African leaders led by  Mandela, Museveni and Rawlings resolved 
and threatened to break the sanctions unanimously, a decision which was adopted at 
the 1998 Ouagadougou summit that forced the hands of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). Therefore, as a token of appreciation to his African counterparts Ghaddafi 
renewed his interest in African unity and his belief that African states could wield more 
influence if they were to act together (Abdul-Raheem, 2009:20). As noted by Abdul-
Raheem (2009:3), Gaddafi’s gratitude to Africa led to the extraordinary session of the 
OAU in Sirte in September 1999. After extending his invitation to his counterparts at 
the OAU Summit held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999 Gaddafi addressed the members 
of the media who were gathered at this summit and said”: "The path of the United 




injustice". It became clear that the issue of African unity would be an agenda item in 
Sirte. Another reason why Gaddafi wanted to host the OAU summit in September 1999 
was because he wanted to use the platform of the summit to cement his full return to 
the geopolitics of black Africa, as well as to demonstrate his renewed commitment to 
the Pan-Africanism Project (Abengurin, 2009:159).  
The 1999 Sirte Conference,  was not the first time Gaddafi had called for the formation 
of the United States of Africa.  During the 29th anniversary celebrations of the Libyan 
al-Fateh Revolution in 1998, Gaddafi made it clear in his address to those gathered 
that he would present a proposal in accordance with the OAU charter for a unified 
Africa for the transformation of the OAU (Khamis, 2008:79). To accomplish this 
mission Gaddafi stated that he would call for an extraordinary session of the OAU. 
Understanding the magnitude of this task, Gaddafi knew that he could not attain this 
dream alone, thus he took the leadership of North Africa into his hands by forming 
CEN-SAD, with Tripoli as its headquarters. This partnership would prove vital in the 
2007 Grand Debate on the formation of the Union Government for Africa. The following 
subsection will deliberate on the Sirte Declaration, which led to the rebranding of the 
OAU and reignited the African unity debate. 
5.2.1 From Sirte to Durban: The rebranding of the OAU and the quest for African 
unity  
The critics of the AU have often likened it to its predecessor arguing that there is less 
difference between the two except for the removal of the ‘O’ from the OAU (Mathews, 
2018:33). Adedeji (2008:16), argues that transition of the OAU to the AU represents 
tremendous improvement in intra-African cooperation and integration. This 
transformation enabled by the OAU Summit held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999 
became a stepping stone for another important summit, which was hosted in Sirte, 
Libya in September 1999.  Three summits were held in the lead up to the official launch 
of the AU: 
I. “Sirte Summit (1999), which adopted the Sirte Declaration calling for the 
establishment of the AU 
II. Lomé Summit (2000), which adopted the AU Constitutive Act 





The OAU’s Heads of States and Government  convened in Sirte, Libya, from 6 to 9 
September 1999 at the invitation of the Libyan leader, President Muammar Gaddafi. 
The purpose of the summit was to “discuss ways and means of making the OAU 
effective” (Sturman, 2007:6). The Sirte Summit reignited the debate on African unity. 
To the surprise of the delegates Gaddafi dedicated  his opening speech to announcing 
a blueprint for a United States of Africa, consisting of a single African army, a common 
currency, and a continental leader with presidential powers.  
This was not the first time Gaddafi expressed the desire for African unity reflective of 
Nkrumah’s version for African unity. However, it was the first formal plea made to his 
African counterparts. Gaddafi’s plea for African unity was not the main aim of the OAU, 
and therefore it was agreed that this matter be set aside for further consideration. One 
of the successes that emanated from the Sirte Summit was agreement from the heads 
of states to replace the OAU with a new regional institution, however, this task was 
given to the Council of Ministers to draft a constitution for the new organisation 
(Sturman, 2007:6). According to Sturman (2007:6), this resulted in the AU Constitutive 
Act that which was adopted in Lomé, Togo, in June 2000, however, it was “a far cry 
from the Libyan model. It placed strong emphasis on democracy and human rights, 
condemned unconstitutional changes of government and applied a gradual approach 
to regional integration, rather than an immediate federation of united states”. 
Article 3 of the Constitutive Act  identified the following as objectives of the Union,  to: 
• “Achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the 
peoples of Africa  
• Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its 
member states  
• Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent  
• Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to 
the continent and its peoples 
• Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
• Promote peace, security and stability on the continent  





•  “Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant 
human rights instruments  
• Establish the necessary conditions to enable the continent to play its 
rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations 
•  Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural 
levels as well as the integration of African economies 
• Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living 
standards of African peoples 
• Coordinate and harmonise policies between the existing and future 
RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union  
• Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all 
fields, in particular, in science and technology 
• Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of 
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent 
•  Ensure the effective participation of women in decision-making, 
particularly in the political, economic and socio-cultural areas 
•  Develop and promote common policies on trade, defence and foreign 
relations to ensure the defence of the continent and the strengthening of 
its negotiating positions 
•  Invite and encourage the full participation of the African diaspora, as an 
important part of the continent, in the building of the Union.” 
The AU superseded the OAU and incorporated the AEC on 26 May 2001, when its 
Constitutive Act entered into force. The AU has been described as “essentially a 
merger of the largely political ambitions of the OAU and the mainly economically 
minded AEC, with the addition of some organs and with an acceleration of pace in 
economic integration” (African Union, 2007). “The AU supplanted the OAU largely out 
of a sense of frustration among African leaders about the slow pace of economic 
integration and awareness that the many problems on the continent necessitated a 
new way of doing things.”  
At the 37th summit in July 2001, held in the Zambian capital Lusaka, African leaders 
drew the road map for implementation of the AU. The OAU member states appointed 




the reporters Essy said: "I have been elected to build the structure of the African Union. 
We will try to do our best”. On the other hand, Kofi Anan the UN Secretary General, 
praised Muammar Gaddafi for spearheading this transition (CNN.com/World, 2001).  
The Durban Summit (2002) launched the AU and convened its first AHSG. A 
significant number of OAU structures were carried forward into the AU, as were all 
treaties and conventions. The AU Constitutive Act and protocols also established a 
significant number of new structures, both at the level of major organs and through a 
range of new technical and subsidiary committees. Many of these have evolved since 
2002 and some remain under development (Mathews, 2018:21). 
5.2.2 From non-interference to non-indifference: AU’s steps towards unity 
The rejection of Nkrumah’s proposal for a federation of African states was replaced by 
the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. A principle 
which was strongly advocated by the majority of states that had recently won their 
national independence (Sturman, 2007:1). In the past decades, this doctrine of non-
interference was not only an impediment to African unity, but it also brought about 
massive human rights abuses, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; by shielding those who were committing these atrocities (Mathews, 
2018:20).This stemmed from the fact that member state countries could not intervene 
in the internal affairs of member states, which meant that the mechanisms of checks 
and balances were weak or non-existent. The shift from the principle of non-
interference to non-indifference has mitigated those acts and has also assisted the 
AU’s objective of attaining African unity. Landsberg notes, the new Pan-Africanists 
also became keen to address the post-independence taboos of non-intervention, and 
articulate new norms of intervention and democratic governance (Mathews, 2018:20). 
Although Africa is still prone to various forms of intra-state conflicts,  one should not 
underestimate the strides that have been made.” 
The honeymoon years of independence were clouded by what Adedeji called “the lost 
decade”, which was the 1970s. This decade produced some of the most brutal 
dictators in post-independence Africa. As aforementioned, the lack of dealing with 
intra- and inter-state conflict during the OAU era was because of the doctrine of non-
interference. This principle of non-interference is deeply rooted in the Charter of the 




non-intervention (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 2015:129). However, its 
conceptualisation under the UN Charter remains contested by scholars of international 
law. Scholars have often drawn parallels between the UN Charter and the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence enunciated by the People’s Republic of China. The 
new China outlined these Five Principles to guide its IR. The OAU  also had its own 
concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, which was inspired 
by the UN Charter and China’s Five Principles.  
Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter states that “the UN has no authority to intervene in 
matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, while this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the 
Charter”.  Chapter VII of the Charter  authorises the UNSC to "determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take 
military and non-military action to "restore international peace and security". The 
provision which is given under Chapter VII makes it possible for the UN to intervene 
when there is a violation of human rights and humanitarian crisis as pronounced in the 
UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 2015:144).   
The principle of R2P dates back to the early 2000s from the work of the Canadian 
government, which was further endorsed by the then Secretary General of the UN, 
Kofi Annan. This principle received UNSC recognition in 2006 in the form of Resolution 
1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which “reaffirmed” the 
paragraphs on R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document (Armstrong, Farrell and 
Lambert, 2015:144). The principle of R2P has gradually been introduced at the African 
level. The OAU possessed no legal power to interfere in internal conflicts of its member 
states and this resulted in it being largely inactive on conflict resolution. However, its 
successor, the AU has been permitted to intervene in the internal affairs of its member 
states in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as stipulated 
in Article (4)h (Mwanasali, 2018:43). These provisions are outlined in the AU 
Constitutive Act, under “non-indifference” and could be viewed as the African 
equivalent of R2P” (Sharpe, 2017:8). 
While the performance of the OAU in maintaining peace and security on the African 
continent was unsatisfactory, there were measures that were put in place to promote 




body, its role in conflict resolution and crisis management has been “characterized by 
modest success in a few cases and dismal failure in most others” (Sharpe, 2017:8). A 
case in point is the Rwandan genocide, which happened under the watch of the 
Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) which was 
established in 1993, with the purpose of preventing, managing and resolving conflict. 
What enabled the Rwandan genocide was the doctrine of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states. This doctrine situated internal conflict beyond OAU 
jurisdiction and thus making it difficult for the MCPMR’s Central Organ to legally 
respond to internal conflict, except in the rare instances in which the affected state 
consented to intervention. Over and above that, the OAU Charter emphasised the 
“sovereign equality of all Member States” and “respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence” 
(OAU Charter).  The OAU’s enthusiastic adherence to these principles, in particular 
non-intervention, coupled with financial difficulties, effectively prevented it from 
tackling conflict in Africa and attainment of African unity” (Sharpe, 2017:9). 
5.3 The second Grand African unity debate and the 2007 Accra Declaration  
At the formation of the AU in July 2002, President Mbeki declared the new millennium 
as the African decade (Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2018:1). In the preceding 
sections, this study detailed the events leading to the transformation of the OAU to the 
AU to meet the challenges of the new millennium. The OAU had encountered its fair 
share of challenges, and thus the need for change.  The OAU’s 1999 Sirte Summit 
which was convened by President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya was to discuss the 
rebranding of the OAU and Africa’s quest for African unity (Mathews, 2018:21; 
Sturman,2007:7). However, the matter of African unity was set aside as it was not part 
of the summit’s agenda.  
 
Libya was not too pleased with the slow pace of the AU in forming the United States 
of Africa, a dream it resuscitated after it had been killed by the compromises on the 
formation of the OAU and its performances. As noted by Sturman (2007:146), 
whenever the matter of the United States of Africa was raised at the first few summits, 
the AU answered by citing procedural rules as the reason why Libya’s call could not 




the AU when a two-day Summit Conference was convened in Abuja, Nigeria, from 11 
to 12 November 2005, for African leaders to deliberate on the topic, “Africa and the 
Challenges of the Changing Global Order: Desirability of an African Union 
Government” (Adogamhe, 2008:3). At this conference a call was made for the 
immediate implementation of a Union Government for Africa. This Union Government 
was to “create an economic and monetary union, establish a common foreign and 
defense policy, among other strategic decisions based on a set of clearly identified 
values” (Adogamhe, 2008:3). “Given the importance and the urgency of this matter it 
was decided that a special committee would be set up to look into the possible 
constitutive, operative and institutional challenges that such a Union Government 
would engender and to work out the appropriate strategies for tackling them. This 
committee was also tasked with deliberating on how to harmonise the Union 
Government with existing African sovereign state governments. The committee was 
made up of Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia and chaired by 
Uganda”. 
 
The following broad principles of integration were laid down for a prospective African 
Union Government: 
• A union government must be motivated by a clearly identifiable set of goals. 
Part of the goals must be that of a union of the people as opposed to merely a 
union of the various structures and government; 
• The pursuit of these goals must be based on a set of clearly identifiable shared 
values and common interests which are non-negotiable; 
• These values determine the constitutive and regulative rules of the union; and 
•  Such rules are expected to be based on the principle of strict adherence.”  
 
For President Obasanjo, the major goal of the union was:  
the unity of all Africans and peoples of African descent in the Diaspora. Such 
unity is merely a means to the ultimate goal which is the development and 
transformation of our people and continent…The ultimate goals of such a 
political structure must be those of sustainable development, peace, security, 
growth, democracy and transformation of the continent” (Obasanjo’s Address, 





President Johan Agyekum Kuffuor of Ghana was appointed chairman, and in his 
opening speech he made the following remarks: 
when nations join with others in a trade or political bloc, they give up a portion 
of their national sovereignty. What people need to understand is that the 
solutions to the problems that affects them as individuals or as groups today 
can no longer be found just at the national level. We should also endeavor to 
have common democratic values so that our citizens would know what to 
expect wherever in Africa they find themselves”” (Adoghambe, 2008:3). 
He went on to say: “regional peace and security are essential for integration. Without 
them, our energies are wasted” (Lohor, This Day News Online, November 13, 2005:1 
2).  
At the AU summit in Sirte, Libya in July 2005 Gaddafi seized another opportunity to 
persuade member states of an urgent need for a United States of Africa. In his opening 
speech, Gaddafi warned that the AU would fail just like the OAU did, if it did not move 
faster towards full unification”: 
We accept from others outside Africa to reduce our sovereignty and to interfere 
in our internal affairs, but we do not accept the same in the name of African 
unity. When we talk of African unity, we say no on the grounds that it is in conflict 
with our national sovereignty... Yet, we are prepared to cede our sovereignty to 
foreign powers. We accept that, saying this is the way things work in our own 
time, but when we talk of ceding part of our sovereignty to the African Union, 
we say no our sovereignty is too big a thing to compromise (cited in Sturman, 
2007: 7). 
 
Gaddafi was openly against the EU model of regionalisation, arguing that “for a 
hundred years now, we have been calling for the United States of Africa to be 
patterned on the United States of America and not Europe” (Sturman, 2007:7). Just 
like in the 1960s, the question of leadership was raised, especially with Gaddafi calling 
for the unity that reflects that of the USA. Hence, the question was: who will be in 
charge?, in answering that question Ghaddafi said: “there will be no one in charge”, 
“stressing the need to appoint a single minister of defence to decide and supervise 
interventions and peacekeeping activities, a minister of external trade to negotiate with 




presidential powers to represent Africa on the world stage (Sturman, 2007:7). The AU 
members were sceptical of Gaddafi just like the Monrovia camp had been sceptical of 
Nkrumah. Sturman (2007:7), says other African leaders thought “Gaddafi may have 
been suffering from similar delusions of grandeur as did Marcus Garvey who 
envisaged himself as president of the United States of Africa”. On the contrary, 
Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo had envisioned the AU’s African unity similar to that 
of the EU. The distinctions will be deliberated on in the following discussions.”  
African heads of states succumbed to their host’s pressure, and they ultimately agreed 
in principle that “the ultimate goal of the African Union is full political and economic 
integration leading to the United States of Africa”. To deliberate on the points raised 
by the Libyan leader the Assembly decided to set up another committee consisting of 
heads of states to draft recommendations, appointing President Obasanjo as its 
chairperson and consisting of Kenya, Algeria, Uganda, Gabon, Senegal, Lesotho and 
Nigeria. In December 2005 just less than six months after its appointment the 
committee reported back with recommendations to an experts’ meeting of the AU 
Commission in Addis Ababa (Sturman, 2007:7). Some of the recommendations that 
emanated from the committee’s report were that the necessity for the eventual Union 
Government was not in doubt. The report also touched on the nature of the Union of 
Government by stressing that a union must be a “union of the peoples of Africa and 
not merely a Union of states and Governments”. Furthermore, the report emphasised 
the need for identifiable goals, which are based on shared values and common 
interests (An African Union Government Towards the United States of Africa, 2005).  
These recommendation from the committee prompted the AU Commission to create 
an advisory board that would review the recommendations from the committee which 
was set up in July 2005. Its review became known as the “Study on an AU government 
towards the United States of Africa”, drafted at a technical workshop in Abuja in April 
2006 (Sturman, 2007:8; Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba, 2018:2).The report on the 
study is divided into three chapters and the first chapter deals with the background to 
the deliberations. The second chapter focuses on the framework for an AU 
government; while the third chapter provides a timetable for implementation of 




Sturman (2007:7) has heavily criticised the report arguing that it lacks substance. 
Sturman went on to argue that it is purposely vague when it comes to the rationale for 
and the content of a United States of Africa. The report also failed to explain how the 
national sovereignty of the AU member states would be superseded. Another issue 
worthy of note is the link between the Union and the peoples of Africa in the diaspora. 
The report suggested that countries that are outside the perimeters of the African 
continent but with a certain population of African descendants would be accorded a 
status of Associate Members of the Union Government (An African Union Government 
Towards the United States of Africa, 2005).  
Another area of interest that was outlined in the report was the set of proposals for 
transforming the AU into an AU government. As argued by Sturman (2007:8), the 
report provided less direction on how the continental government would replace the 
regional organisations. Instead it proposed: 
strengthening the supranational powers of the AU Commission vis-à-vis its 
member states, along the lines of the European Union’s integration process. 
The document claims that creating a union government would have far-
reaching implications for existing institutions and programmes and require a 
revision of the Constitutive Act (Sturman, 2007:8).  
Chapter 3 contains a road map or timetable, starting with the adoption of the changes 
to the AU Act and institutions by 2009, drafting of a constitution of the United States 
of Africa under the auspices of an AU government from 2009 to 2012, and finally, 
adoption of the draft constitution by union members (still the member states) with 
elections at continental, regional and national levels to endorse the United States of 
Africa by 2015. Neither the purpose nor the process of these elections is clearly spelled 
out (Sturman, 2007:8). 
In January 2007, the AU hosted the 8th Ordinary AHSG at its headquarters in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia (Lecoutre, 2008:45). At this summit South Africa intervened by 
offering to host a retreat for foreign affairs ministers and an extraordinary session of 
the Executive Council to prepare for the “grand debate on the union government”, 
which was to be hosted in Accra in July 2007 (Adogamhe, 2008:3; Sturman, 2007:7). 




and hold a “Grand Debate on the Union Government” at the 9th Ordinary Summit in 
Accra, Ghana, in July 2007. Given the pressure by Gaddafi and Senegal’s Abdoulaye 
Wade this “grand debate” at the level of Heads of State and Government was deemed 
necessary especially because the African leaders had never thoroughly engaged this 
subject besides  only ever referring to studies conducted by the AU Commission and 
decisions taken previously (Struman, 2007:7). The following discussion will examine 
the Accra debate and the outcome of the Accra debate.  
 
5.3.1 The Accra Debate: Maximalism, gradualism and scepticism approach 
What was significant about 2007 is that it marked a golden jubilee of Ghana’s 
independence, so as part of the celebrations and the mounting pressure from 
Gaddafi’s camp, the AU held the 9th AU Summit in July 2007, in Accra (Murithi, 
2008:3). According to Murithi and Ndinga-Muvumba (2018:3), “the summit was well 
attended, with more heads of state and government present than at previous summits. 
Discussions were held around speeches and lengthy interventions by African leaders”. 
Symbolic of Nkrumah’s quest for African unity a debate on his vision of a United States 
of Africa was held. This debate produced two major conflicting conceptions relating to 
the questions on the future of the African continent’s organisation, the AU (Struman, 
2007:8).  The ‘maximalists’ supported the immediate creation of a Union Government, 
while on the other hand, the ‘gradualists’ advocated for a step-by-step approach, with 
the first stage being the integration of RECs (Murithi, 2008:6). There was also another 
camp, the ‘sceptics’, located between the gradualist and maximalist camps, this camp 
consisted of member states that were undecided on which camp to side with or were 
not prepared to expose their position publicly (Lecoutre, 2008:46).  
 
Addressing the South African National Assembly, the then Minister of International 
Relations, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma said that “other governments across the 
continent are consulting their respective citizenry on this matter because there is no 
consensus yet on how to accelerate the integration; hence the Grand Debate”. 
However, Assogbavi (2008:124), argued that there was little to no consultation from 
the Africa member states with their civil society organisations. Furthermore, Assogbavi 
(2008: 123) argued that the presence of the civil society organisation at the Grand 
Debate on Union Government was to represent the voices of the African citizens. 




citizens on what position should the South African take at the Grand Debate. While 
this is not a discussion on South Africa’s position, Dlamini Zuma’s speech was 
important for two reasons: (1) to consult the South African population through their 
representatives in parliament; and (2) to lay out what is to be expected or put 
differently, sum up the debates, which were already in the domain. On the latter, 
Dlamini Zuma said: 
Should we do more in rationalizing and strengthening the Regional Economic 
Communities (REC's) as building blocks? Should we strengthen the AU 
Commission's capacity by providing it with both human and financial resources 
and giving it a stronger mandate? Should we do more to mobilize financial 
resources for the implementation of infrastructure, human resource 
development, agriculture, and so on? If we agree to form the Union 
Government, which areas will fall under it? There are suggestions that we may 
start with Defence, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Infrastructure, Finance and 
Agriculture, amongst others. Others say we should go for a fully-fledged Union 
Government. If we do, there would have to be harmonization of policies in these 
areas. There would also have to be proper funding of this government. Are the 
conditions now ripe for the Union of African States? These are some of the 
questions you have to answer (Dlamini Zuma, 2007). 
The above discussion has set the background information, which will guide the 
deliberations to follow. To begin with, this section will attempt to analyse the debates 
that took place in Accra by assessing the efforts of the gradualists, maximalists and 
sceptics in shaping the future of the AU and ultimately that of its people. Furthermore, 
it will examine some of the speeches presented by the heads of state and government. 
This section will also consider the voices from the civil society groups. In addition, this 
section will discuss the items in the Accra Declaration and examine its impact on the 
future conceptualisation and implementation of the Union Government.” 
 
5.3.2 The maximalist’s call for immediate formation of Union Government    
The maximalist camp led by Libya and Senegal, came to Accra with a clear 
determination of steering the summit to their demands, which was an immediate 
formation of the Union  Government. The maximalists were fully aware that some 
would resist this call, so they were determined to forge ahead even if this meant doing 





To deliberate on their plans, the camps held informal meetings on the sidelines of the 
summit. Maximalists were determined to create a Union Government made up of 
ministries in specialised sectors, namely in finance, foreign affairs, defence, transport 
and communication, the environment, health, education, scientific research, energy, 
culture and economic and social integration. Although prepared to go on with any state 
willing to join regardless of the number, the group also entertained the possibility that 
those countries that were initially reluctant to join could do so subsequently on the 
basis of the adherence principle. It was agreed within the group in their breakaway 
sessions that they would take the floor after those who were ardently opposed to their 
project, because they did not want to be ‘taken hostage’ by the gradualists, as was the 
case during the conference that established the OAU in May 1963” (Lecoutre, 
2008:47). 
 
The plan that was presented by the maximalist group emanated from the findings of 
the Extraordinary Summit held by CEN-SAD on 2 and 3 June 2007. It was at this 
meeting that the Senegalese head of state, Abdoulaye Wade, proposed a two-tier 
Pan-African organisation in the event that the formation of the Union of Governments 
was rejected. He went on to suggest that those in support of a Union Government 
should endeavour to set up African ‘super-ministries’ in about 12 areas (the sectors 
mentioned above) (Lecoutre, 2008:48). It was, however, decided that foreign affairs,  
would be based on the principle of subsidiarity; the coalescence of these 12 areas 
would generate a ripple effect and countries that would not have joined initially, 
attracted by the subsequent benefits of unification, would join later”(Lecoutre 2007:12). 
 
The Libyan Minister of African Affairs, Ali Triki, told the journalists that were present in 
Accra that there was a need for Union Government ministers due to the distinct lack 
of power inherent in the portfolios of the AU commissioners in the current Commission. 
In the absence of a strong AU Commission, there was a need to create a Union 
Government” (Fall & Correau, 2007). 
 
The Guinean Prime Minister, Lansana Kouyaté, intervened by reiterating the need for 
the immediate establishment of an African government and he argued that the RECs 




of Senegal who was very critical of the gradualist group. President Wade believed that 
gradualists had had their chance in the 40 years since the debate on a Union 
Government took place between the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia group. The 
Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, maintained that the 
maximalist approach should be adopted immediately, because it would benefit the 
African continent especially, jointly managing certain areas at continental level in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and for the elaboration of African positions 
on the international scene”. Gadio argued that: 
if the AU’s political project is to bring Africans together, the best way of doing 
so is to form a continental executive, a Union Government. Once more, we are 
saying that there are duties that are best performed and best managed when 
they fall under continental competences. Take, for instance, Africans’ struggle 
or war against Aids, which is the greatest blight which claims African lives … if 
there were an African Aids control programme, resources could be pooled and 
the continental-scale control could be assigned to an African minister of health; 
this is feasible. 
 
Gadio went on to say: 
the sovereignty of states would not be affected. It is important to understand 
the substance of the proposal. Nobody said that at the close of the meeting 
heads of state were to return to their countries as governors, that they would 
lose their title as president, or their sovereignty. That is not the issue. Each 
country will maintain its diplomacy. But on issues of fundamental convergence 
like the reform of the United Nations system and extension of the Security 
Council, Africa already started speaking with one voice two or three years ago 
(Cited in Lecoutre, 2008).  
 
President Wade was concerned about being regarded as the reason for sowing 
division among African leaders, and because of that he adopted a position of restraint 
because he knew that intransigence might lead either to outright abandonment of the 
Union Government project or to a split in the Pan-African organisation.” 
 
Although the maximalists were prepared to forge ahead with or without the blessings 




about the maximalists being outnumbered by the gradualists.  In his address at the 
summit Gaddafi echoed the call of President Wade and other maximalist members for 
an immediate formation of a Union Government for Africa with terms of reference to 
follow. The Libyan government proposed that the African Union Government be 
structured with 14 ministries in the following areas: energy, animal wealth, maritime 
resources, education and culture, justice, environment and forestry, security, health, 
agriculture, industry, transport and communications, commerce and the economy, 
defence and foreign affairs. 
 
This call to immediately create the continental government was supported by the 
leaders of Chad, Liberia, Mali, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and 
Guinea-Bissau. When the maximalists realised that their hopes of forming a Union 
Government might be shattered, they adopted an alternative approach, which was to 
study how African states might begin the process of forming a continental government. 
Although the maximalist camp had convened before to deliberate on their shared 
vision for African unity, there were, however, still divergent views among them on the 
concept of African government. The two countries leading the group, Libya and 
Senegal, had undeniably different methodological approaches and proposals: For 
Libya there was no distinction between African government and the United States of 
Africa, while for Senegal, the African government was a step towards a United States 
of Africa. The convergence in their approach was the idea of managing jointly certain 
sectors that could not be managed effectively and efficiently by individual African 
states. Another area of divergence was in the number of sectors to be managed in this 
way: all sectors for Libya, and barely five or six for Senegal. In the end the maximalist 
group somehow disintegrated (Fletcher, 2007:4). 
 
5.3.3 The gradualists’ approach to African unity: A step-by-step approach 
The gradualists led by South Africa and Nigeria can be likened to the Monrovia group 
of the 1960s, while the maximalists can be likened to the Casablanca camp of the 
1960s. The protagonists of this group were supported by Uganda, The Gambia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mauritius. The 
common denominator among countries was their belief that the path to African unity 
should be through the cause of RECs; they strongly believed that the RECs should be 




in stages, with priority given to the harmonisation of policies and regional integration 
(Adogamhe, 2008; Wapmuk, 2009:664). 
 
Speaking on behalf of the Zambian government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Mundia Sikatana, told the news reporters that were present at the Accra Summit that:  
Zambia believes in integration, but this cannot be achieved immediately. We 
are of the opinion that, since Africa already has regional economic unions, we 
should strengthen such unions to make them our foundations. When you travel 
to a region like Southern Africa, there is no infrastructure in certain zones. Can 
you talk of continental unity when regions themselves do not have access to 
one another? We do nothing other than singing slogans, holding endless 
conferences which bear no fruit. Today, we have a unique opportunity to talk of 
an integration with a human face. We want to hope that we will start the 
integration bit by bit. If you come to West Africa, you will see what ECOWAS is 
doing for the people, same with SADC, same with the new East Africa 
Economic Community. We think that the more you try to unify regional 
communities, the better (Fall & Correau 2007). 
 
The prevalent view among the gradualists was that the AU structures and organs were 
not yet fully matured to be dismissed as being ineffective as it was perceived by 
President Wade of Senegal and his maximalist camp. Victor Manuel Barbosa Borger, 
Cape Verde’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed this view when he argued that it 
“was better to maintain the current AU structures because they were still too young to 
have had time to prove their efficacy”. He went on to advocate for regional political 
federations, which would support it in addition to a continental economic integration as 
provided for in the Abuja Treaty (Borger, 2007). Another antagonist of the immediate 
formation of the Union Government of Africa was the Ugandan President, Yoweri 
Museveni, who was also present at the Accra Summit in July 2007. Addressing the 
summit on the economic front, Museveni said:  
I support integration with everybody, [but] politically we should only integrate 
with people who are either similar or compatible with us. The whole of Africa 
has obvious incompatibilities when it comes to political integration. In East 
Africa, we have, for long, talked about a political federation. It is part of our [East 




continental level will bring incompatible linkages that may create tension rather 
than cohesion (Museveni 2007 cited in Locoutre, 2008:57). 
 
As an advocate of gradualism, President Museveni promoted the implementation of 
the principle of subsidiarity. He further called upon the states to “ask themselves which 
function may be best performed at what level – at village, district, national, regional or 
continental level. He conceded that certain functions such as trade negotiations, the 
environment, management of a defence pact and management and promotion of a 
common African market could be better performed at continental level as opposed to 
national or at the substate level” (Locoutre, 2008:57). He said: “if the AU Commission 
could concentrate on these four, instead of being everywhere and nowhere, we would 
start moving forward. We are wasting too much time pushing unresearched positions” 
(Museveni, 2007:17). Museveni then suggested that Africans approach the issue of 
African unity like “constructing one floor at the time”, in essence Museveni likened the 
process of African unity to constructing a building which has many floors.  
 
Lesotho, which subscribed to the idea of gradualism also expressed its position on the 
question of the formation of the Union Government of Africa by expressing the stance 
taken at the SADC Summit in Midrand, South Africa, in October 2006. The Prime 
Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, said “a common position that was adopted in 
Midrand was that the Union Government could be formed only when the African 
continent had attained higher levels of economic and political integration” (SADC, 
2006). At the centre of these debates was sovereignty, so for Mosisili the best option, 
was partial cessions of sovereignty (Mosisili 2007:5-7). "We recognise that Africa's 
interests would be best served through both political and economic integration. 
However, we must adopt a bottom up approach, not a top down one. The entire 
process must be people driven and not leaders driven. It must be the voice of the 
masses that determine Africa's ultimate destiny”.  
 
Mosisili urged his African counterparts to draw lessons from the European experience 
which started with economic integration using steel and coal, which he said was as a 
basis for forging stronger links.  He thus strongly believed that Africa had to start with 




build institutions and the organs of the OAU from scratch, on the other hand, the 
founders of the AU had structures and organs in place to harness the dream of unity.   
Therefore, there was a sense that the structures of the Commission and other AU 
organs that already existed should be consolidated first before moving further. On the 
other hand, the maximalists believed that the gradualists used this argument to delay 
and to avoid forming a continental government.  
This sentiment was echoed by President Mbeki of South Africa few weeks after the 
Grand Debate, which was held in Accra. Addressing the 38th Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association- African Region Conference hosted in Cape Town on July 
27, 2007, President Mbeki reiterated the position of SADC and South Africa when it 
comes to the quest for African unity in the form of Union Government for Africa. Prior 
to the Grand Debate, President Thabo Mbeki made the following remarks:  
The grand debate centred on one critical strategic question. This was, should 
we adopt a top down approach to the formation of the United States of Africa 
with its union government or should we follow the bottom up route! Should we 
set up a union government to lead this process or should we use our existing 
structures, especially the regional economic communities and the AU to effect 
the process of integration that would lead to the formation of a union 
government serving as the executive authority of the United States of Africa! 
 
5.3.4 Caught in between: The sceptics’ answer to the formation of Union 
Government 
The first Grand Debate started with three camps but ended up with only two camps: 
the Casablanca and Monrovia camps. The third group was the Brazzaville group, 
which was later absorbed into the Monrovia camp. The second Grand Debate had 
three camps, and two of those camps had clear positions with the exception of the 
third camp which adopted a stance that was difficult to categorise. However, it should 
be noted that states also seized the opportunity of the Grand Debate to cross the floor 
and switch from a maximalist to a gradualist posture. Some of the leaders were 
reluctant to take sides because they did not want to be seen as perhaps having caused 
the debate to fail. On the other hand, leaders like Benin’s Yayi Boni, showed enough 
ambiguity to make it impossible to assign them to either camp. Although Boni said at 




determination to work towards forming the Union in the very short term (Wapmuk, 
2009:666; Lecoutre, 2008:51).  
 
Egypt was in favour of the principle of a United States of Africa but called for a gradual 
approach before strengthening of the Commission in a transitory manner (Fall & 
Correau, 2007). Egypt’s stance showed a non-committal position. On the other hand, 
Algeria was notably silent, regardless of its role in the strengthening of regional 
integration. In chapter two of this study, Algeria was classified under what Khadigala 
called “the African Renaissance Coalition” (Mathews, 2018:20). Lecoutre (2008:50), 
asserts that the “countries of the north might have found it difficult to take a stance 
owing to their traditional convictions of sovereignty and the near absence of RECs in 
their region, with the exception of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)”.  Lecoutre went on 
to argue that Algeria and Egypt probably decided not to single themselves out publicly 
by toeing the gradualist line. In the summit, there were some countries which even 
delivered speeches that were entirely unrelated to the discussions. For example, Niger 
which focused on internal policy issues. 
 
5.3.4.1 Gabon drifting towards the CEN-SAD camp: from a neutral position to 
maximalists 
As aforementioned, some states often crossed the floor from one camp to another.  
In Accra, Gabon’s head of state, Omar Bongo, joined the maximalists. The maximalists 
appeared to be losing ground, and the Gabonese leader sought to rescue and 
reinforce the maximalists’ position.  President Bongo was known to be Gaddafi’s ally, 
and seeing that the Libyan leader was more or less being abandoned by the CEN-
SAD camp, the Gabonese undertook an operation to rescue the maximalists. To 
achieve this, the Gabonese president used both his personality and the political 
symbol he represented. Bongo had been present, as director of the cabinet of 
President Leon Mba, at the OAU conference in May 1963 where the issue of Union 
Government was discussed. As dean of the continent’s heads of state he also had an 
established reputation in the international arena. In short, what he had to say would 
no doubt be listened to and probably heard” (Lecoutre, 2008:52).  
 
In his address, President Bongo discussed the issue of the Union Government and a 




continent. For Bongo, a single continental government could make it possible to 
present common positions in international negotiation forums”. Bongo said: 
today, our continent, like the others, should accelerate its integration process. 
In effect, when Africa speaks with one voice, the entire international community 
listens and understands. This has led to a consensus in favour of the political 
and economic integration of Africa … we are however aware that in order to 
arrive at a broad-based consensus, we still need to reassure one another, 
dispel doubts and fears, with a view to ironing out our divergent approaches. 
Indeed, the real difficulties are technical. The formation of an African 
Government does not mean the end of national sovereignties. 
States, governments and their ministers will, at this stage, continue to have all 
their current national authorities. The federal government, with a number of 
federal ministers, will be based on the principle of subsidiarity. We should 
therefore decide which portions of sovereignty we are ready to give up (Bongo 
2007).   
 
“The Gabonese leader assured those who were afraid to lose their sovereignty that: 
the federal ministries that would be chosen will have only the powers and 
authorities bestowed on them by states. This principle implies that not all duties 
will be under the Union Government. The Union Government will only handle 
those that members states can handle better collectively than individually. That 
is what we are already doing within the context of the international grand 
debates during which either the African Group or the Group of 77 speaks on 
our behalf. The Federal Government will also be based on the principle of 
consensus. We need to present a common position when we negotiate in 
international forums like the World Trade Organisation. The Union Minister will 
defend a common position previously adopted by the 53 African ministers of 
commerce. The extra-African powers will, as such, no longer work for our 
division. Our sovereignties, which have so often been given a rough ride, will 
come out strengthened. The African Union implies that we should stand united 
before the outside world (Bongo 2007). 
 
In effect, Bongo took a remedial position in an endeavour to bring peace between the 




proposed that continental ministers be assigned temporary mandates to 
conduct negotiations on behalf of Africa, instead of vesting them with 
permanent authority under the principle of subsidiarity. The preparation of 
common positions and policies was aimed at giving Africa a better chance to 
position herself, weigh in on debates and obtain a real place in the international 
arena. Such intermediary positioning was aimed at reassuring partisans of a 
total subsidiarity by proving to them that progress was being made towards a 
Union Government, and reassuring those who were afraid that subsidiarity did 
not substantially compromise their sovereignty, given that it was just a limited 
delegation of sovereignty.  
5.3.5 The voices of the peoples of Africa through the Civil Society Organisations 
As aforementioned, the recommendations from the task team that was tasked with 
studying the feasibility of forming a Union Government reported that African unity must 
be a “Union of the African people and not merely a Union of states and governments” 
(Assogbavi, 2008:123). The task of involving the peoples of Africa was then entrusted 
on the governments of every AU member state, but according to Assogbavi (2008:124) 
was not honoured by many member states. The lack of consultation by member states 
prompted the civil society organisations across Africa to demand a seat at the table in 
Accra.  
The Civil Society Organisations made it a point to forge ahead with various initiatives 
of involving the peoples of African in the debates.  The Institute for Democratic 
Governance (IDEG), based in Accra, Ghana made tremendous efforts of hosting 
public dialogues in Accra and many other parts of Africa. The IDEG partnered with 
different non-governmental organisations to raise awareness about the debate which 
was set to take place in July 2007.  
Assogbavi (2008:125) noted that a total of nine public debates in seven countries were 
organised between 25 May and 18 June 2007. These events were held in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Several of the meetings 
included participation by policymakers who were in the process of developing their 
country positions. For example, the Centre for Policy Studies in conjunction with 
ActionAid South Africa/ ActionAid International Secretariat hosted a debate under the 
theme: “The Grand Africa Debate: United States of Africa (USAF), African Union 
Government (AUG), or Union of African States (UAS)? Seminar Debate in 




The main purpose of the debate was to “educate people on the proposed African 
government and to elicit a constructive engagement with the process of establishing 
an African government”.   
The dialogue in Johannesburg centred around three main issues, which were 
sketched out by the presenters: (1) the models of African government; (2) the road 
travelled; and (3) key drivers. The biggest of these self-funded and organised summit 
and conferences by civil society organisations was hosted in Accra wherein over 150 
people participated and representing different organisations. The consensus that 
emanated from the civil society organisation was that unity must be people driven and 
hence democracy across the continent. They called for unity which will enable the free 
movement of people and goods, unity that values human rights and acknowledges 
differences (Assogbavi (2008:126).  
5.3.6 Divergent and convergent interpretations of the Accra Declaration 
The Accra Summit brought together African leaders with divergent views, but at the 
end of the summit there was a need to present a common position. As a result, a 
drafting committee was constituted chaired by Ghana and made up of Libya, Burkina 
Faso, Namibia, Uganda and Gabon. The first draft of the Accra Declaration was not 
welcomed by several heads of state;  they argued it reflected merely a summary of the 
views of the opposing camps (Colette 2007). This forced the committee to review the 
text and present a second draft. 
 
From the onset, the purpose was mainly for member states to debate, with no intent 
of arriving at a unified decision. To its credit, the “second grand debate” was able to 
bring out the views of member states that had not officially taken sides until the 
conference. With that being said, Fletcher (2007) argued that the challenges 
associated with assessing the positions of African states on this politically sensitive 
issue remained difficult for at least two reasons. 
At the Accra summit roughly 41 heads of state and government presented their 
speeches during the debate. Of that 41, only 17 countries had openly opposed the 
formation of a continental government and only 15 states reasserted their adherence 
to a Union Government. The other nine states were in favour of the formation of the 
Union Government, but only on condition that it was done gradually. Based on these 
statistics, President Mbeki estimated that the majority were against the immediate 




states as countries that wanted a Union Government, thereby bringing the number to 
24 (Meddi, 2007). 
The Accra summit witnessed divergent and convergent views on the question of the 
formation of the Union Government, given the extreme position which was held by the 
maximalists who were prepared to forge ahead with the Union Government regardless 
of the numbers. It was thus believed that this summit had the potential of splitting the 
AU, so at the end of the summit, some people argued that everybody left Accra as 
winners in the sense that the Declaration once more reaffirmed and adopted a 
consensus-based unity and the AU was not split.  
For some, the maximalists arrived at the Accra summit with a written script from the 
CEN-SAD summit where the membership had been formed. The Libyan leader who 
spearheaded the maximalists believed that the CEN-SAD members would subscribe 
to the resolutions adopted at  Sirte in June 2007. However, things turned out differently 
at the Accra summit when Senegal, which before Accra was strongly bent on forming 
a Union Government,  bowed down and retreated from its previous stance. Thus, the 
Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi felt betrayed. It is on this basis that others believed 
that the maximalists had lost their quest (Fletcher, 2007; Wapmuk, 2009:664). As 
such, they wonder, what is the centre of gravity on the continent: the AU or the RECs? 
The one positive outcome of the Accra summit was that it enabled states and civil 
society to debate and agree to disagree. Even though civil society was not involved in 
the summit debates the sense was that the people were listening and debating the 
issue in Accra. Ultimately, the debate will continue and the scene is set for further 
deliberations in the years to come. 
5.4 Africa’s Agenda 2063: A quest for African unity 
The year 2013 marked a Golden Jubilee since the formation of the OAU, and to mark 
this celebration the AHSG convened a special summit at the headquarters of the AU 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At this summit, African leaders signed the 50th Anniversary 
Solemn Declaration wherein they echoed the aspirations of the founding fathers of the 
OAU that Africa must unite. African leaders acknowledged the past success and 
challenges of the AU and its precursor, the OAU, but rededicated themselves to 
Africa’s accelerated development and to build on the implementation of past and 
existing continental initiatives that are aimed at achieving growth, sustainable 
development and ultimately a unified Africa. Thus, it was agreed by the African leaders 




complement the strides made by the AU and the OAU by producing a shared 
framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development for Africa, to be realised 
in the next 50 years (African Union Commission, 2015). 
 
Over and above that, Agenda 2063 is a continuation of centuries of the Pan-African- 
driven aspirations, for unity, freedom, self-determination, progress and collective 
prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance. The African 
leaders also expressed a guiding vision “to build an integrated, prosperous and 
peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic 
force in the international arena” and coupled with that they identified eight ideals to 
serve as pillars for the continent in the foreseeable future. These eight ideals include: 
“African identity and renaissance, continued struggle against colonization and the right 
to self-determination, the integration Agenda, Agenda for social and economic 
development, peace and security Agenda, Democratic governance, determining 
Africa’s destiny and Africa’s place in the world” (African Union Commission, 2015:1). 
 
In addition to the eight ideals, the Agenda lays down seven crucial aspirations that are 
to propel Africa to the next level”. These include; 
1. “a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, 
2. an integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan 
Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance,  
3. an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice 
and rule of law,  
4. a peaceful and secure Africa, 
5. an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and 
ethics,  
6. an Africa whose development is people driven, relying on the potential of 
African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for the children, 
and 
7.  Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner (African 
Union Commission, 2015: 4).” 
 
For the purposes of this study, the second aspiration will be discussed in detail, to 




Agenda 2063 seeks to:  
• “Galvanise and unite in action all Africans and the diaspora around the common 
vision of a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa. 
•  Harness the continental endowments embodied in its people, history, cultures 
and natural resources, geopolitical position to effect equitable and people-
centred growth and development.  
• Build on and accelerate implementation of continental frameworks, and other 
similar initiatives. 
• Provide internal coherence and coordination to continental, regional and 
national frameworks and plans adopted by the AU, RECs and member states’ 
plans and strategies. 
• Offer policy space for individual, sectoral and collective actions to realise the 
continental vision” (African Union Commission, 2015: 6).” 
The following subsection will examine the free movement of the peoples of Africa.  
5.4.1 The free movement of the peoples of Africa 
Agenda 2063 stands on seven pillars/aspirations with aspiration 2 of Agenda 2063 
envisioning “An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of 
Africa’s renaissance” (African Union Commission, 2015: 1). African leaders have 
envisioned an Africa with seamless borders, and the management of cross-border 
resources through dialogue; and a continent where free movement of people, capital, 
goods and services will result in significant increases in trade and investments among 
African countries and strengthening Africa’s place in global trade by 2063” (African 
Union Commission, 2015). 
 
The AU’s predecessor the OAU dedicated itself especially in the early 1990s towards 
the development of Africa’s RECs, which was essentially meant to promote economic 
growth and trade between regional members with a hope of forging greater integration. 
The AU’s Agenda 2063 has outlined its vision of an integrated Africa calling not only 
for economic integration, but the integration of Africa’s people by breaking down the 
invisible and physical barriers that have limited the movement of people and weakened 




These barriers have not only prevented the economic integration, but have also 
prevented the easy flow of knowledge and skills for economic development. The 
reasons for these barriers are many and varied and include security concerns, socio-
economic disparities and fear of health epidemics. The AU’s Agenda 2063 identifies 
free movement of persons as a key ingredient for achieving other development 
aspirations. Free movement of persons in Africa is expected to deliver several key 
benefits, including”: 
• “boosting intra-Africa trade, commerce and tourism;  
• facilitating labour mobility, intra-Africa knowledge and skills transfer;  
• promoting Pan-African identity, social integration and tourism;  
• improving trans-border infrastructure and shared development;  
• fostering a comprehensive approach to border management; and  
• promoting the rule of law, human rights, and public health.” 
 
The increase in the movement of people, goods and services across borders will 
undoubtedly bring out infrastructural development which will create linkages and 
connections among African countries. In tackling the issue of the integration of Africa’s 
citizens, Agenda 2063 identified as one of its flagship initiatives the African passport 
and free movement of people, which aims to remove the restrictions on Africans’ ability 
to travel and work”.  
The AU protocol on free movement of persons envisages three specific rights: right of 
entry, right of establishment and right of residence. Below, a brief summary is given of 
these rights as: 
 
• Right of entry: Nationals of AU member states shall have the right to enter, stay, 
move freely and exit the territory of another member state in accordance with 
the laws, regulations and procedures of the host member state. African 
nationals will be granted entry without the requirement of a visa. Nationals will 
be permitted to move freely or stay for a maximum period of 90 days from the 
date of entry or such further period determined by member states, or through 
bilateral or regional arrangements. A national of a member state who wishes to 
stay beyond the period provided shall seek an extension of stay in accordance 




• “Right of Residence: Nationals of a member state shall have the right of 
residence in the territory of any member state in accordance with the laws of 
the host member state.” 
• “Right of Establishment: Nationals of a member state shall have the right of 
establishment within the territory of another member state in accordance with 
the laws and policies of the host member state. The right of establishment shall 
include the right to set up in the territory of the host member state: (i) a business, 
trade, profession, vocation; or (ii) an economic activity as a self-employed 
person.” 
During the Extraordinary Summit on the African Continental Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) held in Kigali, Rwanda in March 2018, 30 of the 55 member states of the AU 
signed the Free Movement Protocol. The signing of the Free Movement Protocol 
The African passport 
The AU leaders met in July 2016 in Kigali, and the assembly took a decision to officially 
launch “the common, electronic, biometric African passport that will facilitate free 
movement of persons across Africa”. Two years later, chiefs of immigration from AU 
member states convened in Nairobi, Kenya with an aim of reviewing the draft 
guidelines for the design, production and issuance of the African passport. This is 
indication that the AU is gradually moving towards the African Union of Governments, 
which includes the free movement of the peoples of Africa. 
 
5.4.2 Free trade agreement and the unification debate  
The journey towards an integrated African continent reached an important milestone 
on 30 May 2019 with the entry into force of the Agreement establishing the AfCFTA 
following ratification by 22 state parties. The AfCFTA Agreement had earlier been 
signed by the first 44 AU member states in Kigali, Rwanda on 21 March 2018. This 
was historic not only because it marked the third stage of the road map set out in the 
Treaty establishing the AEC of 1991 (Abuja Treaty); but also because of the speed at 
which this happened. Never before, in the treaty making history of the AU has a legal 
instrument of such nature received 22 ratifications in such a short period of time.” 
 
The initiative aims to transform Africa’s laws, which remain generally restrictive on 




to promoting the issuing of visas by member states to enhance free movement of all 
African citizens in all African countries (Gumede, 2020). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Conclusively, this chapter has examined the transformation of the OAU into the AU, 
which was spearheaded by the new generation of Pan-Africanists, which Khadiagala 
dubbed “the African Renaissance coalition”. This generation was determined to usher 
Africa into a new millennium with an African-centred approach predicated on the 
values of African revival on all fronts. These reforms were led by President Mbeki of 
South Africa and supported by President Obasanjo of Nigeria calling for the promotion 
of democratic values and good governance, among many other things. On the other 
hand, President Gaddafi of Libya felt that the step-by-step approach, which was 
proposed by Mbeki and Obasanjo was tantamount to derailing Africa’s dream of 
attaining some form of political and economic integration, which he argued should be 
reflective  of the USA as opposed to that of the EU. 
 
The Damascus moment in the transformation of the OAU came when Libya hosted 
the OAU Summit in September 1999. This was an opportunity for both the camps: 
Mbeki and Obasanjo’s camp and on the other hand, the Gaddafi camp, which was 
predominantly made up of CEN-SAD members. For Mbeki’s camp this was an 
opportunity to present its views on how the AU should be formed without having to pay 
for hosting the OAU session. On the other hand, Gaddafi as the host saw an 
opportunity to throw into the agenda the issue of African unity, which had not been 
part of the agenda.  
 
These camps would continue to push for their interests insofar as the make-
up/structure of the AU was concerned. The 2007 Accra Declaration was a result of a 
Grand Debate between the maximalists, who were led by Libya and Senegal, and the 
gradualists who were led by South Africa and Nigeria calling for the gradual approach 
to the attainment of the Union Government of Africa. The former called for an 
immediate formation of the United States of Africa and were even prepared to forge 
ahead with any AU member state willing to join this single federal state with a 





The themes that dominated the Grand Debate are more or less similar to the ones that 
had preoccupied the early generations of Africans. These include the questions of 
leadership, time frame, logistics and preparedness of Africans to embark on this route. 
What was significant about this summit was the inclusion of non-state actors in the 
deliberations.   
 
The new generation of Pan-Africanists was able to do away with the policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of  member states, which was highly valued by the 
OAU. Furthermore, democratic institutions were established to strengthen and 
promote democracy in Africa. However, all these policies were adopted before the 


























Conclusion and summary of the findings 
6.1 Overview of the research 
“Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray 
it” (Fanon, 2004). Generations of Pan-Africanists, from political activists, politicians, 
economists, philosophers, literati to the musical activists have all endeavoured to 
identify and fulfill their mission. Mathews (2011:29), divided the generations of Pan-
Africanists into four generations:  
• “The Pan-African generation 
• The nationalist generation 
• The globalist generation 
• The renascent generation, or new Pan-Africanists.” 
The quest for African unity has been a common denominator among all four 
generations of Pan-Africanists and the first generation was mandated with a task of 
liberating Africans from slavery, colonialism, apartheid and all other forms of racial 
oppression. The first success of this generation was encapsulated in the words of 
freed slaves at the abolition of slavery: “Free at last, Free at last, Thank God almighty 
we are free at last” (King Jr, 1963). This generation completed its mission by liberating 
South Africa in 1994 from the apartheid regime, and the culmination of this mission is 
encapsulated in President Mandela’s inaugural speech: “Never, never and never again 
shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by 
another” (Mandela, 1994).  Another credit that is given to this generation was the 
formation of the OAU in May 1963, which played a crucial role in driving the decolonial 
project.  
The second generation was tasked with nation-building, which followed immediately 
after independence. While this generation was determined to build its national identity, 
it was, however, confronted by the legacies of colonialism such as multi-ethnic groups, 
religious and political interests, and class. Often this led to the ’One-man rule’ and 
’One-party state’, which ushered in an era of authoritarianism and economic 




The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era in global politics and the failure of 
nation-building  in Africa, which came with economic difficulties. Therefore, the third 
and fourth generations of Pan-Africanists set out to rise above these challenges. The 
third generation recognised that the world had changed from the Cold War political 
divide into a more globalised world, hence this generation of Pan-Africanists viewed 
themselves as global Pan-Africanists rather than nationalists. The fourth generation 
was inspired by what Khadiagala called “the African renaissance coalition”, and it was 
tasked with transforming the OAU which had realised its aim of achieving Nkrumah’s 
political kingdom, but failed to add on to that political kingdom as Nkrumah had hoped 
(Mathews, 2011:30). This generation revived the dream of African unity, which was 
neglected under the second generation (Mathews, 2018:20).   
Nkrumah, who was the main proponent of African unity, called for the immediate 
formation of a single federation, and thus gave his African counterparts two options: 
unite or perish (Nkrumah, 1963). Nkrumah further maintained that, “independence is 
only the prelude to a new and more involved struggle for the right to conduct our own 
economic and social affairs; to construct our society according to our aspirations, 
unhampered by crushing and humiliating neo-colonialist control and interference” 
(Obeng, 1997:20). However, Nkrumah’s call was met with fierce rejection by his 
counterparts who opted for a gradual approach towards unity. 
The debates on African unity started in the African diaspora over three centuries ago.  
Over the years, the quest for African unity has been a contested aspiration for many 
generations of Pan-Africanists. The debate has had very little to do with whether Africa 
should unite or not, but it has always been about how to unite and when. In the era of 
slavery, African unity was about collaborative efforts to break free from the chains of 
slavery and to form a community of freed men and women. Moreover, settling in the 
so-called free towns was not every slave’s dream. While some yearned for freedom 
others yearned for a freedom that would see them cross the oceans to head back 
home to Africa. While this study did not romanticise the idea of slaves finding the 
means to return to Africa while bearing tags of slavery or of freedom, it was, however, 
stressed that the sentiments of Africa, the motherland, lived among the free and 
enslaved Africans. This created a notion of an African  personality, which meant 
Africans could take pride in knowing that they were equal humans in the face of racism 




Nevertheless, given the scope of this study the debates on political and economic 
integration/unity on the African soil has had the benefit of over 40 years of the 
combined experience of the OAU and AU, during which Africa has faced multiple 
economic, social and political challenges on the national, regional and global fronts. 
Among them are widespread poverty and the devastating social and economic 
impacts of such pandemic diseases as HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. Its 
collective responses to these challenges have repeatedly affirmed the logic of unity 
and integration as formulated in the Charter of the OAU (1963); the LPA and the Final 
Act of Lagos, (1980); the Abuja Treaty, (1991); the Sirte Declaration, (1999), the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, (2000), and Agenda 2063. These instruments stand as 
galvanising landmarks for integration in the face of Africa’s political and economic 
challenges. Despite these defining moments, the debate on the future of the AU is as 
divergent as it was when the OAU was established in 1963. 
Key research findings 
A lot has been discussed in this study, but the key finding can be summed up as 
follows: 
1. African unity is not a linear process, meaning it has always generated debates, 
which ultimately led to various steps in pursuit for African unity. For example, 
the formation of the OAU instead of a Union of Government for Africa/ the 
United States of Africa.  
2. The African unity debate started in the African diaspora, and it gained critical 
mass in Africa post-independence. The Back to Africa debates represent the 
first African unity debates. 
3. The major issue in all three phases identified in the Pan-African unity debate 
has been the issue of sovereignty. Most of the African leaders who were 
opposed to the idea of immediate formation of the Union Government for Africa 
has been on the basis of: (1) unguaranteed sovereignty for member states; (2) 
inadequate or lack of proper institutions and policies to guarantee successful 
integration.  
4. In all three phases, the idea of having a united Africa has been well embraced 
apart from the logistics and timeframe set for the formation of the United States 




5. The incremental approach to African unity has always been the widely 
supported view/option. This is evident with the formation of African Economic 
Community (AEC), which was established under the Abuja Treaty.  
 
Future areas of study 
Since the adoption of Agenda 2063 in January 2015, there has been numerous 
initiatives from different AU organs to leapfrog towards the attainment of the 
aspirations set out in Agenda 2063. For example, the African Union Peace and 
Security Council declared 2020 as the year of “silencing the guns” in line with 
aspiration 4 of Agenda 2063. While this represented an aspirational target, however, 
it was never met. Therefore, there is a need to study how Agenda 2063 will foster 
African unity and what can be done by member states to assist in meeting the targets 
set out in Agenda 2063.  
6.2 Conclusion 
Conclusively, this study has traced the evolution of the Pan-African unity debates and 
it has divided it into three phases, which have been identified by Murithi (2008:1) as 
the phases in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism. In Murithi’s classification the 
first phase in the evolution of Pan-Africanism began with the establishment of the Pan-
African Congresses in 1900. The second phase is marked by the formation of the OAU 
in 1963, and the third phase is denoted by the transformation of the OAU into the AU 
in 2002. The scope of this study allowed this study to examine six decades of 
convergent and divergent views in the debates on African unity and this study provided 
a historical background to these debates. This historical background detailed the first 
encounter of Africans in the diaspora with the ideas of Pan-Africanism and unity, which 
was punctuated by sentiments of returning to Africa propagated by Marcus Garvey, 
who got the idea from Blyden. 
Moreover, this study detailed how the transplantation of Pan-Africanism from the 
diaspora to Africa brought about a paradigm shift in the concept of African unity. The 
debates on African unity took four forms: First, the time frame, meaning: when should 
this unity be pursued? Second, how will this unity be pursued? Third, what form will 
this unity take (single federated option, vs the unionisation – or incremental, 
approaches to African unity). Finally, the issue of sovereignty and nationalism seemed 




who will be entrusted with the sovereignty of each member state of the federal 
government, and what powers will be possessed by the nation-states?      
This issue led to rivalry between the three camps which had emerged following 
independence in Africa: the Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia camps. The 
Monrovia group merged with the Brazzaville group making them the largest group, 
although the Brazzaville group was never dissolved after joining forces with the 
Monrovia group. The Monrovia group was in favour of a gradual approach to African 
unity, which would start with economic cooperation at the regional level; while on the 
other hand, the Casablanca group under the stewardship of Nkrumah  called for 
immediate formation of a single federal African government similar to that of the USA. 
Nkrumah  argued that if Africans did not unify, they would be vulnerable to the 
imperialist forces, which he argued were stronger than ever before because of their 
experience, now masked as neocolonialism, which he regarded as the last stage of 
imperialism.   
On the other hand, the Monrovia camp encouraged Nkrumah’s view by arguing that 
African states had just attained their independence, and thus, the single federal 
government would curtail their hard-earned sovereignty. Moreover, the Monrovia 
camp argued that there were no institutions to support Nkrumah’s dream of a single 
federal government; while also showing mistrust of Nkrumah by claiming that he 
wanted to be the President of the United States of Africa. Furthermore, the Monrovia 
camp maintained that a gradual approach would enable African states to build from 
the bottom-up, which would strengthen the Union Government of Africa as opposed 
to from top-bottom.   
These rival camps had common platforms that brought them together such as the 
United Nations African group, but the issue of unity was never discussed in that forum. 
The diplomatic skill of Haile Selassie led to the 1963 Addis Abba Conference, which 
was aimed at bringing together these rival groups.  A total of 32 African Heads of 
States and Government convened in Addis Ababa in May 1963 to give birth to the 
OAU, which marked the second stage in the evolution of Pan-Africanism. Although it 
was formed as a compromise between the Monrovia and Casablanca groups, the 
OAU, however, marked a turning point in the quest for African unity and the debates 




pursued through a step-by-step approach, which entailed forming the RECs. These 
RECs were regarded as stepping stones for a larger Union Government of Africa. 
Second, the debates on African unity were now policy debates discussed in one forum 
as opposed to different platforms, which often fueled the division further. The OAU 
stressed the importance of sovereignty by adopting policies such as non-interference 
in the internal affairs of the member states.    
While the method of attaining African unity was debated, the desire and willingness to 
be united was never in doubt as every member expressed the desire of being part of 
a united Africa. The OAU had encountered its fair share of successes, but those 
successes were soon clouded by its failures to deal with undemocratic changes of 
governments among its member states such as the civil wars and territorial disputes, 
which led to intra-state wars. Poverty and economic challenges continued across the 
continent and the abuse of power by some heads of states led to some labelling the 
OAU as the dictator’s club, which was formed with the intention of shielding the 
autocratic leaders. The nationalists’ projects had resulted in one-party states and one-
man states, wherein heads of states became presidents for life.  
The Cold War, which played a crucial role in the formation of the rival camps and in 
turning the African continent into proxy wars came to an end in 1989, when the Berlin 
wall collapsed. This signaled a new global order, which would be overseen by America 
as it emerged from the Cold War as the only uncontested superpower. With that being 
said, this also ushered in a new era in Africa as the new generation of Pan-Africanists 
emerged and unclouded by the Cold War lenses they called for a global Pan-African 
movement. When Pan-Africanism landed on the African shores after the 1945 
Manchester Pan-African Congress it lost  touch with the diaspora. Another issue that 
compelled the OAU to reform itself was the economic devastation that the African 
countries, especially in the global south, experienced in the 1970s. The decade which 
Adedeji (2008) has labeled as the “lost decade”. The OAU adopted the LPA in 1980 
and the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which was reinforcing the LPA and establishing the 
AEC. The OAU attained its decolonial goals with the ending of apartheid when 
Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994) gained their independence.  
South Africa did not waste any time in joining the OAU and it expressed the need for 




Renaissance ideals called for the transformation of the OAU to the AU, which would 
promote democracy, good governance, economic development, and peace and 
security, among many other things. The AU was inaugurated in 2002 in Durban, South 
Africa, however, the task of transforming the OAU began in Tunis in 1999, and the key 
moment in the transformation of the OAU was at the Sirte Conference hosted by 
Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi seized an opportunity by calling for the formation of the 
United States of Africa. The transformation of the OAU into the AU marked the third 
phase in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism and the search for African unity.  
The AU built strong institutions that would help Africa to attain the total unity which 
Nkrumah had envisioned and heavily  advocated for by Gaddafi. When the Libyan 
leader realised that the partnership between Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo was 
taking the continent on the gradual approach he began demanding  African unity. As 
such, in 2007 the Grand Debate was held in Accra, which was also meant to pay 
respect to Nkrumah and the peoples of Ghana as it was their golden jubilee since 
independence.  
The Grand Debate produced three camps: the maximalists led by Senegal and Libya, 
the gradualists led by South Africa and Nigeria, and last and by no means least, the 
individualists who were undecided on which side to support. Libya questioned the 
willingness of the presidents to attain unity.     
At the golden jubilee of the formation of the OAU the then AU Commission 
Chairperson, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma called on Africans to reflect on the strides 
that had been made and reiterated the call for Africa to unite. The Solemn Declaration 
which was signed at this conference led to the conception of Agenda 2063, which is 
Africa’s blueprint for the next 50 years. However, Africans have to start walking the 
talk. The debates on African unity demonstrates a willingness by the African leaders 
and their people to form the Union Government of Africa, which Murithi (2008:4) 
regards as the fourth phase in the institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism, should it 
materialise.  
One of the most notorious leaders in African history, Von Bismarck, famously 
remarked that, “when a man says he approves of something in principle, it means he 




should move from a theoretical debate to more practical steps without undermining 
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